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The dissertation explores

a

postulate common to both Max Weber and

Hans Blumenberg that modern organizations gain
their intense

motivational power from the anxieties created in the modern
era by the
disenchantment of nature and the death of God.
omnipotence gave rise to

a

The doctrine of

modern theodicy problem, experienced as an

anxiety that the conditions of goodness must henseforth be self-

consciously created by the self-assertion of large associations of
interdependent people.
carries with it

a

This self-conscious forsaking of omnipotence

high price.

In the work of Immanuel Kant natural law

ethics and economics are no longer available and our associations tend
to be bureaucratic.

The dissertation follows the thought of both practical reformers

and philosophers in developing this characterization of modern

organization.

What emerges, alongside their positive accounts of the

relation between freedom and organization, is

a

darker picture of

profound anxiety and melanoholy.

Particularly instructive is Kant's

interpretive text on Cain and Able in
which modern people are identified
with the brother who murders. Kant's
insights are followed by those of
Soren Kierkegaard, Rene Girard, Elton
Mayo, Martin Heidegger, Michel
Foucault, and others to explicate the
structure of mimetic desire as it

operates in modern large-scale organizations.

These intense mimetic

structures do not mean that freedom in large
organizations is

a myth,

but it does mean that the self-conscious
assertion of freedom involves

a

profound spiritual struggle which can result as
easily in demonia as in
release.

Thus the final chapter employs a Weberean
typology to show how

freedom in its various organizational guises has so far
remained elusive
while the champions of freedom have tried to embody
it in ever more

inclusive organizational structures.
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation explores a
postulate common both to Max Weber

and to Hans Blumenberg that modern
organizational life is

a

response to

and accommodation with the disenchantment
of nature, or, in another
vocabulary, the death of God.

will not so much test this postulate
as

I

discuss what it actually means;

I

will explore it, deepen it, and

specify it more closely.

What Weber, emphasizing its negative aspect,
calls disenchantment,
Hans Blumenberg, striking

a

positive note, calls self-assertion.

will become clear in Chapter IV.

This

Blumenberg was referring to

Heidegger's infamous Rectoral Address, and wished to counter
some of the
more destructive directions which the doctrine of
self-assertion had

recently taken, but without for all that giving up on it.

Blumenberg

especially rejected the notion that modernity needed, through selfassertion, to be ruthlessly destroyed.

He argues,

first of all,

nothing could be more modern than self-assertion, so that it is
tool for defeating modernity.

that
a

poor

But he argues further that self-assertion

is not an optional stance in the world,

but follows directly from

western civilization's long meditation over the problem of theodicy; how
is it that bad things happen to good people,

that good things happen to bad people?

and inversely, how is it

From Blumenberg and Weber we can

learn that the modern quest for freedom is deeply rooted in this

1

2

question of theodicy.

What

wish to understand is how
freedom and

I

theodicy have become implicated
in the modern large-scale
organization
and how that entanglement has
worked to frustrate our aspirations
for
both justice and freedom.

This raises clusters of themes
which

I

will explore below.

I

have

anchored these themes in two poles: in
the phenomenon of organization
and in the later works of Immanuel
Kant.

These two work in the

dissertation as recurring foci, orienting
the other themes.

But they

also take on different persona depending
upon the context within which

they come up.

m

the context of civil service reform they
seem

straight-forward and benign, in
they appear sinister, and in
profound.

I

a

a

context of organizational pathology

context of philosophical rigor they seem

believe that organization is the way disenchantment
or the

death of God is actually experienced, and that our
experience is

ambiguous on this score.

I

found that this theme comes up and is made

especially clear in the works of Immanuel Kant.

Through the focus on organization it became difficult to discuss
any one theme without discussing the rest.

Kant reinforces the concern

with both assertion and with organization, but then further introduces
the themes of freedom and anxiety, and through them,

the problem of theodicy.

returns again to

Kant also introduces, through his focus on

Cain and Able, the concern with mimetic desire and collective murder and
he shows how these things are connected to self-assertion,

freedom, and

.

progress.

with these the.es on the
table, the work of Soren

Kierkegaard, Rene Girard, and Elton
Mayo all become themes, and they
in
turn call forth the work of
Blumenberg, Heidegger, and Michel
Foucault
Each of these thinkers, in turn,
implicate Immanuel Kant and especially
his relation to objects.
The experience of organization
is first of all
an experience about the modern
relation to objects, but also the

experience of organizing people in such
this relation properly.

what

I

way that they can experience

a

am trying to understand is why the
quest

for freedom can so often come down to
this search for the truth of

objects and of ourselves.

In the first chapter

I

study a number of American organizational

reformers and strategies and their links to the
Protestant religious
problematic, especially the problems surrounding the
question of
theodicy.

This chapter, while remaining at

introduces

a

formulation.

a

fairly pragmatic level,

number of Kantian themes which call for
Thus in the second chapter

I

a

more rigorous

study the works of Immanuel

Kant, especially Kant's Critique of Tel enl ocrica 1 Jnrtgmpni- and his very

revealing interpretive text on Cain and Able.

Kant understood as well

as anyone that nature had become disenchanted,

and how and in what sense

this situation called for something like modern self-assertion.

It is

my contention that Kant's doctrine of freedom makes no sense without the

profound ambiguity he uncovered in the Genesis story and the melancholy
he experienced over the French Revolution.

4

Having articulated Kant's
pure theory of

a

free self-assertion and

its relation to organization,
in the third chapter

I

look to Soren

Kierkegaard and the humanistic
management movement for insights
into the
pathological potentialities of modern
organizations.
I briefly compare
the religious interpretive mode
which I prefer with a secular

Aristotelian mode to show why

I

find mine superior.

The forth chapter overtly addresses
the discussions of Hans

Blumenberg in order to put pressure on the
critical presuppositions of
the previous three chapters.

In Blumenberg the disenchantment
of nature

is specified more closely as the history
of the doctrine of omnipotence.

Once this history is spelled out, argues Blumenberg,
one will see that

self-assertion in the modern age is

a

legitimate attempt to assert human

goodness against the empty echo of omnipotence.

While the point is well

taken and appreciated, the discussion of pathological
organization makes
it impossible to simply endorse the modern era,

potential rather than imperative progress.

I

even when one speaks of

therefore engage

Blumenberg with two other texts, one by Martin Heidegger and one by
Michel Foucault, in order to put pressure on his optimism.

The last chapter pays tribute to

theorist, Donald Mcintosh.

review

a

recently retired political

Using Mcintosh's discussions of Max Weber,

I

in ideal typical terms the organizational strategies put forward

in the first and third chapters.

Each organizational move,

I

believe,

was an attempt to locate freedom and goodness together and to give them

5

simultaneous organizational
expression.

Eac h successive attempt to
do

this articulated the point of
moral freedom in a more inclusive
collective entity; the church,
the individual, the college,
the

profession, the corporation, and
the state.

Mcintosh's work helps us

understand, much as Hegel's truth
comes finally to that which it
always
already was, how modern organization
always depended on the charisma
of
weaponry, and finally on nuclear
weaponry.

Finally,

an earlier reader of the third and
fifth chapters has

complained that there is nothing here except
textual exegesis and little
contribution of my own.
opposed to offensive.

My method of interpretation is defensive
as
That is, in many sports one defends against
the

opposing offense by being assigned
locked in.
Here

I

It

"man."

One stays with one's man,

raises the intensity; one loses oneself in the
play.

try to stay with

myself within it.
reply.

a

Thus

a

thinker, to follow a thought, and to lose

I

seldom lay out

thinker's position and then

a

The purpose was to ask questions whose answers

like to know.

I

would have to admit that

I

I

really would

got something less than

answers from this study and from my own interpretive techniques.
have gained

a

deeper insight into my own questions.

But

I

CHAPTER

NATURE
,

FREEDOM,

AND

I

ORGANIZATION

—Introdiir.t
In this chapter

organization in

a

I

IN

i

19th

CENTURY

AMERICA

on

will explore the problem of nature, freedom,
and

preliminary way by offering an interpretation of three

texts: Perry Miller's Nature's Nation, the speeches
and letters of the

Land Grant College advocate, Jonathan Baldwin Turner, and
the speeches
and letters of the Civil Service reformer, George William Curtis.

The

first section will trace what Max Weber called the disenchantment
of

nature as it occurred in Miller's version of American Puritanism, the

second and third sections will discuss two possible responses to

disenchantment and their organizational implications.
Protestant religious disputes

I

By focusing on

hope to avoid two pitfalls; first, the

naive view that science, technology, and organization were simply better
ideas whose time had come, or, second, that these things were simply

elitist impositions upon exploited people.

7

Faith and Enl ightenmpnf

i

n

Am^ri™

During the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, Americans went
through their own version of Hegel's
Faith-Enlightenment dialectic.

The

purpose of mentioning it here is not so much
to establish the relevance
of continental European thought for American
political theory as to

better appreciate how we came to have the
organizations that we do.
Hegel's dialectic is quite fair when it deals with
faith.

Yet somehow

when one reads it, it is hard to escape the impression
that faith is
moment in the history of Enlightenment.

a

Even though the consciousness

which faith possesses is given an internal and completely

phenomenological reading, the story is told from the point of view of
someone who already knows that faith cannot possibly win.
closes off our taking faith seriously.

This actually

When we look back at the past or

try to construct geneologies of present day organizations, we tend to
look for the rise of Enlightenment structures, and even when we

criticize or deconstruct these structures, it is Enlightenment that we
privilege.

Whenever we do this, we judge the history of organizations

more in terms of their future than their past.

But in their own day Enlightenment figures were actually far

outnumbered by people who tried to move according to the dictates of
faith.

In fact the premise,

so familiar to us,

that faith's fate was

already sealed was simply not available to the participants.
faith was not,

That is,

for its adherents, a historical moment which could not

8

sustain itself.
of problems,

entire lives.

Faith rather confronted the
participants with

range

a

options, and ways of being; out of
which they had to create

One might, then, ask the questions
of Hegel's dialectic

at a more local level and with an eye
toward discovering exemplary

figures who experienced the conflicts of
faith and enlightenment but are

interesting precisely because they did what world
history cannot do,
they lived their lives in

a

state of unsustainable tensions.

such people much as we do characters in

a drama.

they remained true to their dramatic situation.

We judge

We ask whether or not
The obvious point here

is just that people do not live their lives at
the level of world

history, the level of the problem of sustaining an entire
epoch, but at
the level of sustaining their own best insights, ambitions,
plans, and
loves.

I

will now turn to the problem of freedom and hope.

If in philosophy our modernity begins when representations no

longer mirror their objects,

1

in spiritual things it begins when

estrangement from paradise is no longer

sign of our disability, but

a

becomes the basis for our systematic activity.

It becomes a blessing.

Earlier Dante had faced this estrangement but comprehended it as

a

temporary blindness; what we see is not fundamentally different from
what we cannot see.

Hope--and Christianity must offer hope--resided in

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason Norman Kemp Smith, trans.
St. Martin's Press, 1965), A-34/B-50; A-92/B-125--A-95/B-129;
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: Vintage Books, 1973)
2. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
Talcott
Parsons, trans., (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), 88.
Larry
Peterman, "Machiavelli s Dante and Sources of Machiavellianism" Polity
20 (Winter 1988) 254.
1.

,

(New York:

.

,

,

1

,

9

the faith that ultimately our vision
would be made complete.

Of course,

this means Dante had to be close
enough to the Beatific vision to feel
its absense; the threat of its being
withheld was a compelling

experience.

It was not totally and simply
other.

But by the time of

the New England Puritans, God had indeed
become too radically Other to

support Dante's sort of hope.

Human and divine vision were in principle

incommensurable, and the Puritans did not look
in this direction for
hope

In contrast,

the loss of paradise in Milton's Paradise

different sort of task.

T.osf

sets

a

The fall from grace opens up opportunities, and

it is these which now constitute hope.

There are exertions one might

make, or rather, that one must make if one does not want
to abandon
hope.

We are placed, Puritans believe, in

cultivation and improvement,

3

a

wasteland which requires

and this is the conception of nature

through which one best approaches the twin notions of hope and freedom
in religious thought.

For the wasteland to be

a

dynamic and compelling

image for Puritans, it must be, at least in principle, possible for

America to become

a

paradise.

If paradise were not possible then

cultivation and improvement would be
inverse is equally true.

a

merely futile gesture.

But the

The possibility of paradise would move no one

unless it were bolstered by our being situated in

a

wasteland.

For the

3. Peter N. Carroll, Puritanism and the Wilderness: The Intellectual
Significance of the New England Frontier 1629-1700 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1969), 14.

10

formula to work, success must be
rather difficult, yet demonstrably

attainable

Two sets of problems need to be
mentioned here.

involves spirituality, the second freedom.

The first set

The formula of cultivation

and improvement sets a specific context
for how these things might be

experienced in modernity, while they severely
modify our belief in the
formula

First, the formula of cultivation and improvement
answers a

spiritual insight, yet puts that insight to work in
the everyday world
of work.

The everyday world is held together by

a

constellation of

habits and manners, the highest expression of which—
habits informed by

spirit— is ethics.
a

But spirituality enters the work-a-day world only at

great cost to itself.

It is always the uncanny guest,

an outsider.

It can not really explain itself in ethical or legal terms.

be contained in ethical categories.

4

It cannot

It sometimes even becomes a sort of

scandal5 to the world of habits and manners, and it is certainly

possible for habits and manners, including churchgoing, to maintain

4. Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling
Howard Hong and Edna Hong,
trans ., (Princeton, N J Princeton University Press, 1983).
For instance
see p. 115, "Abraham cannot speak, because he cannot say that which
would explain everything (that is, so it is understandable) that it is
an ordeal such that, please note, the ethical is the temptation."
5. I have borrowed the term scandal from Rene Girard, The Scapegoat
Yvonne Freccero, trans. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
,

:

:

,

1986)
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themselves at the expense of the
spirituality which animates them.
Thus habits and manners might maintain
themselves for some time without,
for all that, constituting a living
ethos.

m

this situation we would

expect manners to resent being reminded
of spiritual things; this may
be
the case in the late 20th Century United
States.
But earlier the

problem was less vicious.
hundreds, say, it was more

I

One suspects that in the early eighteen
a

question of contradictory pressures.

will mention three instances of such pressure,
all of which

could probably plague any religion, but which seem
to especially plague

Calvinism and later forms of American Protestantism.
from spiritual motives can, especially when

a

First, things done

religious person

personally benefits, always be interpreted as self-serving.

Since the

spiritual defies rational or ethical language, the believer might feel
slandered, but would still be unable to offer

a

compelling defense.

For

the same reason, the world which American Puritans created by

cultivating and improving the wilderness could never be adequate to the
spiritual vision which called it forth.
gained,

The Christian insight, once

inspired people with an intense and simple vigor, yet, its

success continually unnerved it.

The vision seems to be always turning

stale; turning into an array of acquisitive manners through which

spirituality could only penetrate in the form of
formulas.

a

recitation of

American Protestants recognized this problem early on and

George W.S. Trow makes this point in a very different context in his
"Annuls of Discourse: The Harvard Black Rock Forest," New Yorker June
6.

,

11,

1984,

44.
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much of the history of American
Protestantism involves

a

series of

strategies designed to meet it.

A third pressure, arising, again, from
the same source, is that
the spiritual project of cultivating and
improving the American

wilderness actually ruins the wilderness and
renders the spiritual
project increasingly difficult.
say,

This involves social decadence.

their clothing people tend to dress for the work
at hand.

everyone dresses to confront

a

How

wilderness is usually courser and less

pretentious than the way they dress to confront
intellectual circle.

In,

a

commercial world or an

As colonial life became more sophisticated

hundreds of small nuances in etiquette would reinforce intricate

patterns of social divisions and specialized pleasures.

All this would

make the simple and vigorous piety of the early days much more remote.

Already by 1700 the second generation of New England Puritans were

bedeviled by decadent temptations.

By 1837 Nathanial Hawthorne's

allegorical "Celestial Railroad" evoked the specter of

a

streamlined and

easy religiosity through which true pilgrims, like those Bunyan

describes in Pilgrim's Progress

,

might pass only by

reader suspects, myopic act of will.

a

heroic, and, the

But along with decadence, many

Americans were beginning to sense, in the eighteen hundreds especially,
that the lands and forests and rivers were themselves being irrevocably

mauled.

This line of thought was troubling; it arises from a spiritual

insight, but throws into question the most cogent available expression
of that same spiritual insight.

It thus always manages to sound

13

righteous and even didactically
pr0 p he tic when it is uttered,
especially
by abolitionists, but always
remains an other voice, usually
romanticism.

I

will discuss this more below.

deeply troubling for another reason.

implicated in

a

But this thought was

The notion of freedom had become

search for happiness within the
bounty of the

continent's natural resources.
justified itself as,

a

themselves to be free,

This search was motivated by, and

spiritual insight.
I

Americans could believe

am saying, only so long as their
quest for

happiness through cultivation and improvement
could be plausibly called
spiritual.

They could not maintain their self
-conception as free beings

if they were merely being swept along;
the slaves of greed wantonly

destroying the continent.

The second set of problems revolve around the
issue of freedom.

For religious thinkers the problem of freedom often
presents itself in
one of two forms; the question of the nature of God
and the question of

the nature of man.

If today we have trouble understanding how

Calvinists could believe in predestination and still consider themselves
free,

it is because we think of freedom in terms of the second set of

questions.

Before the Great Awakening of 1740, and for most people

a

long time after that, virtually all white Americans posed the question
in terms of the first set, what is the nature of God?

If God is all-powerful and all-wise and all-good,

then he isn't

the sort of God who would create us unfree, or make nature vastly

14

different from our aspirations
and moralities.

guarantee of human freedom.

God's omnipotence is the

The question of whether people
are free or

not is answered by simply saying
that they are certainly free
enough and
that to have faith is to already
believe this.
But even though faith
and revelation are the courts of
ultimate appeal here for Puritans,

there needed to be some reference
to nature.

Nature is where one looks

to discover "God in the act of willing, "7
and the early Puritans took

this quite literally.

They were supported in this by the
older science

of the Renaissance which involved
the notion of a chain of being, and

even

a

sort of prose of the world.

There was

a

space between the dumb

animals and the angels where there ought
to exist
man,

possessed both of reason and will.

free creature like

a

since everything in the great

chain supports everything else and nothing is
superfluous, if God
c reated the space for freedom,

crea ture of freedom as well.
h is

creation, of course.

put it,

he must be supposed to have created the

This doesn't mean God is constrained by

It only means that he is good;

as William Ames

"not for want of power, but through abundance of his goodnesse:

that namely he might communicate

a

certain dignity of working to his

creatures also, and in them make his efficiency more perceivable

.

"8

Theologically, then, the Puritans turned to nature to be reassured of
God's wisdom and goodness.

7. Perry Miller, The New England Mind, the 17th Century (Npw York:
MacMillan Co., 1939), 224.
,

8.

Ibid.,

235.

Mark Taylor, "Itenerarium Mentis in Deum: Hegel's Proofs of God's
Existence," in Mark Taylor, Deconstructing Theology
(New York:
Crossroad Publishing, 1982)
9.

,

15

With the introduction of
Bacon's science the formula
doesn't
really change, but it does
become more vulnerable.

Puritans had never
liked miracles and their earlier
writings all stressed the regular
and
orderly course of nature, encouraging
believers to perceive God in the
everyday. After 1685, however, they
became more interested in the
unusual.

it became more important to
demonstrate that nature,

causal system, was not simply indifferent
to human concerns.
instance, Increase Mather needed to
develop

a

as a vast

For

notion of secondary

causes, causes in which God insinuates
himself into the natural causal

chain so as to change its direction through
completely natural means. 10

Suddenly an earthquake or illness might show
up and change the course of
events.

Secondary causes are at work when

falls into

a

well and drowns.

a

child of ungodly parents

God nowhere has to suspend physical laws

to work His will in these events, and we might
read off these events,

even in Bacon's or Newton's world, to get

earlier one.

a

result similar to the

"The greatest probability of Success," writes Urion Oaks,

"is ordinarily on the side of Causes that are most sufficient
in their

kind of Efficiency. "11

But in this formulation we notice two things.

First the Puritans are very aware that

a

causal order, as opposed to

great chain of being, is one laced with radical contingency.
no necessary connection between,

say,

heat and flame anymore.

a

There is
Second,

this formulation puts heavy pressure on the premise that God is all-good

10.
11.

Miller (1939), 228-29.
Ibid.,

235.
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and all-wise, since the fact
that he rules the world in one
way rather
than another is itself a
completely contingent state of
affairs.
In

work-a-day practice, of course,
the Puritans had displaced the
problem
of freedom into diligent activity
and industriousness, and faith
in
God's goodness into the formula
"The Diligent Hand makes Rich,
but
Sloth, and Poverty, and Rags and
Shame must be expected to go
together. "12

There is

a

work-a-day equation of success with
election.

This means that the equation of piety
with freedom is most sustainable

when God's positive lessons outnumber
his negative ones, and so long as

obviously greedy people are not routinely
rewarded with success.

As the

conditions of piety became more difficult,
paradoxically through
success, the work-a-day conception of freedom
detached itself from its

theological foundations.

Of course, work itself remained Americans most

pious activity.

In 1740 and again in 1800,

America.

evangelical revivals spread across

Immediately a dispute arose over the nature of evangelical

conversions.

Was it God's hand, or was it rather the rhetoric and

charisma of the evangelists which moved people to such fits and

convulsions of religious frenzy?

The dispute wound up relocating

forever the issue of freedom; away from the question of the nature of

God to the question of the nature of man.

12.

Ibid.,

232.
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The older conception could
support, as we have seen, a
doctrine of
predestination.
it also supported a covenant
theology, the political

expression of which was theocracy.

The duties of the clergy included

reading the natural signs of God's
wrath against the commonwealth in
such things as hurricanes, droughts,
and diseases, but included also

establishing the legal code by which the
commonwealth might best fulfill
the terms of its covenant.

This sort of theocratic commonwealth
seemed

to work best in the small tightly knit
colonies of New England where

religion was actually a way of life shared in
common by most people.
Success, while not impossible, was difficult.

To have the clergy making

civil law in accordance with religious precepts
made
sense in such circumstances.

a

certain amount of

But few Christians in 1800 believed this

arrangement could survive a far reaching and prosperous
westward
expansion. 13
rate,

In the West religious factions multiplied at an
alarming

different geographic sections became bitterly opposed to one

another, and commercial expansion created an economically diverse
and

non-equal population.

No one Christian denomination could claim to

speak for the conscience of all Christians anymore. 14

speak with enough authority to constitute

a

theocracy.

No one could

Things actually

came to such a pass that when the clergy of one section tried to declare
a

day of national atonement and prayer, something which had been fairly

routine for two hundred years, because the Lord had visited

a

devastating cholera epidemic on his people, politicians and other

Perry Miller, Nature's Nation
109-10; 116-17.
13.

14.

Ibid.,

110.

,

(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press,

1974),
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clerics actually disputed „ hether
Qr
as had been claimed.
15

^^^

^^

Once such interpretations of
God's wrath were

open to empirical dispute,
theocracy had become impossible.

Furthermore, the American Revolution
had been fought in the

n«
lame

of religious liberty and it is
instructive to note that evangelists
used

religious liberty to justify themselves
against the more orthodox
clergy.

Perry Miller relates the following:

...Peter Cartwright once found himself
forbidden by a Presbyterian
minister to form a Methodist society within
the area of his
church, and to him Cartwright answered,
"The people were a free
people, and lived in a free country, and
must and ought to be
allowed to do as they pleased." when the
Presbyterian cleric
still endeavored to suppress the Methodists,
Cartwright relates
that members of his own congregation objected
on the grounds that
he was un-American.
"I told them," Cartwright continues,
"that my
father had fought in the Revolution to gain
our freedom and
liberty of conscience; that I felt that my
Presbyterian brother
had no bill of sale for the people. "16

Much is being said in Cartwright'

s

reply.

Hegel,

in his

Faith/Enlightenment dialectic, rests much of his argument upon the
premise that faith had already accepted all of enlightenment's standards
of rationality 17
.

Cartwright

'

s

The empirical dispute about the cholera epidemic and

almost utilitarian reply to the Presbyterian minister give

us a more local glimpse into how this worked in America.

What is being

Ibid., 114.
Ibid., 87.
Jane Bennett, Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment Nature and the
State in a Post-Hegelian Era
(New York: New York University Press,
G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit A.V. Miller,
1987), 28.
trans., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), paragraph 564.
15.
16.
17.

,

,

,
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asserted here, says Perry Miller,
is the assumption that
"men who had
fought for liberty in the
Revolution were the sort of people
upon whom
one could evangelize." That
is to say, f irst
that predestination „„
no longer an operative dootrine.
Man's nature was such that he
oould be
reached by evangelism and thereby
spurred to action in his own behalf.
,

Further, since authority has
collapsed, that no one has any right
either
to forbid someone to preach, or
to tell Christians not to listen.
it

also means that in times of grave
spiritual crisis, Christians don't

kneel to pray, nor write fine tracts
on theology, they get out and do
something.

But especially it means people must
be such that they can do

something about their own salvation, and
that no one can deny them all
available help in doing so.

The new faith, then, upon which both

religion and nationhood rested was this: God
gave us this broad and rich

continent in which we were meant to be free and
happy.

A free people

searching for religious truth and happiness in an
extended continent are

bound to splinter into endless bickering factions, but
it is exactly
this fragmentation which, says Miller, constituted national
unity. 18

Americans could sincerely boast to Europeans that finally there
existed
a

Christian nation.

to the past,

The trick was that man-centered religion looked not

to floods,

diseases, or hurricanes for inspiration, but

instead to the future; to the promise of future happiness or to the
series of crisis which threatened it.

"lived not in fear.

18.

.

"This people," writes Miller,

.before a covenanted Jehova, but as a race who go

Miller (1974), 117.
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through sorrow, distress, resources
in an eostatic assuranoe
o£
happiness "19
1

'

But to suggest how much of the
Enlightenment has been accepted

here we need only note that evangelism-

identical to modern advertising's.

s

self-defense is practically

Already we see that in

a

continent

available as resources for spiritual
and material happiness, available
for productive work; already people
too become available and on call as

means; available to evangelism, available
for salvation, and available
for happiness.

In the same way modern advertising
finds them on-call

and abvailable, and justifies itself with
the notion that people need

to

hear its messages and no one has the right
to tell people not to listen.

Utilitarian logic had won the day.

Americans for
utilitarians.

a

long time were touchy about being criticized as

To their credit most Christian Americans worked to make

sure their works and lives were not merely utilitarian, but
inspired

also by spiritual concerns.

We might even suppose the nation became

great precisely because so many people kept this issue so straight for
so

many years.

In the next section

such American, Jonathan

19.

Ibid.,

116.

B.

Turner,

I

will turn to the thought of one

21

On December 31, 1866, Jonathan
Baldwin Turner, in a letter to the
editor meant to accompany the text
of his speech from the day before,
which the paper was reprinting,
wrote that in light of the recent

history of negro emancipation,
«I think we may safely conclude
that the
Lord has determined that this shall
be a Christian continent.
At any
rate we are no more competent to
take care of Christianity than we are

the solar system or the laws of nature.
"20

clarification.

The last sentence needs

The dispute here is over who should
be in charge of

college education funds in Illinois.

There were at the time many small

religious colleges in the U.S., each representing
the doctrine of some
one or another religious sect. 21

Congress had recently passed the Land-

Grant College, or Morrill, Act and the discussion
was over whether to

divide the proceeds from the act among existing colleges
or to found

wholly new State agricultural and industrial university 22
.

course, had been campaigning for such

a

a

Turner, of

university since 1851. The

argument he answers here comes from religious college presidents who

claim that in large secular universities, Christianity will die out.
His counter claim is that free people thinking freely do not need

classically educated scholars to manage the education of their children
Mary Turner Carriel, The Life of Jonathan Baldwin Turner
(Urbana,
University of minis Press, 1961), 182.
Richard Hofstadter and Walter Metzger, The Development of Academic
Freedom in the United States
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press,
1955) see Chaters 3 and 6.
22. The 37th Congress, The Congressional Globe
32, Part 2, (Feb-Mar
1862), see House Bill 138.
20.
IL:
21.

,

,

,
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nor do they require denominational
colleges to wet nurse their

Christianity.

His argument, to a modern
reader, is missing a premise,

which one can infer by thinking
about the previous sentence, "the
Lord
has determined that this shall
be a Christian continent." We
know this
because everywhere we look we see that
despite our best attempts and
efforts to thwart it, God's divine
purpose and design can be seen

realizing itself in our national life.

purely utilitarian position.

This must not be seen as a

Freedom and Christianity and national life

can almost be synonyms for one another.

in fact we learn that

emancipating negroes means that they can finally
receive the benefits of
Christianity, which nature would have imparted
to them anyway, and

Turner uses the word 'Christianity' here in
exactly the grammatical

position where we would probably use the word 'freedom.'
We shut [four millions of colored slaves] out from all
light of
the Bible, and from all our schools and literature; we
hemmed them
in with fugitive-slave laws, and employed the whole
force of our
courts, our army and navy to crush out all the Christianity
that
was in them.
we leveled against them the entire force of our
arms, our votes, our schools, our literature, our pulpits, and our
prayers; we called on our doctors of divinity...; we even, at
last, forced our brave boys in blue to stand guard over "this kind
of property" and keep Christianity from them at the point of the
bayonet .23
.

.

,

In the main body of the speech he is more explicit

Mr. President, I am sick and tired and disgusted with
hearing about a Christianity that can only be kept in the world in
a bandbox or in the care of a dry-nurse.
And I wish here to
affirm that wherever freedom is, there Christianity must be; and

23.

Carriel,

181-82.
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wherever Christ is, there freedom
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Turner's argument is more interesting
than it at first appears to
be.

To deny that freedom and Christianity
are mutually supportive and

tightly linked, is to deny God's
omnipotence.

realizing freedom is to deny that God is
wise.

To deny that we are

The teleological proof

for God's existence is being used
against the cosmological proof. 24

In

fact the argument only works if we presume
the opponents accepted, and

the college presidents probably all did accept,
the cosmological

argument.

The cosmological argument states that because
everything we

observe is the subject of natural causality, there
must be some one

thing which is the cause of all the other causes, the
cause of nature
itself which is not itself subject to natural causality.

But such a

cause could only be an omnipotent God.

This argument was never considered an adequate substitute for

Biblical revelation, but it was believed to be forceful when confined to

merely secular studies, like physics.

Kant had already pointed out that

the argument as it stands does not aid piety since an omnipotent God

might still be an idiot or

a

despot.

While he doesn't mention that

argument here, elsewhere the despotic argument clearly bothered

24.

Mark Taylor (1982).

24

Turner, 25 and he probably
had it in mind

IOCS

He doe3 say

.

^

„ hen he

at the natural world he
sees not merely a grid of
mechanical

oausality, as in Newton's
physios, or Xncrease Mather's
seoondary
oauses, but evidenoe of a grand
and beautiful design, the
testation of
Christian freedom. This freedom
has been ooming into being
despite the
best efforts of religious seots
and regional prejudices.
One either has
to believe this, or give up believing
that one oan infer anything at all

about God from natural events.

theologioally.

This wouldn't bother the seotarians

They could still oontinue teaohing
thoir own individual

accounts of revelation in their own
sectarian colleges.

But it would

mean giving up on the further idea that
here on the North American
continent somehow we had at last founded

a

Christian nation.

It

would

mean admitting defeat in the very cause the
sectarians were championing;
saving the country from

a

plunge into barbarous prosperity and secular

utilitarianism.

Turner's turn to teleological inspiration goes back
to at least
1833.
a

During

a

horrifying cholera epidemic at Illinois College, Turner,

first year professor fresh from Yale, worked heroically ministering
to

the sick and burying the dead.

A hundred people in the town died; the

young man saw ghastly sights and heard grizzly stories.

Overworked and

exhausted, he kept on healing, but he also found time to write letters
to his fiance in Connecticut.

Several times he notices in these letters

that cholera makes no distinctions as to piety or vigor, two signs, in

25.

Carriel,

56-57.
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early New England, of election.
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By August 28 he had lived through
the epidemic, but after describing

some of the horror and exhaustion he
had experienced, he brings up the
same theme again:

...the most temperate as well as the drunken
and worthless are
stricken
Doubtless more than one tenth of the present
population have died since I came here; that is,
more than a
hundred persons.
But this does not prove the place
unhealthfulnot at all; for what place or people are
healthy or safe, when God
sees fit to scourge them with cholera? But
my trust is in
Him... alone, not regarding the disease so much
as to change or
restrict my diet in the least. 27

Then follow

a

remarkable few sentences, considering that this is

the close of a long letter detailing the horrors of a
cholera epidemic

and written by

a

professor of classical rhetoric.

He ends the letter by

talking about the abundance of fresh fruit. "The woods have been full of
blackberries which the people were forbidden by ordinance to eat."
Turner ate his fill, despite the law.

"I

am sure they helped me; and

now the woods are full of plums of all kinds..."

gathered twelve bushels in about three hours.

26.
27.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,

18.
22.

Twelve persons

The fields are full of

26

wonderful melons "as large as

pu^in*," which

no one dares

^

himself and a friend; "hence,
we live well."

And if we live well, God cannot
be unjust.
finds the indiscriminate cholera
epidemic to be

^

Though clearly Turner
a

challenge to his

faith, he refuses to entertain
the thought that perhaps God is
unjust.
He takes the heat off God by
dividing him practically in two; the

omnipotent, inscrutable, and even
vengeful deity who authored natural

necessity; and the wise God whose divine
laws of nature shine with

intelligent life.

All his life Turner opposed what he called
omnipotence.

If the

omnipotent God himself cannot be thought unjust,
certainly priests,
dogmatists, and sectarians who make omnipotence
the center of their

theologies can be called unjust.

In fact Turner seems to believe that

these theologies are selfish and mean spirited.

God and nature tell us

...

"[T]hese teachers make

monstrous and utterly unbelievable lies. "28

And the lie seems to be that we are too depraved to make the world
any
thing more than

a

valley of tears, and that things can only be better in

the after-life, and that such depraved beings as people don't really

deserve any better.

Turner claims that this view creates hell on earth;

it sanctions great evils,

like slavery, and because it is selfish it is

divisive and leads to distrust.

The vision Turner offers instead is to

create something more like the conditions necessary to create heaven on

28.

Ibid.,

236-37

27

earth.

The Bible, he insists,

"is the sole logical cause
and basis of

freedom," but for more than fifteen
centuries now "Christ- s gospel was
officially interpreted only in the
interest of some s3motiaait e i
ther
church, state, or sect."

Slavery and the doctrine of
predestination are

only two examples of this sort of
despotism.

The following is

a

recollection of Turner written many years
later in 1906 by one of his
students.

The discussions described are said
to have occurred in 1850.

It was through him in a prayer-meeting
talk that I first heard of
the Fugitive-Slave law... "We are told this
institution of which
we are all to become defenders is authorized
by the Bible
Well
if this is the Bible, I say, take away the
Bible.
We do not want
it... But, thank God, this infamy is not from
the Bible
'Whom the
Son maketh free is free indeed.'" Once in a
class he had occasion
to denounce fore-ordination, which he characterized
as
omnipotence, "chaining men down by decree, and then
damning them
for not being free."
"I tell you," he said, "nothing could equal
my utter detestation of such a God as that; but thank
Heaven, such
is not the God of the Bible! "29

With this we begin to understand at least the psychology of
the
man who, as much as anyone, bequeathed us the modern American
University
system.

His almost breathless energy is involved with a creative

anxiety.

The vigorous pursuit of justice in America is finally the

justification of God.

The overcoming of factional sectarianism, the

creation of national colleges, and his enthusiastic embrace of science
are all finally the overthrow of hell on earth and the creation of a new

world with new beings within whom it is possible for heaven to dwell.

29.

Ibid.,

56-57.
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There is one more place in
Turner's biography where the
word
omnipotence comes up in relation
to drudgery and ignorance.
Again the
quote comes from the 1866 debate
over how to best disperse
land-grant
funds, and Turner is arguing
against simply adding an agriculture

department to existing colleges, where
one might perhaps take courses
in
agriculture much the way students today
take physical education or

English composition.

Turner here is both replying to

a

very popular

criticism of government help to agriculture
in general, while at the
same time taking over the argument.
30

When Almighty God created heavens and
earth, and ordered man to
eat his bread by the sweat of the brow,
He created, and most
likely endowed, the best possible university
for learning
all... mere manual arts; and if we expect
to supersede Omnipotence
by grants of land, for endowments, it will
prove worse than the
Bull Run defeat; for no institution for
teaching arts and the
habits of bare manipulation and industrial skill
can ever be
endowed at all comparable with those which the great
Father of all
has most munificently spread abroad
The principles of
science, therefore, and not the bare manipulations of
art, should
form the sole end of industrial universities 31
.

Earlier in the address Turner had equated learning to plow with

becoming

a

two legged work animal.

Nature, conceived as God's

omnipotence, yields only an animalistic existence.

The implications are

that nature teaches hard work, but hard work does not of itself offer an

exalted life or even an intelligent being.

Drudgery, Turner seems to

believe, is not the mother of either freedom or of thought.

An American

30. See the debates over the creation of a Department of Agriculture,
Congressional Globe, 32, part 2, p 856, and the comments of Mr. Hale on
May 8, 1862, p. 2014 and also those of Mr. Fessenden, p. 2016.
31. Carriel, 202.
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farmer content to mimic the
„ays of his father is
leas than free.

The

argent

a slave,

or at least

is radically anti-traditionalist,

hot what

is more revealing is that
tradition is understood by Turner
as

omnipotence, and omnipotence as
a realm of drudgery and
necessity.
Omnipotence cannot be the basis of
American freedom because it
justifies
despotism and unf reedom-hell-on
earth,
with this in mind, it is

interesting tc look at Turner's attack
on the classical moral
curriculum.

The forth Illinois Industrial
Convention, meeting in January,
1853, presented a memorial to the state
legislature which the

legislature in turn sent to the U.S. Congress.
a

The memorial opens with

confession.

We would respectfully represent: That we are
members of the
industrial classes of this state, actively and
personally engaged
in agricultural and mechanical pursuits.
We are daily made to
feel our own practical ignorance, and the
misapplication of toil
and labor, and the enormous waste of products,
means, materials,
and resources that result from it. We are aware
that all this
evil to ourselves and our country, results from a want
of
knowledge of those principles and laws of nature that underlie
our
various professions and of the proper means of a practical
application of existing knowledge of those pursuits. 32

What might enable such

a

confession?

32. Edmund J. James, The Origin of the Land Grant Act of 1862 and Some
Account of its Author Jonathan B Turner
(Urbana, IL: University of
Illinois Press, 1910), 90.
.

,
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It is interesting to
notice that J.B.

Turner tended to argue

against classical education in
America in terms very similar
to those
that some classical theorists
today use to argue against
scientific
education.
Turner, and he wasn't alone
in this, calls classical
education a t^hnoA^y, and to it
opposes thinking, that is, science.
To make this more plausible to
political theorists, and to anticipate
bit,

G.W. Curtis,

point.

in a discussion of Milton, makes
almost the same

"Technical scholarship begins in

grammar.

a

a

dictionary and ends in

a

The sublime scholarship of John
Milton began in literature and

ended in life."

Richard Hofstadter has cataloged the dreary
monotonous

form of classical education in pre-Civil
War America.
memorization, pure and simple.

A professor typically spent his time

insuring that students got every word correct.
rhetoric, was no exception.

The method was

Turner, a teacher of

In one letter he mentions that he starts

hearing recitations at five in the morning.

This method of teaching

must have, as Hofstadter claims, done much to deaden
the study of the
classics.

But if we stop at that, then we refuse to ask any
serious

questions about the curriculum itself, and assume that, taught
properly,
it could do the work of creating practical reasoners in
a democratic

regime

But,

of course, we are imagining the curriculum as it is today,

something outside the status quo of American education,
opposition.

portfolio.

In Turner's day,
I

it was,

as it were,

a

a

form of loyal

minister with

suspect that the curriculum's roots in the natural law

31

tradition will always make
lt#

^

specific circumstances employ
it.

^

_

^

In the modern world,

that will always

Place it in the position of
an apologist for regimes
which cannot
themselves be convincingly
rooted in natural law.

Turner might be correct to
call the classical curriculum
technical
since, in the older sense of
the term, the curriculum
thinks of itself
as technical.
says Martin Heidegger, "is a
process of

t^,,

reflection in service to doing and
making. "33

One no longer approaches

the classics thoughtfully, as
the matter given for thinking,
but one
rather occupies him or her self with
the classics.
And this education

purports to produce better citizens and
practical reasoners.

Throughout

the debates between Turner and the
college presidents, the presidents

always seek to show that Turner's sort
of education ought to be

disqualified; whether because it will be
agnostic or will produce people
who are unfamiliar with classical questions,
or both, or because it will

produce

a

barbarous unreflective nation.

and invalid.

They think in terms of valid

Again Heidegger puts the point best, "When thinking
comes

to an end by slipping out of its element it
replaces this loss by

procuring

a

validity for itself as techne, as an instrument of
education

and therefore classroom matter and later cultural
concern. "34

believed himself to be in

a

Turner

strong age which could think for itself.

The curriculum is technical, then, in the sense that it forces
and molds
33. Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings David F. Krell, editor,
York:Harper & Row, 1977), in the "Letter on Humanism," 194.
34.

Ibid.,

197.

(New
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material in particular ways,
wavs and that these ways
close off other ways in
which the material might
be
The other „ ays here

n„

^

.

^

^

poetically as life, religiously
as spirit, or philosophically
as
thinxing, b ut when one uses
the term technical as a
accusation, clearly
it is in the name of
something else;

an experience of absence,

experience of unwarranted restriction.

Thinking,

an

it is declared,

has

ceased. 35

It is notable that Turner
opposed the classical curriculum in

the same terms he used when he
opposed

and dogmatic sectarian religion.

a

merely vocational curriculum

in religion he argued against
the

notion that Jesus was sent to atone
for anything in us, arguing instead
that Jesus was sent to assure us of
God's goodness.
He opposes the

merely vocational curriculum because
of its connection with Omnipotence,
necessity, and unfreedom since Adam's fall.

curriculum because it is simply

a

He opposes the classical

discipline, unconnected with

ethos, and because it conceives itself as

a

a

living

dry-nurse, the need for

which Americans have outgrown.

The underlying premise, the chief disagreement
between Turner and

everybody else, is that he doesn't believe in the finally
depraved
nature of human beings.

He seems completely uninterested in the

classical problem of how one introduces moderation into human affairs.

35. Martin Heidegger, Being and Timp
John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson, trans., (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 43.
f
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He seems rather to worrv
orry ahr,mabout i-v,~
the opposite problem,

how to awaken vigor

and life among free people.

The technical, then, must
be understood as a sort
of aggressive
resignation; a literal cultivation
of innocence and ignorance.
. [Ilt is
inconceivable that God would allow
for creating a military
science of
filing but not an agricultural
science of feeding, clothing,
and
housing, and in which
people cannot develop their
highest faculties
^e to their
sphere of duty> „ 36 The classical
curriculu
q£

^

^

course, helps keep a kind of
hierarchy in place, since it has
little
useful value for farmers, and
therefore relegates most Americans
to
ignorance. 37 Turner consistently
denies that such a hierarchy can be

justified, either in scripture or in
nature.

Nature may allocate

diverse duties, but it needn't consign
one to ignorance, subservience,
or unhappiness.

Without a basis in natural law, it is
difficult to see

how the classical curriculum could ever
maintain

American education.

Without

a

a

hegemonic place in

natural law cosmology, the classical

curriculum degenerates into one constructivist
alternative among many;
that is, it becomes modern.

it can only commend itself as a technique

for training virtuous citizens.

But without its pretensions, it no

longer can reply to those who find it boring or irrelevant,
except
dogmatically.
ex eludes.

36.
37.

But a dogma can not separate itself from what it

The curriculum offers the experience of absence.

Edmund James, 57.
Ibid.,

79.

34

Turner., basic insight is
this: We ought to be abie
to develop a
course of liberal education
which would do for farmers what
the
classical curriculum does for
lawyers, clerics, and doctors;
or what
west Point does for military
men.
This insight rests upon another.
The
classical curriculum does indeed
work, though only for selected
people.
SO the question becomes why
does it work when it works, and why
can't it
work for everyone? To reply to
the second question first; there
is no

longer any one best way to live.

It is true that the laws of
god are everywhere, and to all
persons and classes, the same; and that
all science is based upon
these unxform laws; but it is equally
true that their application
to the pursuits of life, and the
consequent natural discipline and
development of mind, is infinitely various.
38

If we all agreed on what was the best way
of life, we might also

agree that the classical curriculum was the best
education for everyone.
The idea that the classical curriculum somehow
transcends particular

ways of life, that it speaks to everyone, is an idea
so obviously false,
that Turner never even gives it serious consideration.

He also takes it

for granted that the classical curriculum is only one among
several ways
of educating free responsible people.

The classical curriculum does not

elucidate Being itself, but only one particular way to be.

For Turner,

the laws of God do elucidate Being itself, but their applications are
too varied to be captured in any one curriculum.

38.

Ibid.,

55.
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The other question-how

is

^

it that the classical

for the professional classes-is
answered as follows:

greatest

of

3e^1

^
i-=

Ttls**™

^

"

COnCerned
'

H ^ow

that the
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Choo
if
themselves, but by continued habits
of reading t
and
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The young candidate from these
schools is generally
isciplined and sophoraor ica1
d sho
'
ITZ'
3 Universit
or school has done one thing
^
?
for hi.
n? immense value
him of
and importance, and only one; it
has
neither duly informed nor disciplined
his mind, as it is sometimes
pretended; but IT HAS SHOWN HIM HOW THAT
MIND CAN BE DISCIPLINED
IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROFESSIONAL
PURSUITS OF HIS AFTER LIFE 39

h!™to

T;

r

-

The classical background of professional
men fits into

collegiality of their professions.

a

-

general

The sun, the light of life, Being,

is discoverable in all different ways of
life and work, but only from

out of those ways.

The sublime is disclosed through the mundane,
one's

daily sphere of action and duty, or it is not disclosed
at all.
takes reflection, and every sphere requires

a

It

literature, libraries,

scientific experiments, and other tools of reflection; but each
sphere
will require tools specific to its own life activity.

Is it said that farmers and mechanics do not and will not

read?

Give them a literature and an education then suited to their
actual wants, and see if it does not reform and improve them in
this respect, as it has alone their brethren in the professional
classes

39.

Ibid.,

59.
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Note once again the tension
between wisdom and grace on the or
me
hand and providence and compelled
labor on the other.
Here divine
wisdom yields the possibility of
transcending ignorance.
Farmers are
not forever stuck in dosa.
Humans are essentially laboring beings-

lawyers and clergymen no less than
farmers-but no Christian can believe
that God would so create the world
as to condemn "the vast majority of

mankind to live in circumstances in which
the best and highest
development of their noblest faculties is

a

sheer impossibility, unless

they turn aside from those spheres of duty
to which Providence has

evidently consigned them."

To assume a natural hierarchy in America is to
be blasphemous.

place of hierarchy and omnipotence, Turner next puts forward

a

In

Christian

American and earthly teleology.

For what but for this very end of intellectual discipline
and development, has God bound the daily labors of all these sons
of toil in the shop and on the farm, in close and incessant
contact with all the mighty mysteries of his creative wisdom, as

40.

Ibid.,

57-58.

37

Why would God have made
the principles of pure
mathemati-CS so
applicable to practical pursuits
had he not intended those who
labored
to derive mental culture as
well as bodily sustenance from
their arts?
S
d
Y
dr ° P the cl0
***
the
3unshine and ,h°
*** COncent -ted the mighty powers of the
earth the
th* ocean and the sky,
directed by the unknown and
mysterious force... connected with the
growing of every plant and
the opening of every flower, the
motion of every engine n
e
implement, if he did not intend that
each son and daughter of
Adam s race should learn through the
handicraft of their daily
tori to look through nature up to
nature's God, trace his deep
3
thSir dailY mSntal and m ° ral culture
as well
tTtZ
as their darly food, from that toil
that is ever encircled and
circumscribed on all hands, by the unfathomed
energies of his
wisdom and power? .... Was God mistaken
when he first placed Adam in
a garden instead of the academy?...
No; God's ways are ever, ways
of wrsdom and truth; but Satan has in
all ages, continued to put
darkness for light... and to fill the world
with brute muscles and
bones in one class-luxurious, insolent and
useless nerves and
brains in another class, without either
bodies or souls 42

^'

'

'

r^f^

'

In passages like these it is as though
Rousseau's Savoyard Vicar

had become an organizational theorist.
show how much anxiety lies behind such
as the Land Grant College system,

I

a

have quoted at such length to

radical institutional proposal

and also to show how misleading it is

to ascribe the collapse of the classical curriculum in America
to greed,

utilitarianism, or capitalism, on the one hand; or to

a

loss of

seriousness or vision, or even the admittedly ridiculous memorization
method, on the other.

41.
42.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,

59.
60.

American Protestantism had sought freedom in an

38

active relationship to
nature, seen as God's
Providence.

P^ct

it had found f riend ly

aUiea both

the classicai libera i
curriculum.

in

Etonian

In this

physics and in

But the view of nature
as God's

Providence had, by 1850,
produced some serious tensions.

For instance, everyone busily
ignored the fact that Newton's

ecological

p roo f for God's existence had been
rendered unconvincing by

Kant. 43 There was also the
tension created by things li ke
the depletion
of soils, destruction of
timber lands, and general despoiling
of the
continent.
Everywhere we find agriculturalists
apologizing for their
past record, even in Congress, and
clambering for help in learning to
do
better.
it is as though in the 1630
's, Protestants battled
against

nature only in order to rescue and
recognize themselves, but by 1850
they had recognized that in light
of what they had wrought, they no
longer could believe in their own
righteousness.

I

have also noted that the covenant theology
had crumbled, and

that with it had gone many of the settled
definitions of the good life,

authority, piety, and human nature, and that
evangelism had articulated
a

conception of an active individual capable of hearing
the itinerant

message of evangelism, and that this individual was
thought to be the
basis of the first Christian nation,

a

nation to which God had granted

continent upon whose resources it could flourish and be happy.

But if

farmers are apologizing and losing confidence in how they
exploit

43.

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure

Saafifln ,
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nature, then the uneasy
alliance between Protestantism
and
utilitarianism, as articulated
by evangelism, was in
trouble as well.
The happy continent of
resources needed better spiritual
and

Philosophical underpinnings.

The nature of human activity
upon the land

is not such that we can,
without deeper reflection,
establish a

righteous, happy, and free nation
upon it.

From all these directions the
classical curriculum was

a

problem.

For instance, it was completely
unequipped to speak to the problem
just laid out,

I

and certainly not to the problems
which were most

alarming to agriculturalists.

In practice,

this placed it, as Turner

argues, on the side of believing in
natural hierarchies of elevated and

non-elevated culture.

In Christian religion this stance
meshes best

with the cosmological argument and
meditations upon God's almighty
powers.

But by 1850 this stance implied that
people who worked the land

are unfree, that they are at the mercy
of their own acquisitiveness,

that their daily toil has no clear moral or
pious meaning except the

endless reproduction of the daily round of toil.

If zealousness is any

measure of one's attraction towards justice, then
clearly the twenty
year campaign for agricultural universities, championed
by so many for
so long,

is ample testimony that the situation was not only
thought to

be unworkable, but unjust.

40

Turner fought slavery,
tought fto
n found
* new
Y, fouaht
specifically American

edUCatiOMl lMtitU

"-. ~*»t-

^ ^^

scien ti£i c experiments,
taught Bible

classes, wrote boots, and
proposed .

^

^

^

spirit Of zeal and always
to correct injustices
wrought by the partisans
of natural ine^xities.
A1 „ ays he argues that
people ought fcQ be given

opportunities to improve themselves
because it is only thr0 u gh
such
projects that one c a „ discover
the one true Sod. Again
sieves ere not
bein g denied liberal £r eedom,
but christian
They
held in an unreflective reletion
to nature.
As we saw in Turner's
discussion of the plague, all of
these positions are a response
to the
theodicy problem. But we also
saw that Turner's reply to
theodicy is
grounded in a practical and spiritual
teleology.
This is very important
and Immanuel Kant will have
more to say about it in chapter II,
but

^

first

I

^

must explore why the modern response
to theodicy must not only

be teleological, but organizational
as well.

I

win

exploEe this

through the writings and speeches of
the civil service reformer George

William Curtis.

D.

1.

George William Curtis and th e Duty of Eduraf P H M^n

and the P ossible Motivations for Rpfnrp

LOVff

,

In my discussion of the Civil Service reformer
George William

Curtis

I

will,

as with J.

B.

Turner in the last section, not be casting

Praise or bla me on hi m for
the creatlon o£ today
This contrasts with two
other approaches.

_„tai

,

3

Leonard White in his

stu dy o* American administratis
termed the reformers public
spirited men, selfless"
sppHn^
S v
mg the elevation of American public life.
Y seek
Almost at once writers like Ari
Hoogenboom replied by characterizing
the
reformers as elitists who, finding
themselves shut out of politics in
the post-Andrew Jackson days, tried
to dampen things down, not
1

i

necessarily to insure themselves jobs,
but more to create
people such as themselves could recognize.
44

a

world which

Another version of this

second thesis, that of Curtis- 1955
biographer, is Gordon Milne's. 45
Milne argues that the genteel tradition,
though seeming quaint to us
today, did once inform certain public
spirited men, and help them

improve aspects of our national institutions.
has its value.

I

Elitism, in other words,

disagree with none of these interpretations, there
is

textual evidence for them all, but all three seem
smaller than the man
they interpret.

Curtis admits his ambitions freely, but no one could

call him self-serving.

He turned down too many ambassadorships,

nominations, and job offers.

But nor was he motivated by ethics,

Leonard White would have it.

A purely ethical man would have needed

either

a

more public life, say, in Congress, or

in business.

44.

a

as

more private one, say,

Curtis seems, rather, to always leave and enter the public

Leonard White, The Republican Er a. 1869-1901

,

(New York: Macmillan,

1958)

Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Sp oils, (Urbana, IL: University of
Illinois Press, 1961)
45. Gordon Milne Georcre William C urtis and the Genteel TracHrion
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1956)
44.

r

42

arena with ease.

„ is fara ii y was never
asked to

^^
,

and his pubiicness aiways
see ms spontaneous and in
response to specific
events, issues, or situations.

For instance, at the 1856
Republican national convention,
his
sudden and eloquent demand to
reconsider a platform amendment,
one which
had just been heavily voted down,
to include in the platform the
words
"that all men are created equal,"
was based simply on Curtis'
total
dismay as he watched the amendment
s sponsor, Joshua R. Giddings,

leaving the hall in defeat.

It seemed to me that the spirits
of all martyrs to freedom were
marching out of the convention behind
the venerable force of that
indignant and outraged old man. 46

Curtis demanded the floor and after he
spoke, and he only spoke after

much heckling and noise had died down, the
convention enthusiastically

passed the Giddings amendment.

This sort of spontaneousness, this

freshness, even in the service of the public good,
does not articulate
the shared understandings of ethics so much as
it creates new ones.

What before was beyond credibility became thinkable,
ft

But perhaps Curtis was a moralist.

Curtis himself seems to think

this is true, he talked about little else but morality in all his

speeches.

46.

MA:

All his adult life he made arguments which resemble those of

Milne, 109.
See also Edward Cary, George William Curtis
Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1894)

(Boston,

43

Emerson, whose books he reart
,
read at age
thirteen and whose friendship
he
*ept ail his life.
But here , thin, „e need
to ask what m oraiit

*±*h oo^ands
outlet,

y it is

hi m to speak m0 rai ly

.

For uhat does morality

^

Here

, think Curtis, own answer,
written to his wife on his
thirty sixth birthday,
provides
iues as good
nnnH an
»„ answer
H
as I have seen

one,

as we use the word

3<!
trulv as
truly

t
I

do you
Hf-v

in fart

! who
i
and
knows

t

greate r

su PPose no man who loves
as
himself loved as I feel I am ?!
=,

'

;~ sss
Curtis was apparently an erotic man.
fell in love often.

His

Prior to his marriage he

IzIzj^U^^^

was considered

too candid in its portrayal of
Egyptian dancing girls, and

find his
treatment of the love between an old
bookkeeper and his wife in Prue anH

1 to be so sensitive that it is difficult to believe
man could have written it.
in everything,

a

I

young unmarried

The bookkeeper is able to see his wife
Prue

and he continually rekindles his love for
her in

everything he does or thinks.

In this he uses the method of

indirection, so that he, as it were, comes upon
her again and again

unexpectedly; the beauty and purity he worshiped
in her during their
courtship, when they were new and beginning— her
youth he nearly says,

her purity he mentions often.

47.

Milne, p.

107.

44

Curtis takes up this
theme again
ln all
y in in
a11 m
his commencement
addresses.
it
a i„,

U

rrch with a lush
promise of fecundity; l
ilke
ike the a
h
graduates
he addresses.
Curtis is a consummate
lover of youth,
vonth beauty
k
and purity.
The message
is oft- overtly
poUtical , £or instance to
iMight students
slavey but the vehlcle „ hat
makes
spaech
ia

^

^

^^^^

,

insights the graduates
t0

Uve

ln such a

^

theic aotions

a credit to the
promise ana passions o£
June ,

of yQuth

,

and Qf

^^
^

One advantage to understanding
Cuttis as an erotic man who
uses
the the language of morality
in order to give himself
a sphere of aoti on
is that in this field
we know we oannot entirely
understand or

completely capture Curtis' reforms
in our diagnostic schemas
and
categories.
The unruliness and open-endedness
of this emotion, love,
mean he will often surprise us
and escape our conceptual fr
rames.
second advantage lies, to the
contrary, in our familiarity with
eroticism.

He are familiar enough that we
can make at least

plausible claims about the author -s
intentions and purposes.
say,

A

ssome

We can

for instance, that he loves purity
and that he seeks to insight

others to disclose their own buried
capacity for purity.

^

"
f ° E 6Xample
The Lead ershi P of Educated
MSn <>Tn%rltlltT
Men
in Options and Addresses of Qeorgp W lliam rnrH.
Elliot
Norton, edrtor, (New York: Harper and Brothers
Publishers, 1894), Vol.
'

I,

3 1 6 — 36.

^Jj'

'

i

,^^.

45

Duty *nH KSJ
laiflQ

Before going any further

relation during Curtis

,

eacly

changing dramatically.,,

I

must

^

Early on

^

discussion

a

^^

divines h

^

^
^

^

Aristotelian and scholastic
oonceptions of nature with
those o £ Isaa c
»ewton, keeping natural
theolo gy i„ place by relying
heavUy
Newton's cosmological proof
for God's existence.
natural theolo gy

,

^

F rom nature,

s ay s

one can infer the existence
of a supreme being or

principle that is good and all
powerful.
is accountable for his sins.

Hence, everyone, even a pa
g an,

Miller nakes the point that this
view

always came in tandem with
another, namely, that one can
be most
directly best informed of the truth
through readin g scripture.
The

cosmological proof actually asserts
that nature also, thou h less
g
completely than scripture, can yield
a secure foundation for faith.

The

dilemma here is that neither nature nor
scripture can bear this sort of
weight. Who, after all, can say,
asked Frederick Henry Hedge in 1851,
whether the hope a religious man feels
in the face of human frailty and

death co.es from natural or supernatural
sources?

And Miller adds, who

can say whether Hedge's melancholy flows
from his loss of faith in the

efficacy of natural theology or the efficacy
of revealed religion?

49.

Miller (1974), 121-33.
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—

Since Immanuel Kant
had written
M • „n
ntten his
cla Sslc refutation
of the

C05Ml09iCal

°»

human purposes had
appeared.

—«

-

^

naturally su ited t0

couM
borrou reiigious
*ro* scientific systems
anymore, since science
ls fiMUy(
warned lon g ago, at best
a temporary
systematization made by £inite
m inas in the face o£
staggering
Qne

^

lnfinities;

NotMng

There was also a set of
more standard problem
conneoted with naturai
thCOl °
likS h °" iS
P °" ibl '
'
-turai theology is o P eratin
3 in
the world, that there
renins in human societies, even
in elevated ones
like Greece or Rome, so much
depravity? The degeneration
o £ trust in
naturai theolog y tended to
aiso put pressure on one's
trust in revealed
religion, since, as alread
y mentioned, the direot grounding of
faith had
itself come under suspicion,
and because the discovery that
nature was
not intrinsically amenable to
our categories cf thought
left one facing
an inhuman nature.
That meant one no longer .new
whether one's insights
were products of nature or just
human projections upon a radically

W

^

unknowable material.
natural from

a

«

Hedge no longer could tell hew to
distinguish

a

supernatural grounds for hope because,
since he no longer

could know the natural, he oculd not
contrast with it the supernatural,
and that contrast was central to
making the distinction between natural

and revealed religion.

Newtonian science had confirmed that the
cosmos

really was the way revelation said it
was.
out to be inhuman,

50.
51.

Ibid.,

But when the cosmos turned

then it no longer confirmed revelation, and
in fact,

128; Kant, Critique of Pure i»
Miller (1974), 130.

y„

ni
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nation

at all

.

increasingly beoome less and
less
in junctions.

Ood,

^

Ihe God o£ „ atural

^

^

^^
^

to survive, had to
baoo me minimalist.

ona response to thia

dU*«

was tha creation of the
aew „„ rc

subject-centered religion of Ralph
Wa ldo Emerson ana Theodore
Patk e,
Tha believers in natural
religion had always tended
to opposa
revivalism.
The key to their faith was,
first, that nature illustrated
an "Elegance
« Baauty in all natural things»52
which wara not only
avidencas of tha author of nature,
but also the basis for moral
precepta.53 The other side of
this belief was, and again
against
revivalism, that human beings,
through natural reason, could
discern
something of this author and this
moral code.
Thus these believers were
uncomfortable with evangelism because
it seemed to tamper in a
rather

utilitarian way with natural reason,
and again and again preachers
like
William Ellery channing, a major
figure, along with Emerson, in the
religious life at Brook Farm and, like
Emerson,

a

major influence upon

George Curtis, 54 accused revivalists of
abusing human nature. 55

of

course the revivalists countered by
accusing men like Channing of

stoicism and deism, since he elevated human
nature to

a

privileged

Miller (1974), 126.
Jane Bennett, "On Being Native: Thoreau's
Hermeneutics of Self

52.

53

ty in press.
54. Milne, 15.
Curtis during this period also sometimes attended
Theodore Parker's church.
Parker is discussed below
55. Miller (1974), 55.
EflJ

3

r
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status and there seemed
little loft
Uttle
n
r>
left *for
God to do in bringing
about
human salvation.

To us today the believers
in moral nature see,
romantic and
sentimental.
„ h en the romances of Walter Soott and
Ja mes Fennemore

Cooper are wonderfully
lampooned in

Z^tesz^

with Mar* Twain.

„e

usuaUy

^

But their important
politioal insight was that there
must be some limits upon
the evangelical

manipulation of people's

Physiology and psychology.

The re is a basic insight
that the unlimited

and noisy over-stimulation
of men and women is unhealthy,
and that a
society which needs so many
stimulants is probably sic.
This almost

defensive reaction to American
busyness seems to me to be at the
heart
of the attempts to anchor
morality in the dignity of an
autonomous
rational subject, one which must
never be treated merely as a means,
as
in revivalism, but as an end
as well.

Perry Miller makes much of Melville's
reversal of the American
romantic style; Moby-p ick is a romance
that dissents from romance. 56
"Call me Ishmael,

"

begins the book, and the implication is
that finally

the true outcast has appeared.

create

a

breathing space for

noisy orthodoxy.

a

The romantic view of nature, the move
to
free individual, is declared just another

Similarly and only

a

year after the publication of

MQbY " P lr k Th eodore Parker, the nonconformist preacher,
announced in the
Boston Music Hall:

56.

Ibid.,

136.
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mUSt be
ZTlLlT Tea" Ttbe SSteem
oth «»"« than hated. *
neoessitv
ecesstty

sooiet^church
This is the

1

of ;
my

posrtion-that

I

must be hated. 57

This sort of seif soape
9 oati„ g is, of course, mawtish
and
embarrassing, out
thin,
,
what „ e se e both in
Meivilie and in Pirker
ls
a sort of wrenching
a„a y of a iaudabie set
of ideais from a
discursive
home which oan no ion et
g
support them,
ear.er was in fact treated
shabbi ly by the Boston
Uberal unitarian

nieW(

the fi ght would not have
been so Mtter

-ny

of the same visions and
insists.

^

o

^

participants

^

^

shared

Par.er.s change, it seems, is
to

move a„a y once and for ail
from an y version, no matter
how enlightened,
of utilitarianism.

Poor dear father, poor dear
mother!
You little knew how
many a man would curse the son
you painfully brought to life
and
painfully and religiously brought
up.
WelJ
I bl SS you--true
father and most holy mother vou
wer? to m«.
taught me was dnty^duty to
pleasure, not a pain, but a
duiy.58

^

,

SS^y^o^^^fif^ T
.

Duty is nearly synonymous with
conscience, and it serves God and
man.

At this point it is completely
negative, and James Russell

Lowell-

s

poem,

"A Fable for Critics," captures
both Melville and Parker.

I think I may call
Their belief a believing in nothing at
all
Or something of that sort; I know they
all went
For a general union of total dissent:

57.
58.

Ibid.
Ibid.,

138.
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?

With ° Ut co ^h or hem
believ
not in them;
" !
be ^ umb1
or prevented
Fro^ ?h
From
therr orthodox dissent,
he
He

fraLl

IV I

^
C ° Uld

OWed

a

^

^

^

diaaentS

-

y as conscience and the
individual as di gn i ty W ere
tormulations meant
to spea k to f ai lures
in liberal theol ogy
but without
ing
revivalism or Calvinism.
They
above all
all an attempt to
y are aoove
rescue the
insights o£ natural theology
£rom
vrec
Lifce a

_

,

_nts,

^

^^

^

as soon ss one tried
to embod y liberal dlssent
in positive

institutions, whether in romances
or in Boston
an apoi 0gy for a new
status quo

.

clones,

dissent became

Nor did Par ,ez or Bmerson
or Canning

or Meiviiie succeed in this
regard an y more than ha d the
liberal Boston
cler gy , and for a ion ti»
g
the advocates of d i gn i f ie
d self autonom y

were very leer y about
institutionalizing their insights.

All this granted, and as drearv
as his oonoeption may seem
toda y ,
Parker.
3 oonoeption of dut y must have struck «„,
y oun g American

intelleotuals as an astonishing innovation;

possibilities of being.

a

sort of leap into new

It gave one a basis for moral
aotion,

albeit

negative dissent, while avoiding the
pitfalls of utilitarianism and

sectarian religious dogma.

But mostly it gave one a language
and

standpoint for criticizing the worst
tendencies of the commercial ethos.

59.

Ibid.,

135.
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That George William
Curtis shared
shares these convictions
is very clear
from his lectures and
letters
etters.
a letter written
to Edward Gary in
I860, Curtis summed
up his religious
belief.
:s as follows

h

m

S

^
i^iiid:^^

and that
Inly essentia? tutSlV
which I u „de r! tand his
absolute f
dm, e„ii ghtened i
should believe this or i-w -k
Government, but tnat thev h ?hT
Uld Uve
7
°
lovingly. 60
,

,

.

in all of Curtis, orations,

of the argument.

™"

" t0 be
t an3tlous

b >-

s

<*»»
S
that men
G ° dhead ° r the »»ine
P" 61 *' ^stly and

^

'

this religious notion lies
behind muoh

He generaily invo.es the
authority of oonsoienoe and

duty as a reply to the
American ethos of political
moderation and
commercial compromise. We can
call Parker's conception cf
duty an

astonishing innovation because
with it Curtis inspired his
listeners to
oppose slavery, favor civil service
reform, and champion women's
suffrage. And Curtis was one cf
the most popular speakers in
America.

This religious doctrine was
obviously called into being partly
by

fifty years cf the noisy sectarian
feuds.

In the face of so many sects

all claiming to have the true
reading of scripture, what thinking
person

could with confidence claim to know
which, if any, was correct?
when one answers this challenge with
conscience,

60.

Cary,

7;

it becomes

334.

a

But

doctrine of individual

internally necessary to the doctrine that God

52

rSraaln fSirly rem °
te 61
-

-t

T

°

~* -

MM5

that each pe

,a the best jud ge 0£
uhat i3 and

„ on

Untt
eniightene ^
necessarily implies that~k
that churches are not
the medium through
which one
learns
purposes and
Churches are themselves
institutions within the world
„ hich o££ec
authoritative interpcetacions
of scripture and natural
event*
,h»
events.
They are based on the
claim that some
perhaps the regenerate, the
blessed, or the clergy,
can ma*e sense of
the world and the scriptures,
such that the members
can ,now how they
ought to live in the world.
Thus churches need tc ma.e
seme claim that

Ws

cedents

.

'God is a least- close enough
that we can *„o„ his
commandments in seme

detail and that these

_ds,

because God designed the world
with us

in mind, can be readily
carried out in the world He
created.

For

churches to prevail there needs
to be some very close
affinities between
God, nature, the church, and
human beings. And it is the
role of

preachers to help believers appreciate
these affinities and to act upon
them.

But once believers turn to the
more transcendental duty of

conscience, they are under pressure to
reject institutionalized ways of

belief as unreflective and dogmatic.

To listen to an official church

doctrine is to abandon one's own thought
processes.

Thus these

believers will need to also insist that God's
detailed will for humans
on earth is unavailable to us, and
possibly irrelevant.

61. William E. Connolly, Political Theory an rf
Blackwell, 1988), 142.

M^o rni - y

(Oxford: Basil

53

~—

the classical
ttadition in educationi
teiigion

Mt0tal CaUSaUty

* -3

possible to

-

*

—

t.

«^

in

experience

those theoiogies
uhich ciai

to explicate God's
will in detail
deta.l „.
as unwarranted
impositions.

^^

.

No „

^

Emerson

details about Him, and
He rsn
isn't-t i-„„
too anxrous about
just what we might
actually do to worship Him.
Eurthermore, the older
liberal theol ogy
seemed unable to offer any
compelling

_ ^^^
^

it acknowledged that
slaver, was an evil.

Hha t was needed was a

religion capable of reaching
the world.

It is into this void
that Parker hurled the
word duty.

And when
Curtis took it up, he was
able to inspire young
audiences at Union
College, at Brown, at Cornell,
and at Dartmouth with a
sense cf
excitement.
The excitement extended even
to such, for us, dry subjects
as civil service reform.
Edward Cary mentions several
times that the
men and women who worked
orKea on the
the* Civil
r-iwii Service
c~
Commission, though poorly
paid and overworked, were still
deeply enthusiastic.
But it was a happy quality of
the reform to excite the most
generous devotion in all honest
persons who had to do with it and
el
nt
d UP ° n *
of practical success ttlt has
steadily gained with every passing
steadTlvT
year. 62

V T

62.

Cary,

278.
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—

Leonard White renori-^
reports

=,j
similar
attitude among the
orxgnt young people
y mfcj briaht
tne Department o£
Agriculture

- «» experience
deration
-ndpoint

a

0f young

_

transcendental duty

_

ioaM £ound

tro m „ hich they might

^^
om

^

^
a

a

^

spirituai

possibiuties

^

theit

era

X

Ihs Data of the Hn ^ ri ran
sahalai

ti-

in 1856 Henry Wadsworth
Longfellow left the country
to live £o r a
in Europe.
G eor e

g

Willie* Curtis had aotuaUy
tried

^^

him:

....Couldn't you postpone until
after Christmas-

Curtis had been trying to arouse
all the great American men
of
learning to join him in actively
supporting the Fremont campaign for
the
presidency, this being the most
practical way of openly and actively

opposing slavery.

Curtis believed men of conscience
ought to support

the new Republican party.

But it must have seemed to him that
all the

best minds had given up on American
public life.

63.

Milne,

91.

Many people in his

55

circle of esteemed
friends, and for fh
three years he himself,
had gone to
-rope in search of beauty
culture and a cosmopolitan

-~

,

F uller,

,

Nathaniel Hawthorne,
Charles Elliot Norton

,

brother Burrill, for
instance.

This clearly bothered
him.

chapter over to

«-eiin9

to passengers on

a

Prue
rme

anrt
ann

t
i

,

k
he

*
had

given half

a

^^^^
^ ^^ ^^

„ hat . writer oould
bring

and his a„s MI „ as; only
the del

cce

m

_

£urope

^

ship passing by . tropioal

Perhaps through a haze of opi
um s.o.e.

In

^

^

one is le£t

thinking that this is enough,
hut in that boo* Curtis
is interested in
how someone like an old
boo^eeper mig ht .aintain, even
in ^erioa, a
high quality of P
private
ate life.
life
In io«
1856 whe was thinking of public
life,
and travel to Europe is judged
much more harshly.

m

By 1856 Curtis is making heavier
demands upon authors.

could an author be like

a

No more

large clipper ship from which
one might get

inspiring whiffs of far away places;
of nutmegs, molasses, or fruits.
indirection was no longer enough, and
no more was it permissible for

64

intellectuals to set sail just because
the hubbub of America smelled so

nauseatingly rotten.

At this point,

1856,

Curtis' biographers usually

say that politics came to take up
more of his time than literature.

64.

Cary,

66.

56

suggest it is helpful tQ
see

I

if not the philosophy,

EmerS °n

Channing
'

break

'

^

^

^^^

^

^^^

at least the strategy
of Curtis- .enters,

—

Longfellow » and Hawthorne.

C ° mPare

CUrti3

'

To see how complete the

nts to his friend Isaac
Hecker

in 1843 with what he was
saying in 1856.

m

1843, praising

individuality in Emersonian terms,
he wrote:
Thro- me does not a higher
judge give judgment-.
11 " 1
m ° re POSSible to
*° -tside yourself
and look at your own individuality?
.... Every man, tool like

an/loo^/

^

** *"

the^s^f

~™

The trap to be avoided in 1843
is dependence.

interferes with true nobility.

*

^

Even friendship

And the duty of the individual, if
duty

is the correct word in this period,

is to facilitate,

by indirection and

exemplification, the showing to each individual
of the jewel which
resides unseen within him or her.
•Self-Reliance,'

"Trust thyself," Emerson wrote in

"and every heart vibrates to that iron string."

Emerson himself did tend to be active in public
life, especially on the
public lecture circuit, and all the issues

I

am raising here were

probably known to him, but never satisfactorily settled.
66

Still,

the

inference the young Curtis drew from all this was
disengagement.

65. Milne, 15.
For the impossibility of this two way journey away and
towards oneself, see Mark Taylor "Corporality, " on Merleau-Ponty in
Alterity
(Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 61-82.
66. Miller (1974), 206-207.
,
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Reform becomes at last^
loses soul...
the wLa

^

=,

maTr

The harvest is said
to come in the

house of the sphere of
our duty.
duty

»

^

at eiSm
H

S° £

K

" « - 9 ani 2e d

^ ^^^

q£

»v^o
Vigorous Irving"
,

•

is the medium Qf

Reform is organized distrust
it sav^ ho
God's hand -You are a
miserable bu iness lo"
farrer! and so disputes
Y°U
"
some Fourier or Robert O
Owen Jto improve the
bungling. 69

way to oppose slavery is
to grow inwardly and
intellectually.
Whs „ the
good .an changes on the inside,
the effect cannot fail to
show in his
surroundings. Of course Emerson
would sa y that institutions
are but the
shadows oast by actual people,
and improving the character
cf people
will ultimately affect the
character of institutions. And
the mature
Curtis probably understood this
relationship as well as anyone ever
has.
My point is that in this early
period, he has a very naive, cr
perhaps
mystical, understanding cf this
issue.
He was more concerned about how
a

private person lived

a

cculd do the same thing.
about the latter.

Milne, 16.
Ibid., 19.
69. Cary, 125.
67.

68.

good and vigorous life than about how

a

public

Later, events in Kansas had made him
worried

58

Curtis in 1856 is
perched atC tne
the br^V
k ,
break between
two modes of
individualism th^tthat U, two ways of
realizing subjectivity
in the
world. 70 The first
mode Curtis learned
at Brook Farm,
ac
Farm where
„
he lived
for eighteen months
It i . . _,
PUrS "*3«otivity. that
is, it knows
itself immediately, it
seeks to see itself without
referenoe to
community norms, standards,
or traditions, and,
in fact, spends a great
deal of time purging
itself of all such old dead
weight and noise
especially of religious
sectarianism and dogmatism.
Unitarianism and
transcendentalism are its creeds
r-,,„i.
Curtis never became an
atheist, but
^

-

to preserve his faith
he, much like a. ..
Turner

organized religion.

And in muoh the same „ ay and

same reason, he also avoided
politics.

Curtis
and honesty.

,

^
^^^^
had to shun

Qf

religion was based completely
upon individual conscience
But for Curtis this stance
hit several snags.

one already alluded to, that

a

First, the

purely literary approach, informed
by

even the best European traditions,
was difficult to communicate
to
American audiences.
It was unclear whether the
insights gained in

Europe were transferable to America,
and it was unclear whether they
even could address the American
experience.
Curtis put this in terms of
noble sentiment, apparently after a
study of Plato.
Commenting here on

democracy in America he says:

The theory of democracy is noble.
It asserts the majesty of
human nature.
It is the wise man governing himself.
it implies
70.

Connolly (1988), 100-02

59

^

V Mml
U

^

the popular creed,
P
then tL llZAtTlT
the canonization or
Whether
order *
the martvrd™ I ft
not find in the American
1
Now 1 *>
people that v ,
democracy either politic
al0ne Can render
or
rt
are not a people
WS
actually capable "of self"
lf <? over nment, however
may be our theory. 71
fair

^

St

'

T—

^

Curtis was not a mean-spirited
man and he could not for
long
personally sustain such a low
estimate of his
Ub rexiow
fellow Americans.
Am.
He was
-otic ana he needed . sphere of
actien.
But this pompous paragraph
is
interesting fer its mixing of
Emerson s imagery

^

.

^

tensions between the two see,
to be resolved by interpreting
Plato's
wise .an as though he were
Emerson's.
The wise man here, governing
himself, who the majority might,
as in olassical political
theory,

either make

a

demagogue or a scapegoat, is not

transcendentalism

a

classical hero, but a

But the classical statement
of the political probl em

doesn't really cover the American
case.

Noble American intellectuals

were in danger, not of being made
into demagogues or scapegoats,
but of
simply being ignored. And most
often they preferred it that way;
they

purposely remained detached.

But this strategy, which had worked
in the lives of Longfellow,

Hawthorne, and others of that generation,
did not work for Curtis.

Where the older men had sought individuality
as

a

space beyond the

busyness of American life or the boredom of
the Customs House, Curtis
sought out the community and the political
as arenas in which his
71.

Milne, 26.

60

individuality could find
expression
pressron.

» .formulas and
His
references to

individuality never change;
ge. in
an 18B?
1882 h'
hrs vrsron of the
educated man's
mission still rings with
notes first rung b
y Emerson:

and^™ ofSt^r"^ ^

s^rr-s — -

6 ." 0

°£

-grij~:irr

It is not that he
ahandoned the visions of
Broo* Parm,

s

hut that he

changes most dramatically
in Curtis is his attitude
towards the fitness
of Americans to rule
themselves.
Prom !856 on, if Americans
are too
venal for democracy, it is
not the fault of the c„»n
man, hut the

cowardice and aloofness of
intellectuals.

in the "Duty of an

Ericas

Scholars
life.

address, he maKes this the
starting point of his whole
puhlic
He opens by quoting Milton's,
-I cannot praise a fugitive
and

cloistered virtue..."

The Longfellows had been in
Europe only

a

few weeks when these

words were spoken, and they must
have been on his mind as he worked
on
the speech, systematically revising
his earlier thoughts on reform,
action, organization, and duty.

The speech was a resounding success,
it

was reprinted in the New York
papers the next day.

The American

scholar's duty is to be the conscience
of the nation.

72.
73.

Curtis, Orations and AH dressps
Ibid., 9-35.

,
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The end of all

61

scholarly attainment is
the samP
same,
different now.
the world,-

Even

if

It follows ,

»

»

to

the man be .

Curtis say5f

^ ^^
l lve

nobly." But the harvest
is

„

^

^

&

the fundamentai

^

life is liberty" and that
a thought which will
help the world
if one can not tell it
to the world.
Scholars must introduce:

^^^Z^ ^

s
f
u
ice into human affairs
wa S
icZVr t r;:tis fy n:
but to serve Cod and man!
expedient and watch with alarm
the flickering of the funds
to pursue the truth and the
eternal law of justice

notour

usel ess

-

«•

he is

74

in a republic especially,
educated people must participate or
else

the politics of expediency and
flickering funds will eventually eclipse

the very principle of liberty.

He means this quite literally.

In other

speeches Curtis worked out more clearly
how the commercial spirit could
lead the nation, in the name of union
and prosperity, to compromise far
too much with slavery.

Our commercial success tends to make us
all cowards
Are
we satisfied that America should have
no other excuse for
independent national existence than a superior
facility at money
making? Shall it have no national justification
to the heart and
intellect? Does the production of twelve hundred
million pounds
of cotton fulfill the destiny of this
continent in the order of

providence?75

74.
75.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,

13-14.
58.

~—

^^^

Slavery annlhilates
sel£
361£ r6SPeCt

"

-

-e

cannot have m oral respect
unless he be free."

;

M

^
the laborer

Slavery and commerce are
th
P one-two
r>no
the
punch which threaten
t:
:rue
individuality in America.
Slavery, uetduse
because It
itm , expand,
must
^vn^nH because
k~
"iuou
it
«u« subvert through fugitive
slave
the very principle of
Uberty
and dignity for all and
,
because
*.

_y i

U«

lfc

^

^

^

^

the support of the state,
would l iterally de morali
ze the country.
coerce tends to raa.e us slaves to
prosperity, replying

industriousness with busyness,
the endless pursuit of
nere life.

"Co^eroisl prosperity is only

a

ourse if it be not subservient
to

^

And

^

and intellectual progress,
and our prosperity will
oonquer us i£ „e dQ
not conquer our prosperity.
DrosDprit-v "ia
ci
Slavery
76
and commerce in league with
each
other are a threat to America
itself.

It may be important to note
that Curtis is not advocating
an

Aristotelean ethical order.

The images he uses are never
any

naturalistic right-ordering of the
polity.

He explicitly unhooks

America from any understanding of
natural law, 77 and he certainly didn't
believe in natural hierarchies. The
role educated men are supposed to

perform is never justified as in any way
naturally superior, but merely
different and extremely important.

76.
77.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,

57.
41.

Furthermore, American morality needs

63

to be created on
purpose
P

tv,o
The

^

m odel 1, not Ari3totle
but Thermopylaei
,
,

.

and of Leonidas holdin,
the pass against

^

The Roistered virtue
or Curtis. youth
could not
under the hustle of
^eriean oo^ereiar Ufe. nor
in the taoe of
SlaV y
THiS
«>« Curti.
It reads h im to
reve.se his earner stand
on orations.
He reinterprets the P
gri „
father as though they were
pra^atic transcendentalists
om tne
love of liberty, and from
whatt is rarer
rar P r #•>,„
k-t
the ability
to organize liberty
in institutions, sprang
the America of «hi,„
v
whrch we are so fondly
proud. "78
But the point is not to
discover in iinstitutions
n ,tit„f^
our common

"

^

'

U

.

understandings and then have
ve individual*
individuals take part in

a

^

common ethical

life.

Rather the individual has been
discovered to require
organizations and the sphere of
activity they provide in order
to
realize himself, or give himself
a content.
There is never any question
of which takes precedence;
the individual always has
primacy over the

organization, and is in fact the only
court of appeal beyond the
organization.

One forms organizations like the
Republican party because that is
the only way, in

a

republic, to do great things.

Taking

active interest necessarily leads to
party affiliation.

a

practical and

"Great public

results... are due to that organization
of effort and concentration of

78.

Ibid.,

51.
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aim which arouse,
instruct
struct, «„,i
and rnsprre the
popular heart and will "79
•

Pharisees performed al l the
terms, "vet lac.ed the
„er y heart or
religion,. And Jullus
Caesar beoame
^

^

government.

Therefore
^
nerefore, i-v^
the duty
of American scholars
isn't merely to
a.

hold office or to vote.

althou^

b
rt ma y

TnlLIXT

T""^

Ch

^

""^
"

^

d
con =tant active

practical participation in ti, I
upon the P
Public affairs falls under
the cent ol o sexrish
sir ish and ignorant,
°f or
crafty and venal men
t m Q=
4-u ^
P<SrS ° nal *"ention~„hich,
it must be incessant' is
as
oft"
the details of Politics
0

lr^TZZA\TJZ:i lllllTl^^

LHon"

^ZZlTlr^t"^^

=tSiTis^r

g

^ ^ ^Sv-r
-s

Intellectuals are tempted to disdain
politics, but only

intellectuals can insure that political
banality does not rule our
institutions.

First against slavery, and later
against party spirit and

the spoils system, Curtis always held
up the enlightened moral

individual.

The educated man must fight the
withering spell and "assert

the independence and dignity of the
individual citizen, and to prove

that party was made for the voter, not
the voter for party. 81
79.
80.
81.

Ibid., 272.
Ibid., 266-67
Ibid., 279.

But to

65

make this difference
f«ence, t-«
to insure that the
United States «
'as a moral
first an d a oo^eroiai
re P u bl io second
to be an
,
b e rty m ore than ln
husiness, inteileetuais
ha d to patt icip ate
Otherwise their free d o n
„as e mpty at host a nd
en dan 9 ete d at ,o tst
into .ore P hiloso hie
ter m s, subj ectivit
P
•

^=

^

U

Put

y coui d not he reaii 2 e d
ne 9 atiuei y as an earne
d esoa P e fro, hus ness
an d noise; it coui d
y
not
define itself oven a
ainst
g
the co™onalit without
y
ma ,i„ g the
commonality part of its self
„.!*.
definxtion.
Brook Farm is simply Wall
Street inverted.
Before 1 856 one could
evaluafce

Positively or negatively, grub
in the markefc or

^^

^

air of subjectivity-and
Curtis actually did try
both options-but one
could not be both a su bj ect
and a participant in
American daily affairs.
One's subjectivity could not
make any difference.
The youn g Curtis,
whether at Brook Farm or on Wall
street, must have felt half
deadened,
even given his native enthusiasm
and good humor.

After 1856, Curtis turned his
eroticism on American public
opinion.
He sought always to bring
out its best and he always had
a
lover's insecurities about its
potential for the worst.
But if the
people, through public opinion,
can be active in the strong sense
of
agency, then there is strong
pressure in his position to regard

institutions as finally neutral.

The Supreme Court,

for instance, will

always be glancing towards public
opinion when it interprets laws, and
the long debates over slavery had
convinced Curtis that the Constitution

could be plausibly interpreted to defend
even slavery if the people were

66

everyone's mind he said:

Constituent

ll^Tl^LZ^lt ""^
"

S

~«

°f

means in a crisis what
always
the'oeoo".' I 0Se
The P eo P le °* the
United States will alw„„. Pf P
°
° MStlttti °» *>«
themselves, because that
°*
because they have learned
and
h
9
sometim
do partisan service
appointed to
,
the measure of our morally
always be
°" C ° nStituti °"
82

^
isT^'
2"^™
1
-

'

«

Again these themes recur
throughout Curtis' life.
In 1882
claiming that it is no stig™
when limited men label one
a visionary, he
,

says that:

A visionary is one who
holds morality to be stronaer
than fh„
-«'0«±ty.... Cobden felt that the
heart of England was a
gentleman, and not a bully.
So thinks the educated

hrs own country.

„ e has faith enough in the people

p p ul

cir :

t

:h^r~ror:.8r

ability of the pe ° pie

^erican

of

To anneal to

-

--

And in 1877, on the same subject
he said:

It is especially necessary for us
to perceive the vital
relatron of individual courage and
character to the common
welfare, because ours is a government
of public opinion, and
publxc opinion is but the aggregate of
individual thought
We
have the awful responsibility as a
community of doing what we
choose, and it is of the last importance
that we choose to do what
is wise and right. 84

82. Ibid., 92. Note, by the way, the two
constitutions here; the written
and the unwritten, denoted by the upper
case and lower case 'c
•

83.
84.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,

331-32.
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"Technical scholarshio
snip,
a

dictionary and ends in

"

fwn
Curtis.

gramar

a

.

Hilton b e 9 an in literature
and ended
to show,

the dut y of the educated

participate in public

U fe,

^
^ ^^

k
^
had

The

^

Mn

announced in 1856, "begins
in

„

to his

^
^^
^

;

county changed.

One must

and the older aloofness
could only appear

selfish.

Without the participation
of the educated and
intelligent
members of the nation the
dream of liberty would
never b e reaped.
with this insight Curtis
opened his long erotic affair
with public
opinion.
His orations all read
1U. an uneas y mixture of Emerson's
"Self-Relianoe" and Plate's
"Symposium," both of which he
read and
adored when he was y oung. At the
level of systems, a Kantian

flnd

individualism such as Curtis' can
be called too abstract and
too
universalistic.
But when we descend to the
level of a man trying to
live out a coherent standpoint,
we find that at least for one
man

at one

time, it also could accommodate
and put into practice a sensuousness
not

usually associated with such a
philosophy.

should be

a

And of course all this

warning not to interpret Curtis or
other reformers of this

period through preconceived notions of
what we believe about the later
Progressive period.

4,

The

DppUne

of Manners

a

nd th e Bias o£ Organizations

Everywhere Curtis looked he saw

a

general tackiness taking over

the United States; it seemed to prevail in
manners, in morals, and in
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™
-ion

ce ,es sia.ery „ as
tolerated because

impossible, and politics
and,

-

«-

oom„ercial ethos, „ hich
is

„

speeches,

..

M„ce,

important,

a

_

system of education

^
.

^^

Much 0£ this he lays
at the

,

fcoth a

slowness to extremism,
a

o£

^

blessing

a

He „ york and it press „

Influence of „ igher EdacaUon
,.
-tole

oppose

^

lat6r , Roscoe conkling

ol6K in t

^

^

,f

^

^ ^^
^^^ ^

csrtain liberality ,

a

_ ^
„

..

The spirit

anfl

a„d

-sufficient conditions cf freedom,
which without them destroys
itself,
but which also always
tuns the risk of being
forgotten in their
presence

The problem with commerce,
then, stem from its ability
to limit
certain excesses of democratic
politics while encouraging
others.
Business men "pursue what is
expedient and watch with alarm
the
flickering of tne
the funds
-t
funds, " but easxly
lose sight of justice and
freedom.
t

"[Our]... wise shrewdness and great
aspect of action harmonize with
an
absence and postponement of art.
"86
There is, then, a general

forget fulness of freedom and
justice, taste and eminence.

85.
86.

Milne, 13.
Cary, 43.
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Probably no one anymore
should
uxa try to nr
* manners
ground
and taste in
objective criteria
ri
m
teria.87
Along
„ lth religion
education, manners could not- o
not survive the
ontologlcal shifts of the
early
nineteen hundreds. If
nature can no longer
be

^

_

^

_^

created with humans in
mind, then there can
he no inherently
oorreot
behavior ror
npnni
for people,
anymore than there6 can
ho a universally
° an be
recognized
expounder of the Constitution.
Purthermore, utilitarianism
view the earth an d the
people upon it as infinitely
available for
o-elopment an d chan g e. In the
absence of universally
recognized
3tand ar ds of behavior, any
manipulation of people which
oan plausihly be
sai d to contribute to
their „ell-bein g is
justifiable.
E van 9 elism and
political parties would be
cases in point.
nointif genteel behavior
could no
ion 9 er speak with authority
to the nee d
,

s

no .rounds for limiti ng the
demands

a

of Americans,

^

^

and if there were

party mi g ht make upon its
„illin g

Participants, then, since party
was by definition go od, the
party could
ask anything of its members,
including tithes for office
hcldin g
The
.

iinchpin of the argument for
leavin g the party alone in this
ultimately
rests on the old relation to
nature which I discussed under the
concepts
of natural theology.

To say that there is nothing in
nature which

prohibits these behaviors is tc first
of all recognize the old standard
as the only viable one, but
then to deny in every specific case
that the

anS

9 Gadamer ' ItUth and Method (New xork.- Crossroad
Press,
I
see
especially Part I. Jean Bethke Elshtain
has reminded me
Alan B1 °° m does a "e«*Pt just such a
natural grounding
of taste and manners in his
Clo sing of the Smarisaa Mi "^
I take up
this problem more rigorously in Chapter
II through Kant's discussion of
Spinoza's natural teleology.

,Lf
1982).

,

LT™

.
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old standard can
actually SDea
« us.
y speakk to

This seems particularly

™" — -

" m" ality c
ca.es, while , ti »
holding
e

operative.

And

I

i.

on tQ morality

^

helps ln any speoi£ic

^

^

t-hint
think *-w
thla

accounts for so,e of
the viciousness with
which reformers were
p„
attachattacked, for instance
Roscoe Conkling-a savage
two
hour denunciation of
Curtis »nH
Curtis,
^ t
and Curtis
was present, at the
1877 New
*ork state Republican
Convention
vention.
rv™i,i
Conklmg
referred to Curtis as the
••man-milliner" and as the
carpet . knlght q£
•

•

,.

Curtis. morali 2 ation of
America circumvented this
sort of moral

wisdom of the natural causal
order.

„e en ti rel y relocated
the ground of

virtue and purity outside
of scientific nature
altogether, placing it
instead in the subjective
conditions of rationality.
He
thereby, at

least in principle, saved
manners from a crass materialistic
fate.
But
at the same time he sought
to save Emerson's vision of
Nature as the
light through which God shines
in everyone,
viewed practically, in
Curtis' hands the sources of
morality, virility, purity,
manners, and
action were all more immediately
available to individuals than they
had
ever been before.
Nature also is more directly
available.
These things
are not mediated any more through
preachers or party bosses. We have
already seen how the concept of duty
and the subject it implies, in the
hands of Parker and Emerson, acted
as a means to save natural theology

after Kant and Hume and American
commerce had discredited its basis in
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science.

But-

r„
r n„
Curt.s
reverse, their e,rli,
r strategy

Rather than
trying defensively to
pre , PrvB some
e
preserve
relation to nature against
the
hubbub and noise, Curtis
tried to take the off
offensive.
He attacked the
and noise „ ith the
insigh;a he had gained
f
Ua raing S u bj ect iv it y „ as empty
it oQuid nM

—

.

•

u

.

^

^
^ ^^
^^^^

tr a nsror m i„ g the hubbub
lnto at least a higher

alrea dy noted , this
required

rhetorical

^^
^
^

^^^^

b

^ ^

bec ause Africans na d
ai„ ay s sou g nt, as

, have trled tg
show throu g hout this
chapter> to ground the±r
£reedQm
Curtis off ere. a new aiteit
p ated d own version of , natural
"°te S ° 1Ved S ° me f
°
° ld
»ith m o rallty , but lt also
had
some impo rtent institutional
implications.
It is to these that I win
now turn

^

« P»««-

Curtis was

near as

I

a

reformer.

He was not an organizations
theorist.

So

can tell he never thought
critically about the institutional

legacy he was leaving.

still

I

don't think it is unfair at this
point

to note some of the drawbacks
of his moral formulations.

First, nature had to become a
sort of Real World, that against

which we measure human institutions
and find them wanting.
can never be an actual nature.

As such it

This means that reform, for instance,

can have no end, and no amount of
political victory is enough to declare

oneself the winner.

Liberty, like art, is always postponed.

And
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SUbjeCtS

""

Reives

*

"~

*

*»

an indivldual „ ho
ia no„

decisions

i mpli es

bo th

-Me

^

a p eriod o£

individual,

^
I

the u „ d6rd09s , no
matter Khat

tutelage and ,

b in d 0£ believing

^^^^

oonMpt

om

^

^

for Curt,
n„, f ; s„ clearly
beg ins life at college
,
commencement, or
upon leaving Brook Fa rm.
one returns to one,
al ma mater in order
to
n

xn sue, a way that you
will not be embarrassed
by either your youthful
ld ealis m or your later
experience.
Truth is forever young. 88
So some
institutions are good tutors
and see are not.
Colleges are certainly

legitime,

out parties are not.

But such claims, while
seeming self-

evident to intellectuals and
college trained people, will
always be
perceived as arbitrary by some
members of the population.

Third, the approach is always,

arbitrary power of kings.

89

in a sense, dethroning the

Curtis sometimes defends civil
service

reform on the grounds that political
parties have become

version of an executive with too
much arbitrary power.
strain things

a bit.

In fact,

a

modern

This seems to

the executive branch has never
been

weaker than it was during the post-Civil
War period, and the Republican
party, though very powerful, was
never so monolithic as

a

king.

Yet

only this model of power will fit with
Curtis- understanding of freedom,

88
Curtis Qratat ion s and Ad rPssPs, Vol. I,
316.
This is also a major
JO
point in Prue anH t
89. Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Pow.r/Knnwl^
C olin Gordon,
trans., (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979).
:

'

" hiCh

-in,

"

-s -

al " ays de£i

o1

Edition

-

and pouer

—
—^

parties, what he thinly
thinks xs wrong
h

i3
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itraty authority
inst

the

_^^^^
,

that there ig an
arbitrary

aggrandizement of the party
ty boss,
boss aand
„n -v,thxs results in demeaning
those
who hold political
patronage positions.
Curtis
us rfeels
eeis he only needs to
d of£ . li3t o£ the
gross ine£flciencies and
subservient behaviQrs
office ho lders to
that the
o£ spoiis ia too
rotten
tolerate
since the
natural justification
and since , therefore
others are obeying

-

,

m
^ ^ ^ «~
-

-

,

^

^

-

arMtrary

^^

,

workers are denied access
to their own conscience
and morality, viewed
fro» the point of vie* of
the
good nothing ln the spoils
system
can allow for the voice
of the whole to
lo speaK.
speak
Th»
The unexamined
,

from the boss's arbitrary
personal bon dag e, individuals
would be able to
hear the voice of a universal
conscience within themselves.
Curtis
can't im a gine that much of the
party's power might be arbitrary,
yet
impersonal.

Thus one is compelled to
interpret all threats to morality

and freedom in terms of arbitr
a ry authority, end this
blinds reformers
to the power structures that
don't fit this model, for instance,
those
they set up themselves, like
tightening the discipline in the New
York
State University system, or the
aspects of self-surveillance that must
accompany a heavy emphasis on individual
conscience.
But primarily it

blinded them to seeing how the reform
did not so much abolish
authorities as replace them with others.
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Rein

"

SCh

"mann h "

^^

^

^

^

«- t-» ape.UU.

agencies,- meaning mostly
Rant

,

s

—

custodial

transcendentai
These
agencies act as fiduciaries
~*
.duciar.es of reason,
once reason has
deconstruoted
aUth0ritiSS
e, Curtis, conscience
and the sau it requires
are certainiy

~

but Curtis, in order
to make the se lf
extroverted, had to oreate
agencies of government which
have a verv
very simile
similar ,function.
what the
metaphor of the king did to
Curtis
rtis was to leave
l„
uhim unable to comprehend
that these agencies of
self and government
might also be barriers to
freedom, might still act,
to keep the metaphor
of tutelage, to keep us

immature

p.

in this chapter

I

Conclusion

have tried tc view the rise
of modern

meritorious organizations from the
point of view of an American
Protestant problematic,
in the first section I
discussed what might be
called God's withdrawing His hand
from
nature,

such that His will could

no longer be authoritatively
read in detail from natural events.

I

also

noted some early religious responses
to this, like evangelism and
natural theology.

m

the second and third sections

I

discussed two

other responses; the Land Grant College
system and the articulation of

public duty by

a

civil service reformer.

These responses are somewhat

90. Reiner Schurmann, Heide g ger op
Being and ArHna- txaa p^n„ r1 -.
Anarchy
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1987), 8-9.
i

,
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Afferent, yet both
seemed to contain
an xnternal
organizational
imperative.

Jonathan

B.

Turner locates
]„n -

source of virtue in
the
natural laws by whirh r^w
Cod w.sely governs
nature
To be enUghtened
about these laws is
be opened to a
liberalitv «,
noerality
equal to that which
classical education used
to impart
imoart- to
f„ the
professional classes.
But the
only way to ma.e such
a relation to
natural laws possible
is to form
lar 9e state university
system. G eor ge William
Curtis sou g ht in a
-her different way to add a
spiritual tension to
American public
Uf.,
online Turner, he
celebrated the value of
classical learnin g
but insisted, U*e
Turner, that it not be
used in the service of
mere
scholarship or by clerical
functionaries as a way of k
eepin g people
subordinated to unquestioned
d 0gmaa.
But Curtis locates the
source of
-rality in a conscience which,
when properly enlivened,
can g uarantee
the highest principles a
g ainst the hubbub of American
democracy.
The
difference between the two
responses resembles in .any
respects the
difference between Rousseau's
Savoyard vicar and Kant's
cosmopolitan
a

•

.

,

„

By mentioning the names of
Rousseau and Kant

I

have tried to call

attention to two versions of the
doctrine of self-legislating freedom
as
it applied in America.
Thou g htful Americans had come
to believe, once
the prose-of-the-world standpoint
was abandoned, that freedom hinged
on
subjugation only to laws one gave
oneself.
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Turner's might be
thought
9ht of a
,
as

a
a

k
physrcal
solution, based upon

sample concepts
generally understood
ooa by all m.
k
members
of the community
and articulated in
* ***
a9rlculture
H
<
-ike in Ro
s £2£ia
_
neoessary
largely undiscovered
and extreeiy

—
_
^m
^
^ ^^

*

_.

-o,

.

^^^^

^ jb

then, the university
system functions as .
second ethos
The second ethos is
necessary largely because

_

adjunct

^

agricultural knowledges
could, b y nis
.„...
dav
sustain
y his da
y
neither themselves
nor American agriculture
ture.
T r»HiM
Traditional
agricultural knowledge is,
in
,

-rner.

s

view,

element „ f

iterance and ruin.

, implicity

and

^^

Turner sought to maintain
the

^

^

^

^

rdaal college as an
interdisoiplinar y hands-on and,
though highl y
structured, at least lcosel
y scheduled institution.
L1 ke Kousseau,
Turner had nc gualms about
disciplining those whose
behavior disrupted
self-legislated f reedom. Onl
y hard working highly motivated
people who
shared the general visicn were
truly welcome.
The second ethos, of
course, never did do what
Turner intehded.
Its scientific discoveries
were too minute a„d too
complicated aha took too much
extended
concentration for uhdergraduates
to easil y uhcover them in the
course of
a year or two, and its
discourse quickly became too
technical and
cumbersome to form anything like
a community of shared
concepts.

From the perspective of this study,
by turning to science at all
Turner has already become more
Kantian than Rousseauean.

As so,
>on as one

admits that the natural scope of
man's powers are insufficient to

hi,
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highest moral and ohv^i^i
physrcal needs and
t h.t kno „led e and
9
reason need to
cuitivated that he
Powers „ ot merely
natural lMtinot but
rather
£r
-

r
-

-----

-

_

^

m

3COP... one has forsaken
Kousseau and entered

^«uuy
sinoe he

U

^
a

Kantian world 91

^^
.

..e. Turner lo3es

,

U na b le t o

M3

exi3tentiai intsrest

either Mlnt4ia hls
3tandpoint

^

its tensions.

Thus

^

The analogy between
G. W
w. CurH«
t
Curtis »r>*
and Immanuel
Kant is meant to
the doctrine of
freedom in
. intelligible

*+Um
«

^

^

..K-^.^

opposed to phy , ic . 1( £orm

needn.t g ive itself a

.

specie

u

The advantage of this
version ia
pl ace, an y specific
set of

not provide any specific
ethos.

„

^

distances,

. highly lntegcated

co^ercial repuhlic, this version
neednH hecce ver y specific
ahout how
one ou g ht to iive and can
even appeal to people with
very diverse ways
of life.
J.

B.

In an intelligible
version of aeir
self-leaisl
-f«H freedom
*
*
legislated
much of

Turner's discipline can be
relaxed.

The doctrine of intelligible
freedom insists that people are

endowed with and enjoy "active
and spontaneous faculties which
are not
reducible to the the dictates of
sensuousness
We have interests and
needs as understanding and reasoning
beings which often directly
.

e rge ArmStr ° ng
Cambr H
„
Cambridge
University Press, 1969),

,nd Hinmry.,
95.

(Cambridge:
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contradict our interests
erests aas« sensuous
ani ma iistio beings
92
AU Qther
versions of
freedom-Rousseauean tra
trariit^tionalist utilitarian and
tend to subordinate
these faculties and
interests
o, the „hoi e , but ln
dolng so „ ind up
de£eating prsciseiy
freedom they cl aim to
celebrate.
This is h»„
because true freedom
cannot be
the resuit of naturai
causai necessity.
„„ether that be family,
tradition, onanism, or
sensuous desire.
To be subject to
naturai
-salitv is to be thi„gli ke Evety
natural action
^
^
prior action. Thus nothing
in nature can be said
to be truly
spontaneous. A free being
cannot be one subject to
such things.
Thus
literally no tMng can be
prior to a rree
free action *.
as its cause.
Thus,

—

.

•

'

f

^
^^
^

^

^

^

.

^

•

the intelligible formulation
of self-legislating
freedom claims that it
is only to the extent
that w. clearly mar, ourselves
off from things
that we can be free.
Respect people; that is, don't
use them as

elements in

a

causal
sax cnain.
chain

an other versions of freedom
All
wind up

violating this precept.

This implies that people must
become the sort of beings who can
hear for themselves the voices
of reason and understanding.
Only such

people could ever hope to choose to
bring themselves, one at

a time,

together to form the community of
intelligible freedom, the community in
which everyone obeys the laws they
have made for themselves.
This being
is properly called a subject,

Gilles Deleuze, Kant,
Barbara Habberjam, trans.
Press, 1984), 30-31.
92.

'

3

and certainly Curtis can be seen

Crit i ca l Ph ilosop hy Hugh Tomlinson and
(Minneapolis, MN University of Minnesota
,

:
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constantly exhorting
People,
people „,
as h,j
had „Emerson before
him, to aohieve
mere and more refined
sub jeotivity

14

"

a form of

SaSy t0

*"

h °" SUCh

a

stance might iead one
to

*

disengaged politios, that
of the spectator.

Curtis strove to
overcome this problem
through eduoating public
opinion and thcough
creating organizations.
Ths civil Service
Commission, however, seems

to

be an essentially negative
institution, charged with
clearing away
social structures li ke party
patronage which bloc,
subjectivity.
In

weber.s terms, Curtis opposes
patriarchal institutions but
accepts,
with little reflection,
bureaucratic institutions,
seeing clearly the
problems of personal domination,
but seeing not at all those
of
impersonal domination.

If the new institutions,

the Civil Service Commission
or the

Department of Agriculture, say, are
understood as attempts to establish
self-legislated freedom, then the ground
of that freedom will need to
reside in the institutions' ability
to organize an arena of intelligible
freedom,

a

site where an intelligible community
could, if it did ever in

fact come to exist,

flourish.

In practical terms this means that
the

institution must not be self-defeating,
could never have passed.

a

test which the spoils system

Nor would it build personal empires or

establish natural hierarchies, since these
violate the community's
requirement for equality and the personal voice
of reason present in
each member, that is, the requirement that
no member be treated merely
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as means.

Thi

^

wmii^

thS

~

cou ld subordinate
him or
herself to the
organization and remain
fr
free, provided he
or she believed
in the organization
<™ a
goals
and procedures, and
that they
seif _
defeating, and that it
allocates work on the
fh» K
basis of rationally
tested
and universally
aooeptable standards of
merit
merit.
This
Thxs is clearly a
tall
order and 1 win have
t „ retutn fc>
=!

i

=.

•

•

,

^ ^

^

Both Turner and Curtis,
despite their personal
unique,
sness and
creativity, suoceeded in
oreati„ g organizational
solutions which are
unlikely to produce men
such as themselves.
therefore
largely
irreievant whether they were
personaily elitist, or
ethical, or selfinterested, we can also say
that modern organizations
are in large part

«

attests to fill

u

vacancy left in our spiritual
lives by the withdrawal
of God's providence from
our Mediate lives.
They insure behavior, an
arena of action, and a link
with goodness which wouid
be unavailable
otherwise.
That organizations cannot
fulfil! the terms of this
promise
will be the subject of much
of the rest of this
dissertation.
But for
now we ought to say that modern
organizations grow out of our most
worthy aspirations and sentiments;
freedom, dignity, love, and
spirituality.
a

Any great object we undertake
today will have to be done as Curtis
says,

"in combination," and also without
final reference to any

recognized authority.
from

a

I

have tried to show that his consequence
foil ows

history of religious concern over the
disenchantment of nature.

This history involved
the Play
ni av of the
problem of theodicy with
the
problem of frepHom
v~
eedom.
For the

^

tlee Un

and

" 3S

-a tS3i es,

^ ^

~^—

^

—-

^

a SpiMtlons ., 0

in tandum and in
tension<

but finally

^

ys

^

^

through

a

^

lau dable aspirations,
and these aspirations

^^

^^

^

be both £ree

^

^

^ ^

^^

Parties, interest groups,
universities. and other
complex modern
organizations.
The problem,
nrnhiom t-v
then, beoomes how to
maintain freedom
"ithin a complex and
interdependent life.

Both Turner and Curtis
failed to appreciate that it
isn't only
Private and personally based
motives which present this
problem; it
isn't Just a problem with
utilitarianism.
It la also a problem in
even
the most meritcrious government
agencies end even the most open
modern
universities.
Thus we can learn a great
deal from Turner's critique
of
classic.! education and his
critiques of the older American
relation to
the land.
These critiques should alert us
to the fact that some options
of the past, say an Aristotelean
ethical relation to the world, are
probably closed to us. And we can
learn much from Curtis' condemnations
Of party spirit, and be alerted
to why it is that such recurring

attempts to revitalize American
spirituality as evangelism,
commercialism, and discipline will never
satisfy the best aspirations of

Americans for freedom.

But we do not have to conclude that the
problems

they uncovered are solved in their own
solutions.
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CHAPTER II

IMMANUEL

KANT:

FREEDOM

AND

THE

TELEOLOGY

OF

SELF-ASSERTION

The purpose of this chapter is
to try to make some headway for
a
critique of organizational freedom.
I will explore, through
the works
of immanuel Kant, some of the
salient features of such a freedom:
why we

need it, what it expects of those
who enjoy it, and, finally, its limits
and failings.

There is

a

difficulty about the relation between

works and daily life.

Clearly

I

a

philosopher's

wish to claim that Kant's philosophy

not irrelevant to modern organizational
life, yet

I

do not believe that

his philosophy is the cause of those
organizations within which the

philosophy is practiced.

We should not blame Kant for actual

institutions or governments.
found himself in

a

In fact

will assume the opposite; Kant

world where freedom as material independence was

impossible, and articulated instead

extremely dependent people.

interdependence

I

I

a

is

philosophy of freedom for

will refer to this condition as radical
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Kant himself had
achieved

Pnnc30 Phy

SP-

pQsition

th rou g h perseverance

U £e

His

Ms

work

^

_

„or k in g as . professionai

^

"

h

—

~"

—«-V

^ """""" '~never doubted that he
was

a

——

served

-

cr g ani 2e d ohurches,

r el at ivel

flot

^

uni ver si ty , he often
,t. lunch „ Uh
officers

lar9S3t

^
^

^

-

-

^

^

^

^

corresponded „ ith
and they

au

Prussian state.

under

And Kant

y free ma n.

Kanf

.oral and political hi
losop hi e3 presuppose a
p
rad ioal
interdependence, not merel
y a mong me ers of the same
also a mong regiona,
peoplea, and nations.
The nature! world i. also
3

^

^

charactered by mlnute interdependencies,
an

g overned by the neturel

laws of mutual attraction
and repulaion, and et
scehow in g eniou3l y
y
er g ani zs d 30 that Ea.i.oa
mig ht actuall y bur n firewood
which had been

carried by the Gulf stream all
the „a y fro. the interior
Amazon

jmgi e3

of the

Communities of people had beoome
commercial unions where "each
merger... has constant relations
with all the others." Kant
refers to
this as a community of reciprocal
actionl, which works more like
the
natural realm of attraction and
repulsion than like any traditional

kJTT*

1

*^'

^^^^^

No. 62, in Hans Reiss, editor,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press,
f
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system of natural law.

.
The di
deference
between these two would
be in the
continuous, even, an d
lobal
g
nature of the reciprocity
in t he first and
«- -re oisoontinuous an d looal oharaoter
of the oblivions
and
P-viie.es in the latter.
Kant wrote, then, a
g ainst a bac kg rou„d of
scientific an d social
inter dep en d ence.
In a worl d where no
one is selfsufficient-no one; no
individual, no family, 110
no citv
„.
Clt yf no nation
there
is a problem about
freedom.
,

—

Friedrich „a yek has put the
problem this „a y .2 In Joh
n L oc te s
world, producers are
no lon g er self-sufficient
since the y are lar el
g y
governed b y markets, et the
y
y are still in principle free
because no one
tells them what to produce.
One chooses how to spend
on e s own day s
Socie ty comes alon onl
g
y after the fact to ju d ge whether
the product is
sociall, useful or not. Thus
he or she is rewarded or
i g nored, but
never told beforehand what
to do, and sociall,
useful people are still
in principle free.
But this model presupposes
independent producers.
What happens if one is working
as
sav a f<i
fl
^"g as,
say,
file
room manager in a large
.

.

cookie-making corporation?

It is impossible,

first of all, to objectively
ascertain whethe,

and how much any one person in
the corporation has contributed
to the
cookie.
This means that there is no direct
confrontation between our

manager and the market, and the
decision about whether the manager's
6

editor
6dlt0r
'

Press,

^

"

^beral

1984),

Ts m *™i

80-99.

E{*Ualit
i

ts

y'

Value

PrjHos,

'

^d

Merit" in Michael J. Sandel
New York University

(New York:
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work is useful or
not is decided
not be using social
criteria

dgers.

These managers may

°~«

x

C
or even departmental
and personal goals
and agendas to decide
what win
will oe
be done,
don
„
how
valuable
xt is, and how it
will be rewarded.
Therefore
neretore, if ffreedom
„
is thought to
require independence,
socially useful People
people in l.
large organizations
are
in principle unfree.

For Hays, this

U

really nQ problem

orga„i Z ations are
significantly di£ferent
£tee

"

Chan9S

j

° bS

——

«

^

^

^^

^

-haps

to be,

like Hayek, a

happy conservative Kantian
today one would need to
convince oneself that
not all microchip
companies aree cne
the same,
samP and
an , perhaps
they arn't.
But
it seems to me that
Manuel Kant takes a more courageous
loo, at the
Problem.
Kant does not a assume
that society is massively
mobile, so,
even though it is true that
the Job-search has become
a crucial
institution and the site of
much political debate, Kant
allows us to
focus more on the scenario
srpnsr^ «-p
of someone stuck in a
tolerable but less than
compelling position.

To be free in modern life,
Kant believes, takes a great
deal of

cultivation.

Cultivation must be aimed at creating
a subject, and

freedom becomes the subjective act
of choosing,

one chooses to endorse

the ends and goals of other
subjects, thus people freely unite
in common
endeavors.
This is the principle of love, the
principle of social

attraction.

It sets up a world of freely
chosen interdependences;
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those who one loves

„k„

Pr ° ]eCtS

'

obligated to show
gratitude

—

stance.

"=»

is the

f

that

_^

h

«

accepts,, are

reSPeCt

RSSPeCt

-

q£ ,

^

f

Llon

by respacting ths
autonomy and freedom

the other to be
an entity tor lt3el£

-ivi duates.3
a

»

°™

Lovs ls . f

-eely chosen chec.

_

y

upon megalomania

.

_

^

-

"
1

the Principle

limit my own

Mother

^^

^^^

^

what
simply the endorsement
of one
one',s ,-h=chains is that one
chooses in light of
an overarching moral
principle.
Th is pr i„ c i ple turM
be
.

^^

and believes one's
voluntary involvements
in organisations,
one's
efforts at self-development,
and one's commitment
to a vocation all
enhance and further
progress towards this end.
t
Further
uiLiier, in o
d
order
to
better comprehend this end,
one requires
es a cer
4
certain
tain amount of leisure,
freedom of thouahta^n a= minimum
Lnougnt, and
of affluence
aiiiuence,
T
h„ u
Throughout
Kant's
«or k s, actions can be at
times legitimately coerced,
but minds and
intentions must be left
completely free. T his is
so that the system of
interdependencies can incorporate
a mechanism for
self-criticism, to
Prevent its becoming a simply
dead routine. One way to
sum all this up
would be to say that our
organisations would have to be
voluntary, as
opposed to instrumental^
rational, or, in Kant's famous
phrasing,
•

•

3. Immanuel Kant,
ant. Metaphor
Met
of Mor 11 l> Part Ir# Elements
of Ethi
Part 2, Nos
in
a eS Ellington
trans -' a^ei^ph^ic^i
Zvirtu, (Indianapolis,
H
IN: Bobbs-Merrill Company,
1964),
i

^^^^-^Xt^,

^

'
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^

people would never be
*e treated
treats merely as means,
but as ends in
themselves

™is

n

is a rather long
llst and

_

of our being
a^xe ever
able
evpr t-o
*a
to achieve it

the self-understandings
of people „ s
as, whether theS e conditions
are ever
list as a text to be
interpreted.
"

Ml

«—

"

mlght be

Y^iYet

,

usti£iabiy skeptioai

^^ ^^

a ii „
all
off ltS elements appear
in

^_^^^

^

x

uill

Most ordinary men a„ d women
today
io.

governmental, corporate, or

collectivism

Whether they cling to items
in the list because these
ward off anxiety or becanse
they really d0 choose their
sitnations,
either way, people today rightfully
guard their freedom, and it is
my
purpose here to further their
aspirations.
This critigue of

organizational freedom is meant,
then, to light up, as it were,
from the
inside, this formula for freedom,
to see what else it commits
us to.
Some of these unseen commitments,
I believe, are
self-defeating for the

aspiration of freedom, and yet they
are implied by it too.

The purpose
for exposing these other commitments
is to ask whether and to what

extent they might be revised,
loosened up, or even, perhaps,

acknowledged as necessary, though
unwelcome and transient, evils.

1.

The Ot-hpr K ^nti^n w^y g

I

find over and over how features of the
modern age seem pre-set

in advance by Immanuel Kant.

In Nietzsche,

for instance, it seems to me
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-

t

—

^^

the doctline 0£ the
£ternai Recurrence of

works.

In the

c^i,,,,^^

^
^

^

The value of life fn
(by the natural end
of

th^sum
'

00^™^ ^

a

"h°

^^^_

Or again, „ hen Michel
Foucault

construotion oreated out of

bY Bhat " e «njoy
inclinations, that is by

^IrT
L

of

happiness), is easy to
?
decide
would enter li fe afresh
under the same

multiplicity of drives, ur
3 es, positions

and thou gh t, he is perhaps
taking

a

path which Kant,

Often noted, hut refused
to oonsider.5

in the
in

f aot

CiUo^
all that

stands between Poucaulfs
multiplicity and Kant s
transcendental unity
Of apperception is
universal reason. Neither
a unified self nor a
unified field of ejects are
ever said by Kant to be
direotly known.
The unity of experience
itself is, alcn g with the
self and its o bj ects,
an imposition upon material
which may or may not resale
our knowledge,
our concepts, or our
aspirations as free beings.
Kant, of course,
claims we act as Reason's
agents when we dc this, but
were we to become
unconvinced of this claim while
keeping the rest of his philosophy,
the
result would look very much
like Foucaulfs multiplicity.
Kant himself
often points this out, and usually
y dismisses it uHt-h
with i-v,
the argument that
we can not coherently think
of ourselves other than as
coherent
.

,

t-

Kant

Part II, no. 22, James Creed
(Oxford: Oxford University Press
1986)
97
,
Kant
P"rP P^son, Norman Kemp Smith,
trans
St. Martin's Press, 1965), B131-B136.
'

Meredith^
Meredith, trans.,
*'

'TT

(New York:

'

^^-^ ^

,
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beln g othet than .
systematlc unity avaiiabie

^

themselves could be completely
otherwise.

This list could go on.
on

MarH n Heidegger
o
Martin
discovers that Kant,

despite himself perhaps,
owes his best
51 insiaht,
insights *«
to an essentially
phenomenological, rather
atner than hhi*
=
ls avowed
epistemological, mode of
enquiry.
Certainly few phenomenologists
6
have penetrated deeper
int o
our experiences than did
Kant in the first criti
que

have selected these three
examples, first of all, because
I
intend to follow them somewhat.
Patrick Riley has recently written
that
in the face of Kant's later
political writings no rigid
distinction
between deontology and teleology
ought to be attributed to Kant
7
I
have already taken this one
step further by assuming that
deontology is
I

.

a

necessary fiction for people living
in

interdependence.

a

situation of radical

A second reason to note these three
examples is that

they allow us to see the curious
way in which modern thinkers have
so
often come back to Kant.
They come back by the other road,
the other

Kantian way, the one he indicated but
did not pursue.

In so honest a

Martin Heidegger, What is a Thing?, Barton
and Deutsch, trans
(Latham, Maryland: University Press of
America, 1985)
7. Patrick Riley, "Autonomy and Teleology in
Kant" review essay, The.
Review of Pol ti ps 50, (Summer 1988): 490-95.
6.

j

,
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thkkei ' S b ° 0kS

-

*~ '

—

* «-

other conceptiona and
the proscribed

- eluded
a

^

thoughts, the

^

T he D^at_h of Ah^]

x

»iu

be3in by exploring one
of Kant

,

"The Speculative Beginning
of Human History,

9ene0l09J
"Orxs.

°

f

"n

m° d

Kanfs piece

^

**

^

s

utei ocMsionai

-

read here as . soct
of

oration,

on history gives ,
fleshed

As in all his

Mt

discussion
important part3 and premlses
ln the eariler
critiquea
critical philosophy these
uter dlscussions
Wstory

^

_

^

_

^

Uf
^

^

^
^

Enlightenment, or progress
are mentioned as
presuppositions.
Like „ise,
everything in these easaya
Presupposes the concluaions
of the earlier
critiques

Reaaon ia a great j0 xer.

It gives u3 science, but
iea d s us astray

aiac into metaphysical
presumption.

It ia thus the precondition
for

both sclentism a„ d pseudo-mysticism.

It makes us £ree ,

but in d oing so

ma.es us anxious and, together
with imagination, renders us
sieves to
acquisitiveness and greed.
It destroys the innocence
of natural man,
but only to render him guilty.
It destroys paradise, but
mates us free
by making ua work.
It is the fall of man and
the hope of salvation.
As
in Rousseau it intensifies
sexual desire, and thus renders love
and

marriage possible, but at the same
time, introduces infidelity into
human relations. Reason allows one

to plan for the future and render
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life more predictable,
yet if
Vet
xt om
only *
does 30 by making
one homeless and
insecure, splendidly nH
sera Ki Q
miserable.
Reason displaces
instinct and converts
its natural iongings
into voiuptueusness
p uousness, then creates the
realm of
refusing the voluptuous
impulses it has created.

sensuaftfii^stic attract"^
attraCtl ° ns
eventually
to love

-

8

T

£ rom

^

£

"»

"»

"ere animal desires

Since instinct is largely
silenced, it might he
worth mentioning
that instinct is "that
that all animals obey,"
which
Permitted natural man, Ma m
perhaps, -to use several
things for
nourishment, hut forbade
others,.
Th us when ..reason soon
began to stir
and sought by means of
comparing foods..,. to
eventually ..coo, up

^ic^

an urge to avoid,.
.9 we not only became
voluptuous, we lost the only

direct voice with which God
spea.s on earth.

Rational beings cannot be

once they have surveyed the
"glistening misery which our
reason builds
around us, tc return to some
state of natural equilibrium
are simply
being nihilistic 1
.

e

Kant

S

eCulative Beginnings of Human History,"
in

P
HumXevY \ anS ^Petual
:'
:...
u!!^! Publishing
Hackett
Company,
Ibid., 50-51.
10. Ibid., 59.
9.

P

^p ^Qth^^^,

1983),

52

(Indianapolis:

'
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This remaking of
ourselves „ as .

MSerti0n

"

" hlCh

~—

~

boW

^

foreboding

aeif _

Ms rigbtful place in
the creation as the
designated ruler of the
une earth
earth, but also rendered
himself perpetuaii
y discontented, and thus
incapable of l iving „ in
bovine contentment and
slavish servitude... Thus
unworthy and
discontented, man knows himself
rmself as
a, „»i
(l . master
neither
nor servant.
Men know
they are too corrupt to
command.
In Kant this always
means they knew
they should bring about
a state of affairs
in which the cultural
world,
which men build in place of
their instinctual one, would
reflect and
make natural our highest moral
aspirations.
But because we are
unworthy, we cannot trust one
another enough to create such
a world.
The unworthiness of individuals
^uaxs is our riai'l™
daily «
experience, and the
«

hy of

,

unworthiness of states is the
experience of every war.

Yet if in the name of natural
existence we abandoned the

aspiration to rule our world, if we
tried to recreate the bliss of
Haiti
or Romanticism or the polls now,
that would be, in Nietzsche- s
phrase,
to try to be stones in a great
edifice.

Kant says we could not be happy

natives in Haiti, nor really even happy
subjects in
Thus Reason has placed us in an
existential bind.

a

modern state.

In terms of

Aristotle's well known phrase, modern people
can neither rule nor be
ruled.

We cannot rule because we are limited
by the difference between

our moral aspirations and our moral
capacities.

We are unable to be
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ruled because we are
unable to confine
confirm „our aspirations,
desires, and
imaginings within
i-^ lim its
ln the
which civicv virtue
vj.i_i.ue wonlH
would require.
-i

X

>

would also add, ln
llght 0£ Rant

^

,

s imperative
People aa means, 3ince
such an lmperative
makes sense
^
which treating people
as me
incr( rtiK
t
incredibly
tempting, that anyone
today
Practicing civic virtue,
say an

^^

^

^

.

,

^erican steelwork wbo
accepts

a pay
from S16 to 59 an hear
because ha understands
the ccantry needs to
be mere competitive
in internationai markets
and because he believes
union demands since 1945
have hurt
urt the U.S.
U q *o
economy as a whole; such
a
person will simply be used.
used
peu of us today
Y
Few
could accept such a pay
cut
without feeling degraded.
In a realist world one
must either
artificially ke ep oneself in
-bovine contentment," or
defensively refuse
to practice civic virtue.
virtue
p*t-K^ way, we
Either
prove ourselves unworthy of
our best aspirations,
whether of ruling or being
ruled.

in Kant's myth of human
beginnings, when reason began
to dispiace
instinct, the first human
development was the nomad.
The nomad led a

simple life; he required only
mobile families to sustain
himself.
He
was not permanent, required
nc absolute property rights,
and therefore
no systematic exclusions cr
enclosures. He was rough, but relatively
self-sufficient.

However he was already

more than mere survival.

a

reasoning being who wanted

Some nomads, perhaps seme of the
women or

younger brothers, began to practice
agriculture.
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Agriculture requires more
elaborate cultural and
anrt social
systems.
Farmers must enclose anr* ^
land, demand water
ater rights,
r-irrht-*
^ j
and
develop economies of
e Xch a„ ge
They requlre more
security
•

^

i

.

—

«-

VUla9eS

and the tatmer di3agreed
completeiy
the

fa^er formed village3

a problera
,

in order to

him3elf
<Gen

thia "in ordor t0 protect
their property against

„

_
^ ^

The

.

ustice

Posai b le from Cho3e „ ho
followed the herding

0, wanderin, herdsme n,.n

^^

^^

d

^^ ^^
4;i6)n

They

^d

^

It is the a 9riculturalists
,

says

deveioped cuiture, art,
indnstriouanesa, civil
constitutions and
administrated justice.

-

S T

hu
arts of hich
the most worthwhile " c
ronin

2rSiSLL£3£"S;
^iu n y are
r

-

r

^tsrs^s ^
rac

'

^'

°™

couid muitipiy
f ro
educated colonists could be
sent everywhere
LLualL^
ln£aUiil ty ;am ° ng m en-that source
of so many
evils but Till' f
t
9 9 °° d alS °
period
6

?

^Lre^s^Ltlr^^""

^

^.

But to backtrack a little,
we need to remember that Kant

here is an interpretation of
Genesis.
none other than Cain and Abel.

s

task

The farmer and the herdsman are

Kant says:

^

...[T] he herdsman... hates property
ownership because it limits his
The
**** seem to
envied the herdsman as being more
blessed by heaven (Gen 4-4)
while in fact the herdsman annoyed the
farmer enormously as long
as he remained in the neighborhood,
for grazing cattle do not
spare the farmer's crops .... (Because
these incidents could not be

envied^

11.
12.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,

56.

56-57.

ZVT*

'
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farmer who first used
hat the herdsman did
not

Finally the farmer
mer separates,
se>n* a *-~<,
removes himself, f rom
those who
follow the herding lif
e
e.
Aft-^r- .
After
a long tome, the
herdsman sucoumbs to
the sensuous allurements o-f
ements of the village and
the nomads are finally
completely assimilated.
r-

i

But the Bifcla uses
stronger imagery.

Kant, While
S

"

°£

US

S ee k in g

drSad£Ul

Cain murdered Abel, and

to rationalize the passage
aotually
,

^"-tions,

since we are the heirs,
net e £ Abel,

bet of Cain, the
agriculturalist who slew his
brother the herein.
Kant's myth of our beginnings
only barely conceals a
collective .order,
and one based in resentment.
Abel's offering had seemed more
acceptable
to God.
Again Kant offers a clue. The
nomads "acknowledged God alone
as their ruler" while the
farmers and villagers recognized
"a man

(government) as their ruler (Gen
6:4,"

m

the footnote Kant explains

that since nomads have no fixed
property to protect,
to leave whenever they feel
dissatisfied.

strong ruler over such people.

families are free

It is impossible to impose a

We can imagine nomads, then, as
less

diffident, less circumspect, and more
self-confident than the

villagersl4 who had to care more for
their neighbor's good opinion of
13.

Ibid.,

55-56.

PartT^^

"

is a
itu de of savage superiority rather often.
In
Part I of the Metaphysio of Mor
al', at No. 53, he puts it this way:
...Citizens will not intermix with any neighbouring
people who live in
a state of nature, but will consider
them ignoble, even though such
savages for their own part may regard themselves
as superior on account

^

.
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themselves and who had
^
haH 4-«
to drscrpline
themselves to good manners

being punished for something.

m

fact bn
tact,
,h K
both
Kant, and the

agricultural work as punishment,
and the
dna
tne nomaH'.
nomad's manner probably
constantly reminded the
farmer that he lived a
life of adversity

refer to

,

nomads would certainly have
scoffed at such

The

heavy life.
But the
farmers knew that they were
more complex, more
sophistioated, more
cultured, more mannerly,
more developed, and less
barbaric than the
nomads.
How could these savages
lead such charmed lives.
How could
they presume so much. How
could they en joy the favor
of G od ?
a

Clearly Kant identifies with
Cain more than with Abel.
To
understand this we must remember
that Abel is a younger
brother, and
thus Cain is not overthrowing
traditional or patriarchal
authority as
in, say, Freud, though
herding is in some sense older
and prior to
agriculture. On a developmental
scale, herding is more childish
and
agriculture more adult. Thus, there
is a teleology at work, and
in
terms of teleology Cain must
supersede Abel, the older must replace
the
ycunger.
Thus, even though the parents may
have been happy herdsmen, by
the time the children approach
adulthood, the situation may have
changed.

If the first agriculturalists
were simply herdsmen who allowed

their reason to expand their desires,
and if herdsmen are not simply

°H^Li

a

"';f

freedC"" they h3Ve chosen."

In Reiss,

Kanf., Pnl

i
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instinctual beings, then
th* h.
the
hap Py lnnocence
Qf the herdsme
^ 'ho now
know about and probably
trade with the vill™
vrllagers, might be
mQre fei
and studied than it
was forfor the parents.
Thus the herds me„
might not be
SeP ate
SUPeri

^

"

"

~

- «-

""

P-hlem about

herds eating the farmer's
crops hegins to resemble
the mo.ern

independence, herd ing could
plausibly maintain itself
as a form of happy
innocence taking its
direction oni y fro, the
Mediate voice of Cod in
nature.
In the interdependent
world of the cnnaren,
children however,
h„
the claim

indistinguishable from a license
to plunder,

viewed from the nomad,
innocence might have become
unha PPy innocence due
to the anxiety
created by the agriculturalist's
prohihitions; pronations
which the
ncmad indeed could not
recognize as le 9 itimate or
even understand.
But
because he xnew he did net
understand something, the
thought would
fester and make him anxious.
!5
Cain's hard and patient »„ rk
must
somehow come to he respected
because the
side,

sii^Uan

Kanfs my th P roba b l y tells

has changed.

us more about eighteenth
Centur y Europe

than about our earliest
ancestors, hut the point is that
Kant's

prehistory begins self-ccnscicusly
with murder, force, exclusion,
and
Soren Keirkegaard, The Concept of
15
f^-joty, Reldar Thomte and
Anderson, trans., (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press 1980,
C
e ° tl0n
P ° int6d ° Ut t0 me
P «er F »ve
he
Unlve
I
USSttS C ° mp ati
"terature Department. Por
slightly different account see Charles
Taylor, "Rationality,"
E bUo Bn ph,r n P , P o r z , (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

™

T T

L«.
i

"

M

-
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assimilation of the nomads
3-

Ufe

And fh.
the nomads were closer
and more

in „ hich lt might
plausibly

a

^

by „ hioh everyone kne
„ ha

^is m ar,

heacd

b

murdered

^
ws

thia

^ ^
^

i. open to many
di££erent interpretationSj

indicates that Aoei
Ahpi

'«
s

^

certainiy

^.fi,
death is some sort of
or scandal.
smpH.i
.

it constitutes an
in d i g esti bl e event in
Cai„. 3 constitution,
. part o£ Ms identity
he can neither reP u d iate
nor accept.
*et it i s als0 „ hat
protects Cain
He is now, be cause or
his d ee d , aiienateo f
ro m the scil, an d is
thus a
wanderer „ hom ethers might
He thus

neither

n«

^

^

not

a 9 ri g uituraiist

any longer

,

^

.

^^

^

^

^

wanderer

in Kant's version the mar,
is absent, but in its
place we find

government.

Government acts as a voice of
Abel reminding people that
we
are unworthy and corrupt.
It does this by reminding
us that we are the
sort of people who require
government to secure our property
and

voluptuousness.

We require an impartial system
of justice, and our

world, the one we prefer to
live in, is not a very nice place.

In this

way Kant enlists Abel's voice,
the Other's scoffing voice, in the
very

project by which Abel was excluded.

The victim becomes the accomplice

in his own victimization, but
in such a way that he will need to
be
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continually remurdered
'

s
j n „0
Slnce

needs controlling.

K
he
continually
y incites in us that
which

Agriculturalists founded
vill,™
llageS
they ffeared the
nomads.

erSCted

"ments

boo ks
Dooks.

i
x

because
One finds t-h
this event mentioned
in almost

marginal remark in
virtually all of Kant
no longer read past
these ro f Q

•

s

am suggesting we

ctherwise brilliant
philosophical exposition
The P^gress
D
which Kant
invisions in human affairs
is C ° ntin 9ent
upon this original
act of
withdrawal, exclusion,
murder, and assimil.tassimilation.
Nor is there any easy
return to a happier
innocence.
For setter
better or for
fo
worse we have created
ourselves as unworthy and
discontented.
if there
cnere is no way to
limit
desires anymore, and
therefore no easy
easv w„„
*
way to
promote happiness, then
Perhaps there is hope in
the other airection,
direction that
fh - of, unleashing
desire
and self-assertion.
Unhappiness might
be a spur
sour to
t-n progress,
y il oe
and
progress might be thee route t-n *
to a new more intelligible
and selfconscious form of innocence.

"

i

3.

laiaalagy

To call the defeat of
Abel by Cain progress is
not something

justified by our merely observing
the facts in the case.
It comes
rather from the imposition
of a teleology.
To understand this teleology
better I „1U be discussing the

CrlUaauaf Teleomo^,

16.

Immanuel Kant, Critin„ 0 of .n,^„
m

„

t

Part

llllSassmi

16
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What teleology
asserts here is thatthat what is contrary
to nature;
murder and tillage
of the soil
StUl be redeemable
since these
things allow us to
gl impse in their
SSUlt an order
beyond the merelv
»,

,

'

,

.

«. -

—

^

to a

that natu

^

bUnd mechanism

>—

-

agriculturalist asserts
against

a

of

_

n?

——

^

oultlvatlon

,„
oria
rW that is possibly

An organized being
possesses inherent f„
moreover, as it oan i
mpar t to
which it organizes.
This thereto
formative power, which
cannot be Slaved
movement alone, that is
to say,

materL,^^
"°

in

P °""'
f

*eyon d ,.l 9

a

vain that

once

««
Say

first
'

and 5uch '

""-P^-tin,

°£

'

theu

^^^^^

^^^

ao Savages
33
Adorning themselves foolishly

with feathers and earthen
Dainf
k„+.
paint,
but
more importantly as
farmers
providing for themselves
rationally
b V ridin
ridina
hn
Y Dy
or plowing with
9 horses
Pi*s, asses, and oxen.20
Kant brings up these
examples to shew that
teleology does net arise
with Just any whole.
Natural man lives in a
whole but coesn.t xnow it
could be otherwise. T he xind
of whole that

be'come^ck^i.e^ai;,^
18.
19.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,

22.
11.

.

..secret reeling of
the existence o £
something lying

People require

off from nature,

The

lt "™t.ri.l

b^SS^.Jf

Teleology is

.

8

^

31111510 " t0 natur « ,s

"aging

Abel t0
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calls for teleology
i s an
fln
gy 13

though it functions

0
ar^i^

11 C ° Uld

p
People
in societies
bring
.

whole,

that

1.

—

^

1

been otherwise

-elat.ons ln ways that
nature bv
,„
itself would
never bring about
bout, and xn ways
answering merely to
their
own cultivated
desires
Slres and
an n a s pi
rations.
one can and
Une
*nH perhaps
must,
thlS f
°
f
h
°™
ogy , t0 th8 entirety
ecy of
°£
the world

—
I

-

"

'

- -

^

anrmals, and even,
6Xist as
on however 1™ a
oJ?
al = ° not be absent.
rati °™l animals,
'
But in th .? Ca = S
that are indispensable
thoss
'
things
for
c
existence must equally
as ends of nature. 21
be regarded

" st

"

'

allianoe

U*.

th at between
Laplanders and their
reindeer,

or
the use of Brazilian
firewood by
oy Eskimos
tskimos, t-M
this „does not mean
that
Lapland or the Arotro
Arcfir can
^an be
k~ assumed
to be the natural
and proper homes

have displaced people
to such inhospitable
regions. 22 Th us, their
living there is a result
of the human rebellion
against the natural
state, and their ability
to survive there is a
result of the human

this—nature especially provides

21.

Ibid.

22.

inmanuel Kant,

-

us with the
Lne aoiiity
abilih, to open-endedly

"Perpetual Peace" in Reiss, 110.
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have ends, without
specifying them in
detaH, as w lt h sheep-it
detail
is not
natural teleology
in the way
Arist °tle. s is.
Ratherf
t
teleology of self-assertion.

m

'

.

.

The schema for this
teleology
57 runs3 33
as

s^ective

~U,
«*•

ends of individual3
push people tQ

^^^^

discipline,

*
"
™-

l a „,

^

and administration.

"S

"""^

S " biKtiVe

^

~*»*
° bjeCti

«.

ms

Next

^

end of creation lt5elf

^

^

^

the good 01 the „hole
„ orld

- «*

There may

Stage, which „ U1 be
outside

scQpe of

and Spirituality are
f±nauy found

It is worth „ oting that
,

^^

a sooiai

is represented alrea
dy in the second

" OIk

^
^
^ ^ ^
First come the

^^^^^

pursuu o£

,

th e ne xt group o£
ends the

—re,

.

f ftl
° llows -23

^

fce

„ here
a

fMth

uhsrs ReasQn

^

for Rant(

,

same objectivs eRds 24

all teleologies hithecto

trie, to found themselves
in the secon d stage.

^

T hat is, they nave tried
to discover in social
discipiine the fulfillment
of the search for
happiness and have not seen
that the seoond sta gs is
aotoa lly oni y one
stage in a progression of
judgments.
Kant's criticisms of this view

^1^^^^^
^
41

Hoyt
HovtT^u^^c^f"
H. Hudson, trans.,

(La Salle,

«»t

- -ndred

pages of

Kant.

I. M. Green and
Illinois: Open Court Publishing,

r

.
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will be discussed
in
k
aet axl below,
" detain
but fi
out
r
t need
tirst
I
to discuss the
characteristic of qpi f
Self-asSerttOH in
philosophy

^

i

B
'

-ation

—

world,

M"

-apter

^^^^^^^
I(

x

sxplored in , prelimlnacy

between treedom and
organization

y o £ . religious problematio
_

^

,

dw

z

th±3

disenchantment

^
^

^

^

ioQkin9

and by noticing ho „
varloua pressures in

.

Kanfs mature wor.s

t yP icall y

^

^^

t0 "ticulate
organizational responses
ponses to it.
it

also concerned with the
relrgrous problematic 25
all

gropin9

T
Immanuel

In £act ,

bsgi „s „ lth the premUe

-es

Kant was

^^

the logic Qf

not disclose to as an
y immediate truths-not even
about desires and
Pleasures-nor can it bear witness
to the essence of Sod.
Mature
answers truthtull, onl
y those guestions with which
humans interrogate
it

and that it must not allow
itselr t
u r s ea
n9 trin9s tut ust
prL c r;i es

f r

X^^^
^^^f^ri^T'
2

'

^

k

*™

°f
a

"

S

°" n

'

n

the wir:itn

^- ^^

earliSr W ° rk
Hans Saner,
tranS -' (Chica
The University
,
7 ;7
.
Cassxrer, KiU1 t^j ifJ>_JLr
(New HavenHaven: yT
n
Yale University
Press, 1981), 58-65.
[i

.
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so, however, i n
the character of,
that the teacher
* h ° liStSnS to
chooses to say
everything
?
°f
compels the witness
judge wL
to an e questions
which he has himself
formulated. 26

L IT*? « W^ted

t%

ClSar

^

K3nt

'

* P-^3o P hy of self-assertion
In a
world in which the
direct voice of Cod
God cannot be read
authoritatively
m MtKe , human endeavors
must be seen
originatin9

iS

S

-

^^

—

^

9M1S Md

P^ise

" " tl
pl

~"

th

" «- -

h as radical
impllcations

religion,

and politics as well
'

oniy

™

_

nature of Cod and of ultimat9

Und6tStlndi " 9

" ~"

~

_

^

^

i

us,

Pledge

and that there can
therefore
about how to act, how
to

worship, or how to arrange
human affairs
rSl
desires, including pleasures

physics

it0
Jt
al ° n ^ With Kant's
9 ° eS
doctrine that

-ngs-in-themselves are unknowable
by
be no naturally valid
claims to

This basic

^
^
^^^_

But it
i
,
xt also
follows
that

^

-

^

priviie9ed

experienced

That nature has lost
its status as a teacher
and now on ly assu m es
significance as a witness

should alert us that Kant,
faith cannot rese^le
that of Rousseau's
Savayard Priest, nor can his
ethics rese.able either
Aristotle. s or
Bentham s
1

Kant finds it impossible to
think of revealed religion,
or any
other version of Christianity
based on historical evidence,
as anything
but a dogmatic pseudo-service
of God. 28
The authority of tradition,
26

Immanuel Kant, I^iiious^^r^Re^n
Bxiii, 20
Critigup of Pnr P R QJ<J ^ n A613/B641,
513
,

-

EeJ^^ii^^^
j

28.

imimanuel Kant,

159 _ 73

_
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family, estate,

or church are
at th»i
k
thexr best
merely self- imposed
Anw
„~
y v . rsion of athics
baaed

-

y

immaturity

m

priMipie

^

PP^ess
is antithetical
to either freedom
„
f
or relioinn
k«
religxon because
it completely
PS0Ple U
b

^-

^

—

~ ™^ ^
^^ ^
^
^
«— ~e,
-

causal mechanism
29

•

But there i3 a further
reason „ hy
t

,

^

^

The maxims of
happiness

oQmpieteiy contingMt
situation and what one
desirp,
aesires „or requires
from it.
it
R „r situations
But
are
e.
Th us maxiras 0£
happiness

—

^

" ni ' CISally

ValW

alCMdy hSVe
'

"
"

rUl

" «
«
f

~—
«
~^^

and thls

Sieves

—

'

an intelligi ble world
through realization

in tu „,

,

*

..

we

an

leads

ln fact

the revelation pf

e oth erwise
transcendent

concept of freedom. "30

TO help understand the
nature of Kant

s

break with earlier

thinkers one mig ht c omp are
rho.as Aguinas. notion
of pl aoe with Kanf
notion or spaoe.
I, Aqu inas the politioal
proble, often see.s to come
down to putting everything
in its proper piace.
One can also
read

Aristotle or Shakespeare in
ter m s of finding, discovering,
rediscovering, or realising a
proper order of places,

m

likewise is

a

Kant there

beautiful order to be realised,
and

a perpetual progress
towards it, but now things no
longer have places, onl
y positions.
These

positions are not absolute states
of being (which is wh
y existence
29.

ran
30

I^anuel Kant, C r i t i que of Pr ,
cUra1

Md.

p easoQ
Le „ is
^ acn, ^^ an Publishing Co.,
1985,, 10 7-08.
/
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cannot be

a

real predicate)

and sxxnple, out the
result of

nu
-

Und

of Place , „ h

better thought of as
spacei

Rather than an ordering
or

a

For in
„,
-stance,
pleasure is not

Etonian

_
a

clashes
SS of
forces
° f fo

all piaoes

homogeneous

^

-

essentiauy

Md

a

state pure

If anything

^

piaceiessness

hierarohy of PJ-aces,
piaoes one
on
organizes things

"ithin the general eoonomy
of space.
for any experience
whatsoever.

In fact
in
fac , it is a general
condition
,

Thus in politics one
doesn't see, to restore
things to their
Places, but cat her aims ,
t ratiQnal progress

^ ^^

consult the natural order
is not to discover
natural right, but to
subject oneself to natural
causality, tnat
that is,
is
t„ surrender
.
to
one's ends
to forces beyond one's
control 31 Thus it
if seems a
rather lame criticism
of Kant to compare his ethir-^
.
»„
ethics to, say,
Aristotle's, discover that
Aristotle's ethics is embedded
in richly vsried found
„ ays of people's
being together while Kant's
is based upon . cold end
ehstreot duty, and
from there conclude that Kant
misses the rich fabric of life,
while
Aristotle captures it, and, finally,
opt for an Aristotelian ethics
moder„ity.32 Such criticism
ignores the „ ays in which Aristotle's
ethics and politics are bound up
in the self-sufficiency of
the polls,

^

31

32.

Hans Saner, -Kant's

Philip

H.

Jos,

PHiMr,] Though,

Polity 21,

56; Hans Blumenberg, Th£
Robert M. Wallace, trans., .CaJLSge,
MA

(Winter 1988)

321-43.

:
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Aristotle's physics, and
especially rGreekv aesthetics
33
Kant is a
compelling fi gure because
he tried to nr+>
artxculate a conception
of freedom
3 th ° rOUghlY
for people whose
history had been
CrOSS6d
ChriStianit
- "*
, lives could not be based in
any form of self-sufficiency.
The
me situation,
situation here, is far
y

—— — —

.

,

«™

^

^

v,

from

beneficent

If nature is disenchanted
it makes a great deal
of sense to

articulate

morality based on respect,
respect and t-„
to say that "Respect
always
appXies to persona, neve, to
thin g s,. In . oisenonanteo
nature,
a

reoeive no respeot.

T hey are resources

^

avaUable tor use ano m aster
y

.

Thus in a disenchanted nature
hu m an lire, as a part
of nature, becotes
another instruct for use unless
hu m ans can b e m ade so.ehow
special, in
this case, objects of respect.

Probably Kant's most complete
discussion of these issues comes in
thS
There,

in his critique of

Spinoza, Kant argues that nature,
by itself, cannot render any
viable

conception of an intelligent purpose,
that is, no teleology.

33. For the relation of Aristotle's virtues
to his science, see Alasdair
Maclntyre, Aft^vixt^ (Notre Dame,
Indiana: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1981), 139.
Maclntyre refers to Aristotle's "metaphysical
biology." For the relation of the virtues
to aesthetics see Soren
Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety 16-17;
compare with Aristotle's
Nic homachPan Kthi^, B k IV, Ch. 3, especially
at 1125a where the greatsouled man embodies the virtues of masculine
perfection, beauty, and
goodness.
34. Immanuel Kant, Critique of JnHa^nt, Part
II.
,
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" 6re

Thus,

"~

MS

°£

"~

——

justifiably

to answer the
question; why
Y is evervth'
everything

no other way; what
,3« n,„
the purpose o£ our
being
i

C0 " CePti0nS
'

""""^

~

—

•

D

^

MU

_

ust the way it is
and

earth?

^

Spinoja

apply to the material

We are here to work- nnt- <-k
out the va tMU3 ways
of God's being, to
participate
in that, and to find
meaning
in it.

The problem with

Spinous

it contains no contingency.

T he

world of substrate and
accident is that
seeming design of the
world turns out

to be really nothing but
the Supreme Cause's
unfoiding of itseif. Such
a Being doesn't so much
cause the world as sustain
it.
final causes
are analogous to a iandlord
causing a house to be built
to realize the
idea of rent, where rent
is the determining ideal
condition for building
the house, then the
appropriate analogy for Spinoza's
scheme of

«

Substance and its accidents would
be an athlete and her
perspiration.
Perspiring i 3 just a by-product
of exercise.
It is foolish to as k why
She bothers to produce it,
it is just in the nature
of her constitution
to do sc.
Kant's first criticism of Spinoza,
then, is that the Supreme
Substance might be very powerful,
but needn't be very smart, very
moral,

109

or,
S

finally, even omnipotent,
since
nee for all
all we can know
there could be

"ethin5 mOIe

— s™

«~

«-

C MS8 0£ the world
35
.

^^^^

Kant's second criticism
is that the proof
need,

a

O&^i^n^r of the world
a

"

m

fh. modern age,
In the

theologically „ hy things fit
together
assume several things.

For instance

,

a

when we ask

^^^

systematic uhoie>

things do

^^

held by mechanical forces
=
„^
forrp<? at
certain
coordinates in space.
possess a radical contingency.
They mlght have „ ound
up
+-

^

^

Things

^

configurations, both internally
and spatially; that is,
they are
organized.
The question of teleology
would arise for as oat of
the
world of causality and contingency,
rather than out of places
and
hierarchy.
a world of places and
hierarchy it is reassuring to
articulate a teleology of substance
and accident.
God is the solid
ground we walk upon, the guarantee
of a rightly ordered cosmos,
the

m

beneficent provider, and that which
enables one to participate in
cf integration with God, nature,
and
community.

which generates the teleological
question is not

need to account for diversity, but
rather
happens to be organized in

a

certain way.

a

a l ife

But for us, the world

a

whole in which we

multiplicity that just

m

a

world of contingency and

mechanical causality, to reply to the
question concerning ultimate
purposes with the theory of substance and
accidents is not reassuring at

35. On the limitations of God's omnipotence by
the material He must be
presumed to shape in Kant's early work see Ernst
Cassirer, Kant's Life

and Thought,

59-60.
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all,

because it makes one
the subject
o:ect of

hr „ necessity,
blind

a

other animal

A continent, yet
still .oral, „ orld
together not b y
against which

.

.

su.stance, hut by . design

contingent „ orW

coul d have been ooordinated
or

other „ays.

T here

^^

U

^

cm

^

Design

.

^

any

^
^^

^^
u

contingen ^

coordinatsd

l ike

irfinite

hocizon

^

nothing even In the
incredible coordinating

o£

^^

oak tree that suggests
any necessity of its
ts or
oraani^r'
9amzation, yet it brings
together an array of d isparate
Aerials into a thriving successful
organise How dld all those
materials know to go cosine
themselves
into an oak tree. Our
conceptual
to efficient causality
fails us here.

cogent

It is possible to draw an
analogy to a construction
project.

The
the glass, the clay in the
bricks all need not be together
in a
building, and they certainly
could not have put themselves
together that

steel,

way, yet there they are.

They are together because
someone with a

design in mind called for them to
be placed there in just such
relation to one another.

a

if we ask again why the designer
did this,

the

next reply might be that she did
so in order to gain rent money
from the

building's office spaces.

Thus an idea,

rent, works as a final cause,

that which is at once the cause and
the effect of the placement of the

building materials in the building.

Something analogous to rent is what

moderns are looking for when they ask the
teleological question.

.

.

Ill

in a continent werld
must be

,

first

,

,

^ ^
and _

^

^

erlyrng substance
doesn't help at all,
because both
OO* and humans would
be sublet to the bl
ind nece3sities of

^

in reality blind mechanism
rules all.

We require our designer
god to have one more ma r
j0
attribute

—Ute.

Continue,

has two edges.

On one side it rants
to human
g

individuals autonomy, it allows
for the possibility of
free activity
On the other, it threatens
those sa me individuals with
determinism God
is needed to guarantee the
first by staving off the
second.
The way
Kant answers this difficulty
is by formulating

a

Through teleology we can glimpse
having access to

moral teleology.
a

form cf causality

other than efficient causality.

The argument against Spinoza
is just one of the many different

ways in which Kant shows that
knowledge of nature can never yield

conception of God.

God is not discoverable in nature.

a

This means that

the traditional link between nature
and morality is broken, in much the

way it was for Abel's behavior.
split

Modernity is the era of

a

fact-value
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The old way bega n
with an ontology
yy designed to secure certainty
the nat e f God
d
°
„ as established
one
PrinClPl
...
The problem
had become that ln
. iadicany

"

J""

—

—

- "

— --

—^
-

,

-

^

Mntingent

ana the soul „ ould
have to res

-

—

_

ie scientific

vocabulary, theoretioal
kno „ iedge _

-

causal la „ 3

.

But o£ course

,

fM

^

^

uhich

'

o

^ ^

^

Kant> theoreticai
knouiedge

=an refer o„ ly to
objects of a possible
experience
au
attempts to understand
God in the sam
P Ma
same
way we understand
nature have
become completely unconvincing
cmg. God is
1« supersensible;
*
beyond any
possible experience.
_

Kant turned the entire
procedure aroun ^
begins, what can we kno „
about Qod and

term of saying that he „
ho desires the

Qiven

^^

^

sQui?

^

^

huMn

dssices

meaM

it. 37

^

Thus the conception of
God at which Kent arrives
is not
theoreticai, but practical.
Nor does it involve us in
a Mind

^

necessity, as would any
conception derived from nature,
because it acts
as an assurance freely
accepted rather than a brute
fact. 38

Since God and soul are means
to the moral ends of freedom,
Kant
spends a great deal of the
Critique of T ,l„ lmi .„
-

^- m

elaborating a conception of moral
ends.
36

-

37.
38.

Cr i tique of .Tn^ o rn
Ibid., 142.
Ibid.

t)

Part IT/

„ e must,

147 _ 49

nt

of course,

argue that
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his reader,

upon reflection
on,

needs to find

win
wxn

a1
also

endQrse these

^

a

conception of ends
<*s that all
„
moderns
could in principle
His answer is as fnii
follows: all human
being5i he

adopt.

m0ral intSrSSt

"

People thought it made

—
.

*

——

^.^

when acting rightly
oarrled no

1

'
brought him „„
as though they perceive"
a difference. 39

4->,^

_

»"
^J^"
- «" "«h
.

equit y ° r

^:

vo "e

^

^^

•

k

,

^

always been th6 oase
that

difference „ hether they

It could never be t-h^thas acted f airly or
*
£als
to his life's end as far =1

^

-e,

Aether . man
violence, albeit
his virtues ha

^

PU "" h
seems
" them sa V tha t it must make

^TL""

-«- «

comes the notion that there
is something for which
people must strive
At the basis of humen
being Kent finds a moral
vocation,, to strive

for

the supreme good of the
world.

This vocation to pursue
the creation of

world where the possible
might be actual, simply
because it is good,
is the main precise in
Kant's moral proof
a

for God's existence.

The germ
of this vocation has been
with us from the start, but
has had to grow up
along with the progressive
culture of reason. Kant's most
rigorous

version of the argument for moral
teleology runs as follows. 4 0

PI.

If there is some final end,

that is, some ideal for which

everything else exists, it must be man
as

39.
40.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,

120.

114-19

a

subject, not a creature, of

.
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-ral

laws.

discussions

Mm.

Kant gives four
reasons for
ur this
tnis, all ba
H in long
based
prior

the world „ ould ba „
orthless if

^

^

dw Mt

world would become valuable
for all
all men would have
to be an end to which
we could all subscribe
unconditionally.

™

the q uest for human
happiness,,! since happiness
provides onl y relative
ends, which, as we have
seen, are too open-ended,
changeable, and

volatile to act as a final end.
42

Just because we know that
everyone in

fact values happiness doesn't
tell us why people should
exist in the
first place, or cf any worth
we might possess which
justifies our

attaining happiness.

We would need

because of purpose

people's existence ought to be
made agreeable.

X,

a

statement to the effect that

But it is that purpose for
which we are searching,

what is in question

Is exactly why or how we can
be justified in assuming that
nature is or

could be disposed to "accord with
the conditions of [man's) happiness."
Happiness is not self- justifyi ng 43
For the same reason contemplation
cannot be the final end of mankind.
44
not acquire

a

The "existence of the world could

worth from the fact of its being known."

Ibid., 88-93.
Ibid., 108.
See also Rousseau's Bailfi, Allan Bloom,
York: Basxc Books, Inc., 1979), 81.
43. Ibid., 108-09.
44. Ibid.
41.
42.

Contemplation

trans.,

(New
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therefore receives its
wnrt-h *
worth
from „ hat ls
contemplated

»>

—

g is lntimately c

no matter what our
situation.

_
m

oted

^

everything

«« end must must

i n „ ature is

conditioned.

^d

fact n
fact,
„
peopie
search tor
,

because our situation
cannot justify lt3elf

Third, the

^

.

reside somehou be

conditloned

final end

a

^

^ nd

^^^

natMe

_

^

^

since the argument bsg
ins with the
presupposition that

natural order of causality,
therefore, forth, there
must he a moral law
utilizing a different sort
of causality, otherwise
there is no basis for
^eedom, since the moral law,
as a causality beyond
natural mechanism,
is the formal condition
for our
freedom.

P2.

The moral law ob li ga tes
us to strive towards the
highest good
possible through freedom, the
Kant has shown

^

-.Ua,,^

morality as freedom commands
we strive, as autonomous
rational

individual, for what is good without
regard to self-interest or sensual
desire.

Vet, at the same time that
people are rational, they are also
finite beings, and the only end
available for rational
be ings is

fi^

happiness.

45.

Ibid.,

Therefore the highest possible
physical good is happiness in
99-100
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conformity with the
moral law;

—

.

«-

a state,
state

h the way,
by

in which the split

says Kaat; onoe
conceived; ls an idea

both the cause and
effect of itself
'

t-w 1S
that

lfc
'

is th -

^nal

^
end,

that

wh.ch justifies the
q uest for well- be i ng and,
witn it
with
it, the subordination
h
of nature.
,

P3
-

Bu t if the

MMU^

is to determine our
actions we
a^uions
We require

the concept of a
non-natural causality,
causalitv

n
using only theoretical
reason,

that is,

the laws of efficientefficient causality, it
is impossible to
conceive
of how happiness and
morality
Y could be af
at hho
the same time both
conjoined
by natural means and
conformed to the idea of
the
That
is, if we did find
that nature had somehow
caused happiness and morality
tc come together, we
could not simultaneously
believe that nature had
done so with the
in mind.
This logic equally applies
to

human beings pursuing natural
desires and longings.

if such people

happened to bring about the best
possible world, it would be
accident, not

C

a

a

random

working out of their axeJ^.

Therefore, a moral cause of the
world is morally necessary in

order for us to fulfill our
obligation, discovered in the moral
command,
to strive for the supreme good
of the world,
without a moral,
intelligent, causal designer,

a God,

there is no guarantee that our

moral conceptions are at all amenable
to the physical world.

The moral
law would still command one to work
for the good, but any imagining of

in
the intell igible
community-thai.
associate

^

" he

.

voluntarily and
harmoniously

«orld-„oul d be lost

Kant

.

.

-

^

" ~—

" 311

doings might

- «-

Deceit, violence,
and enw *i n
rife 3r ° Und him
although he himself
i s ho e 8
n!
other righteous
b
'
^nt; and the
„
d e e rV ng f
subject by nature
haPPinSSS
°
tlLT h ; e d J
the evils of want,
d6SertS t0 a11
disease, anf ultim^f
other animals on the
jUSt as
the
earth!
And so Z
?

«.

^

™

.

,

—

i

Tf
L

'

'

'

!

-

ai.less chaos o?

Without

^ta^r^'iM^h^iTLSn.I?" "

designer one cannot hope
nope tor
for t-h=
the moral community.
But
the moral community
is the regulative
principle for modern
politics
though it depends ultimately
desirei
stresses
^
free desire47 which ,„r
to limit and discipline
the more usual
sensuous desires.
Preedom occures when one
sets before oneself, as
the
a

.

.

^

^^^

b

refined such that we haye
"a crowd of insatiable
inclinations,.

c«not, as in the

We

artfully limit desires, nor
can we easily giye

everyone the power to realize
ize desires
aesires, as
a, in
;„ Marx.
u

The only way open,
Kant believes, is to endorse
the modern world and to
articulate its
highest aspiration. He thus
argues that happiness in its
highest form
would be the agreement or harmony
of satisfactions and desires
with

46.

Ibid.,

121.

"^^^1/^

15 meant

"

SVOke

3

—

'«»

.

lie

"oral legislation.

in

—

our „„
=
age
,„ admired man can
be i„„ ardly

man of well-being
oan be,
e- for thi
tins, reason, unhappy.
m ° ral

a

"

— —
^

.

.r

-

To seek

however,

.

and

happiness that the
quest £or

proves

^

world of contingent
and complex desires,
create s as requirements
creates
yet
cannot satisfy it b,,h.
pulls one out cf
introversion, it
discipline, desir
even whiie cultivating
them, and it recogni.es
individuals
uuais as aautonomous
t
beings 4 8
a

'

„

.

,

.

The motive for arHp,
articulating something
like

a

^.^^

seems
to arise out of the
development of culture
re itself
itself.
Nature, according to
Kant, provides people
with two social drives
6S the
thenPursuit of happiness
'

and the pursuit of
culture.

Culture, then, oan be
thought of as the

Other of natural law.

Culture unsettles what
happiness wouid settle
reopens what happiness
wouid close, and broadens
what happiness would
limit,
cuiture does this by
continually creating
unsatisfied desires
It shatters complacency,
it ieaves us in
splendid misery.
This

renders
the pursuit of happiness,
despite its pretensions,
finally disgusting
and self-defeating. E ventuaiiy
disgust and insecurity lea d
everyone to

form civil commonwealths and
enter social contracts.

But the civil

commonwealth further develops
culture, decadence, and war.
deepened

48.

Ibid.,

100.

Disgust is

,

s

.
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*m „ hence

»»

disoust
gUSt

f
fSar
'

'

-

«

-

P o IitM

disgust?
ln stitutions.

Eventually
and reflection
lection reveal
that there is a

- «-*

-

.

tMs

—

c ^tivation,

—
——
- _

MnCePti0n

"

comes

ity , ,

judgments

.

nations

^

Ihey
hus

.

a

—

a

~"°

* " "»
*

n

o f „ hom seek
sarnsstly
y and harmoniously
to brinr,
=u
g about
a higher
unity,

„„..ln

^

.

which Abel's h.nn'
PPlneSSWlllbe

and intelligence.

^

°f

dw , hCainIshard

^

We should note
that if we drop
God from Kant
scheme, we are still
left1 with
Wlth aa growing and
deeoenina hdisgust,
deepening
i n need
of h n ,h
.
. redemption
0ne couid neuher
persuade oth
i

~
~~

«

.

is jastified
,

nor hope for a
teieoiogicai

Bef ° re leaVl " the
9

-cent criticisms

«*
iaw

«

Kant.

x „ ish to c

of Kant made by the
secuiar naturai

is bsyond my po „ ers
at present
t radit io»,

^

«

^

deai Bith

ls difficult at times

„ orks fOB some of
these

^

„ ltiolsmS(

astonis hing ignorance of
„ hat Rant actuauy
to s ay that Kant has
no notion of a

_

reii9io

^

^

textuai suppQrt

that

^

^

^^^

^^^^ ^ ^

^

on some

^ dit ion

t

and occaaionaUy

^

^

^

missea

profound roie of „ ature in
shaping our moral oonceptionS;
Qr that he
m isun der st a „ d s the pr0 ol
em of tbe nssd for moderation

^

world,

^

^

or that he fails to spp
see th*r
that teleology is crucial
to a search for
sources of moderation.
Further lfc
it 13
c Grange
to claim that Kant misses
,

4
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the importance
of the search
for ha

^

Kant has a very
powerful critique
of the

——

"
-ural

law traditio

S 5tSnd

badly

-

tta °PP03ite.

In

a

49

Of Kant one would
„ ever

or *,ai„, the secular
fraction, relationship
to nature is
ultimately one of knowing
and finallv °
„,f Phll
w, ,

^

-°P^al contemplation. 50
Butth
But
thrs rs hardly a
g ocd rejoinder tc Kant,
since
nce for hi
hl ™ knowledge
.
of
nature, no matter
how Perfect
perfect- or
nr imperfect
cannot yield the
moral
teleology that natural
theorists claim it
does
aoes.
To g
ailve an example
from
.

.

'

i

tecent discourse, much
of what used to
pass for natural
knowledge o£
-ial nature has recently become
seriously unsettled.
Por instance,

U

-coming increasingly
difficult even

between insane and
reasonable people.

this distinction 51
•=1

it

to justify .
5trict distinction

But natural law
theorists, to

Ruf rf* seme
„
But
people can no longer
accept such a
distinction as natural, in
orde r to mate it
effective
errective, ,someone will
have
to maintain and enforce
mU
it.
Those who challenge such
distinctions would
need to b e somehow silenced.
But this seems to Involve,
on the part of
the silencers, a nagging
doubt about whether the
distinction really
natural, since they can only
appeal to their own
self-definition as
<

1

+-

U

Z'J.t^:
50.
51.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
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680-81
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Liberty and Nature
'-

41,

121

moderate to justify
themselves

m

A , Wlth Kant
AS

to the ethos of
natural happi
PPxness.
ness

would be nihilistic.

In
m

It is difficult
"icult,

'

s

noma ds, anxiety
creeps

my opxnion the
whole project

at any rate,

pursuit of moderation win
08ntUry PO

" tiCS

thM

Political

to see how the

visions

To summarize
KanHos discussion
6 Kant
of teleolom,
teleology, physico-teleology
b8 replaced by the
teleology of morai sel£ _
asseru
ia thia
an arbitrary notion
on Kant s
,-1

•

~*

,

_

^

interdependence and continqencv
cmgency.

^

£oiioBs

f

^

^

rt remains
it
now to show what the

implications are for modern
organizational life.

In tne Metap hy^i^

Morfll(!
-^^-^-^^tol^

of the social contract.
contract

-rr

„
Kant gives a fairly
standard account
,

,

,

By aa sort of* magic people
manage to give up

"their freedom in order to
receive it back
=+ once
hsnir at
as members of a
commonwealth, i.e., of the people
regarded as a state." "They have
in
fact completely abandoned
their wild and lawless freedom
in order t<
:o
find again their entire undiminished
freedom in a state of lawful

Ul

editor
272

W
^^^
0

Lea?t

'

CY and

!° litical Parado *' " in William E. Connolly,
fchfl State,,
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984], 250-

.
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dependence

(i e.,
e
ii.

in

a

st

dePendS " ce is

'

,y their o„ n xlegislati
«yisiative will. "53

—

light of th e Cain
and Abel story
storv we now know
more abont-ythologioa! connotations
which the mere
idea of such an
act" oarri es
In the m ° d «n
world natural right
ha,
h
9
bSen ^PPlanted
'
by a complex
dependence, and, if
we are to
„
f
consrder this
dependence to be , ,t .
then „e have to
consider
Sld
it o
cur own creation.
We m ust also
assert that
tht we ar P fr-<=~
111

..

.

«"

though something
imoorf^nt"

"

^rder.

*

.

*»«

if we take the
e social
social ncontract
to hp

of chaos, we

revolution., the

my

sublet

s

up,

and that now our

m„
Dionysxan
break in the

better understand its
seriousness.

is constantly
reminded that he or she
is a

consenting member
-ber.

Rut- +-u
But
the socral, contract
is actually the
source, not
only of the state,
but of revolution
as well
»
A pastoral
Dasf
world of
independent no ra ads retires
no revolution.
As Kant stresses, a
family
unhappy with the soclal
relatlQns uitMn

m

,

-

a

«oc,s and herds elsewhere.

^~-^ep^
53.

I_l

Kant,

c

Tru ly independent
people

people , however , have nouhere

Mat^^i^^,

Pact

^

^^

retire no

^^

^^

much

^^

.
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™re

s U sce P ti b ie

to

t yr an„ y

because they depend

^^

"hich, in turn , depends
on the cule of tight<
uhich;

retires

a coercive state.

^

^

Dependent peopie ju st mig
„t otea m of

revolution

The social act, the act
of creating ourselves
as dependent and the
murder of our own independence
in a collective act, i
s indeed a founding
of sorts.
It is both the founding
of a regime and the founding
of the
overthrow of individual regimes.
To speak only of its clean
elevated
side is, in Nietzsche's terms,
to tell a lie.

2.

The Eropaadautifl nf v iolent

Kant often speaks of the quest for
morality, whether in

individuals, nations, or states, as in
principle

a

forward task, even if it is extremely
difficult in

fairly straight
a

corrupt world.

to unify his philosophy Kant also
requires freedom anchored in

a

teleology of self-assertion, where even our
conception of God is
assertion imposed upon nature.

But

a free

This God cannot be presupposed as

creating an evil world, and therefore the fault
for evil, again selfassertively, must belong to men.

Innocent man, Kant believes, due to

his naivete will always begin looking for sensuous
reasons to obey moral

commands, thus inverting the true moral relation. 54

54.

One might, for

Immanuel Kant, Religion Within th e Limits of Reason A1nn P

f

31-39.
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instance,

refrain from tellina

1

I

mSrely ln

« d« ^

avoid anxiety

This "eates a
split

between behavior and
moral worth.

When self
self-love
l
legislates, the moral
law rs followed
only „ h e„ it
£urthers
thers the interests
of self-love,
one
m9ht eVe dSSi
"
'"
PoUtieaa institutions
Lions in which
„ hi h self-love
does coincide with
moral behavior
Thi,
„
,

—«

.

—
-e

,

^

^

^
_ ^

^

middle classes for
whom
h
the absence of vice
counted as virtue.
that exactiy this
was
evil

,

„ hich

°*

Kant

^

extreme if y oo take him
to mean shopkeepers
opkeepers, b
bureaucrats, businessmen,
and professionals.
Ho „ could such
P 8 De ra dical

m

anything?

The answer is that
the evil is aualit,,
qualitative, lt inverts
the moral
Elation.
Be add
premise
Qxi

„

^

^^^ ^

^^

i

People are also radical!,
interdependent, we can
guickiy imagine bland
People creating evil in
massive quantities
,

avciding vice.

_^

In a world where
everyone has his or her
price, Kant
notes, no one is righteous,
and everyone is under
sin.Sf.
One of the
more serious problems in
modern life is "at
that it
if „encourages a dishonesty
with which we humbug
pursers into taking our rack of
opportunity to do
wrong for virtue, and thereby
never confront our own
capacity for evii
But we rai ght aiso view this
from another angle.
Xn an interdependent
society, the smallest acts
of moral cowardice are
matters of deep
concern; they affect everything.
No reformer can afford to
ignore them,

55.

Ibid.,

34.
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but neither can
the police

Th* „

system of systematic
cowardice.

*

^„

n pr ncipie
:

;

™-

tlD9 dSSireS

56

~

Kan t believes lnnocence

-eolog y

.

-ern
Kan t

,

break

life,

_

to

cuim

•

«

Ths loss o£ lnnocen=e

m -" —

and in the iater

^

*

_
^
—
—
_
— ^

——
^

this situation
Kant

, -

^

u

^

»a S ans

d by

innocence. But

^^
^^^

f

1

through the la ; er

"""-"ion

hes

a Ml03ues

e spKially in revolution
,
colonialism>

for example , often
mentions

tribes b y Eur ope a n colonists.
5,

Md

vioient dispiac

_

throughout

professionaiism
nt

^

He is cleariy uncom£ortabie

natives, but there ere
other displecements which
he vigorousl y
champions.
He champions the displacement
of an oid form of
individualism, utiUtarianism,
by a newer form, autonomy
„. advocates
replying older religious institutions
and beliefs with newer more
enlightened forms. 58 Governments
need to become republics.
The list

oould be m a de quite long.

56. Ibid., 35.
57. Reiss, 173.
58. Ee_ligio_n, 11.

But ell of these evoke a
violent moment which

~* -

PrWldin9

3 nS9atiVe

- ~*
o«

~»« ~V

overcomi„ g is typicany

—

thSmSelVeS

wit,

^^

ideologically redeemed

a

„ e overcome
violence.

conective

oases, are tOQ corrupti
espeoiaiiy

^"

thSir

~ *« "

Pirations 59
.

conective capacity tor evil
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^

^

usuauy

„ hich force3

^

^

it ls disgust

M ^

create
institutions which l>»t
l-im-itev.l and enable
process towerds the good
i

.

50

ironically, „ e individuals
are most autonomous
when „e endorse out
m0 ral
interdependence, even while ~=
participating in actual
organizations „ hich
d o not
s » re up to our best
visions of moral
interdependence.
Actualiy, because of ma n.
s asociai sociabiii
ty , ail actual institutions
would Have to be classified
as pathological, but
a g ain, patho i ogy
is
redeemed by teleology.
<-

«

Without these asocial qualities
(far

*

national nature, would be an
unfilled void.
;„
Nature
h
should
thus
be thanked for fosterin
g social incompatibility
envrously competitive vanity, and
insatiable desires for
possession or even power. 61

116 ~ 17
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Kant*"

'

92.

^

Purpo"i Herss/"-^"
61.

Ibid.
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The break with tho
Past

rr

^.

«.

which prepares one

~~
-an

thus thoroughly a

ne „ self - kno „ led9e
f or

a

i^eQ of*
l

i

--

begins as

•

a

a

violent founding events
open up

up most P lainl
Y
.

m

——
„ descent

.

But

into

^

^^^^
^^^^^ ^ h
f

hell on earth, then
saves itself.

—

^

Klsdom;62 tor nations
the horrors

taxation are preparation
foc

a

a

^ iguous

.

self-assertion, in destroyin9

creates

—

•

appaiied and for
entertainin9

—

-

„

a„

^

the oase of the French
Evolution.

•

^^
Ka „t al„ays

insisted that the revolution
„as too foil of misery
and atrocity,- that
imPOtent
bri " 9
therefore perpetnate.
evils it sought to
overcome; an d that it
was b y ds finition too
seoret an d faotional to
ever b e the legitimate
oreation of the „ ho le

U

^™—~

"

sees evidence of

a

deeper moral disposition in
the human raoe.

The international publio
of onlookers, Kant maintains
in "The
Contest of the Faculties,.,
"openly express universal vet
disinterested
sympathy for one set of
protagonists
this revolution has aroused
in

622,

tts-itet^^^
No.

14,

in Ellington,

Part 1If Elements of
104.

.
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the hearts and
desires of

»n
an

spectators... a

enthusiasm, althouqh
the vov,y Utte
u

"

with danger. "63

W

fhj
this0

But-

Kanfs reflections

m^Tf

a

ZL

" nCe

„ hich borders

°£

^

=V-Path y was fraught

sympathy comes at

a

dear price, as

on the execution
of L ouis XV!

£ n lTchT Vol\te

t

s

Zl%t
"orst

3 3

^

r
0luti ° n ---^" the
T
It
as the formal

r

execution of a monarch .h,Vk
s
r us
dread in any soui
with ideas o f h Uma
lg
:
?irt
hi: f Selln9
wil1 recur whenever
one thinks of the
fate o C
to explain this feelingf
BUt h ° W «•
t is not
[with] the sufferer's
s
situation^
h t
reaction to the compl ete
° Ur
r^erS 1
C ° nCe P ts of right.
seen as a crime which
it is
must aiwjvs" it
never be effaced, and
Whi
°
h
wil1
it mignt be
theologians maintain can
* t0 that sin which the
be 1f ° rgiven ei ther in
the next. 64
this world or

L

'

T

i

7

^^^^ ^

Wthy

faU^

1^ £

itT"^

-

^

The sympathy which
formally
revea], „a moral
m„
Y reveals
community of
^

disinterested spectators is
ciose ly tied to
death of S bel.

dread.-

to mortai sin and the

The most dreadfm notion
is that the roles of
Rig ht, in

order to establish themselves,
mi g ht become involved in
a spectacle of
reversal.
Kant, of course, on ly thinks
of this reversal in

the sense of

a reaction or setback,

but his teleology actually
suggests something

more serious.

Right and the reversal cf
right are both contained
within
the same progressive culture.
Right, in order to flourish,
requires its
own reversal to spur itself
on.
Morality is an asylum from evil,
but
evil is a loss of innocence
which makes culture, the realm
of the moral
spectators, possible.

63.
64.

Reiss,

182.

Metaph ynir of M^xal^, Part

I,

no.

49,

in Reiss,

145.

i
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The moral SDectat- n v =
Pectators
turn out to be those
whose minds have
experienced a mental ra ^t
revolution, and who
then
try to remake the
sensuous world over to
tit their acguired
conceptions. 65 The mental
revolution
D 13
i s -a
,
1n ,
single
unchangeable
decision" to render
»
oneself aa sub:ect
o k
susceptible Qf
what Kierkegaard would
later call a* leap, and
the motivation is
the
same, to find a stable
form of selfhood.
selfhood
of
Of course for Kant,
there is
only one true form of
selfhood, ana
and it is lmked
nv „ .
,
to the sensuous worldthe sensuous world
proves the oondltlons by „ hioh
*.

^^

<

^^

i

i

experience the mental
revolutioni
beco.es the ,

MM

^^

^^

_^^^

for implementing it slo
„ ly and smoQthly

^

,

This

^

version of Kant's perpetual
progress.

in the other version,
horror, dread and anxiety;
the thought that
one's best endeavors are in
vain; even the deadening
complacency of
Middle olass life; these are
what the spectator actually
reflects upon,
and against which he or she
actually frames the vision of
the .orally

intelligible community.

Thus Kant offers the vision of

a

final unity; a whole in which

natural teleology will be superseded
by moral teleology, and the evil
principle will be eliminated finally
by human moral self-assertion. But
Kant is also interesting as

65.

Relicn nn f

42-43,

a

thinker who sometimes confronts his
vision
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«— U, -

same,

or „ hen he notices

^

oooi(

controiiea

reflective characteristic
of „
° ° f P assi °n.66

~
a
.

The procedures of
U1 passion bear
k
_x.
striking
resemblance to those „f »„
of moralrty, and
Kant seems clearly
Or, agai n, God
enters the
teieoiogy
.

,

.

^

^^^^

-cllltate judgment. but
judgment

0^ ™y

be at the same time
meritorious,

but objectively a
transgressor.

relate

^
^
^

^

^

to others around
one

Thus God
God-

s unity must
be split up into
trinity which makes us
the subject of three
ree dlff
diff.
ering principles of
justice; where Chri <?h »<* +-k
as the mrddle term
Is grantee that
the principle
of relative merit
will get , hearl

a

r\ant

is,

of course,

consummate master at usi„
g his teleolo gy to tie all
these loose ends
together into a P l au3 ible
systematic acMunt;

^

t,in g together,

a

^ ^ ^

Why , after the Fcench

;

^

^

^^^

quickly into the Kantian
system?

It is difficult to see
how one can establish the
modern notion of

right without killina
ng the king,
kinou
the bearer
of the medieval notions
of
Patriarchy and natural law.
In practice, Kant would
ask us to kill the
*ing slowly, or, actually,
ask him to kill himself
slowly, since he is

meanwhile to be

a sort of vanguard,

implementing policies in the name
of

the future republic which
will someday no longer need
the king's
66.

^

M^m^l^lL_tlQJ

l

Part ri ,

in Ellington

,

67>
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services.

—her

ind in practice

^ _

tus poUcy

it takes two

years

chosen to overthrow the
kina
kxng.

^

h

a

a

^t

minutes _

^
^
^ ^

^

^

one has oreated Right
by inverting it;
v,

one has murdered to
create law and warred
to make peace; one
has
£ orci bly closed
oneself ont of an entire
ran 9 e or human
experience, the
ethical.
At his b est, Kant snows
us that we ou ght to
experience these
self-assertions, these avenues
of hope, with
wxun a certain amount
of fear
and trembling.
l

3.

Organ

7^1-

-I

r^

no

in Chapter I,

i

^

eiriphasized how organizations
fcake

*ings, but now this seems
too simpiistic.

piace

^

The modern organization oan

be seen as relying on a whole
range of exclusions and
conditions,

beginning with radical interdependence
and the death of natural law.
But within these, there are
other more specific conditions.

We can illustrate these conditions
by again making

with John Locke.

a

comparison

In a society constructed along
Lockean principles,

people would be free because they were
independent.
one would think of the whole of

a

in such a society

nation's wealth as an

acar^

But in a radically interdependent
society, viewing wealth this way would

imply that almost no one was free.
be regarded as a distr ibution..

Therefore, property and wealth must

That is, there is an operative fiction

that property ultimately belongs to the
sovereign.

But this
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distribution can't take
th*

«-*

notes,

*

f6Udali

^^^^ ^

such things are

——

"
C<S

--

-~

ccher proper, bolder
be

•

° riginal

o-ership one can derive

.

the rights of taxation
and conscription.

-he

^
_

thSre "° Uld be
«» higher court „£
appeal

From this fiction
of the st
a t-«.«
tatS
3

governments ciaim.
claim

P^ogeniture, since
-

So
^o tar
far this is merely
what all

T
hn modern
™ ^
The
requirements
ements n-F
of -ffreedom make
4
these rights
t heir particular
form.
Gove

"

_
~~

SUCh S

principle, upon themselves

_^

themselves,.

^

^

and the state

<+.
All
11 nf
° f Xt mUSt therefore be "done
through

the corps of deputies
of the people. "67

Immediately this is sard,
the number and hind cf
impositions
the various roies of
public deputies begin to
proliferate.
The police look after
public security
for it makes it much

eLitr^^f ^^^'

t^i^;

„

11

^

^

a nd

3lS °

SenSe
such as begging, uproar in
the Greets,
street! offensive smells and
public prostitution. 68

1

Me^^phy^^H^^

part

lf

^^^^

Consequences of the Nature of the
Civil Union

,

-

in Rei

^

^
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6

~*

fOU

—— -

as is

• ««. church.
private
associations must,
subiect- to proper
subject
authority, be open tn
P
inspections,
anr! fh.
and
there must therefore
be authorities
ties and in
inspectors.
The wealthy
must be compelled
n aay
„ taxes
to p
which go tQ
e social welfare
nf
the very poor, though
of course t.
taxes must never
be used merely to
f

i

«-

.

i

en-h

— ——
^

-lectors,

~.

quired

need to be ta x
assessors and

au d itors o£ public

inSPeCt0

-

^
^——
—-—
-U

Ul

"

-

of these functions,

^

and

-come

au alternative

Institutions, and dep
utles are

in an inter d epen d
ent society to Insure
that all members

ha ' e S St3ke

" "9

COnti

win

ent of lawli,
government;
so that everyone can
cultivate ann interest
in morality.
Otherwise

People cannot view themselves
as free.

Thus lnter d epen den ce,
freedom,
the loss of the nature!
right perspective, and
the distributive

Principle of legitimacy ali
support one another in
a teieology of
Progress which demands, in
turn, multiple and
varied incursions into
and
impositions upon daily iif
i£e,
e
i nrlllH j n „ even
including
y
smells,
uproar, begging,

and

prostitution.

These incursions an d
impositions must be carried out
in the name
of those whose behavior
is regulated and, therefore,
a corps of peopled

deputies is required to organic
and enforce the careful
regulation of
society. Bithout a civil
3ervlcSi

^

^

^

^^^

be convincingiy called
distributive, since feudal,
ecclesiastical or

134

personal modes nf hoidrng
h^i^'
and di3tributing
prQperty
«Pec t or other o£ the
teleology; either

—
-—

right,
,

rellglous rlshti

^

m^

independence

nor in the prlnoiple
o£ giving

au vioUte

^
^

_

^^^^

^

according to personal
merit. 69

—^

There are some mundane
complications

id6ality mUSt

™-

understands this and offers

a
a

^

some

^^

^

-istenoe.- and Kant
himself

„i
olue
to rts solution.

The complication is
this: on the one hand
the civil servant is
a sort of eunuch,

disinterested administering
public a£fairs

,

^ ^
on

Officials ought not be
discharged without reason.
70

^^

^

renure gives one

training time is less likely
to be wasted because
easy d is m issal is
unlikely. But in a distributive
society, exactly this
argument
undermines the credibility of
civil servants because as

intaxa^d

parties, they ought to be
disqualified as keepers of the
public trust.
That is, to endorse an
interdependent life, people need
to see

themselves as freely choosing their
roles and tasks within it.
This
free choice depends upon the d
etailed administration of a
distributive
ethos, which in turn requires
a professional independent
civil service.

69.
70.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,

148.
152.

a

135

comPeting

_

rs ,

undermines peopieis

order of distribution.

This need not be fatal
t-o #-u
fatal to
the xnterdependent
social order, sinoe
People can separate
specific acts of
nf admxnxstration
h
f rom allegiance
to
the order as a wholp
th^
oi..
the, can stlll think
of themseives
•

PrOVidSd thSy
'

COOTPt admi

"de ™

—-

^—

™
»•

—

^

* on

-

'

^

incompetent, bad

But since arbitrariness
is also ,

frSed0m

^

or

ion of

in turn that there
be open

avenues for criticism
and complalnt , and

^_

government could correct it»i» <„ -i.
itself an the long term,
loops ere tenuous end
where people reel
Impotent,

^

,

servants ere prime candidates
tor scapegoating.

necessary mean

that the y will be
victimlzed

where such feedback
however, civil

^

This does not

^

they
instead
an entire culture of
anonymity or in crisis may
monotonously see, to
shift blame away from
themselves or, most likely,
i„ daily tasks refuse
to take risks or initiative
and thus become an obstacle
rather than a
help to their events.
mu;
clients
0
Thxs,
xn txme, would of course
undermine the
legitimacy of the distributive
ethos.
,

Kant never addresses the
problem in this form, but he does

explicitly deal with

a

similar issue in "What is
Enlightenment" and in

"The Contest of the Faculties."

m

those essays the problem is that

members of complex organizations
must further the goals of their

.
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organizations while

at-

„~

eVe

,

^

« —ate

" he
ta
"
reser vations
The government
cannot afford to
fn remain
indifferent tQ
educated in fields
like medicine law
„ reli
'
^on. High standards
in
fl6ldS
*
society, Plus the
cannot toierate an
y thing which actually
undermines its credibility
A
3-ilar problem comes up
„ ith church clergy
^ergy.
Jf a pastQr callg
If
himseif
say, Lutheran, he
must present
esent t-h«
*-u
r
the Lutheran
view of re li i on
g
even when
he disagrees on
finer points.
'

^

"

"

~ —

_

-

,

~

Kant probably kne „
this problem „ ell

COU

"e "

^

~

,

since even

^

Ms geoiw

*

«- government. rhe proMem
comes because
se no aof„
a
„
actual organization
embodies all or
of a t-Mnirthinking man's
convictions and aspirations.
what happens
i

u

^

replies

t hat

there must be an unrestrained
public

vorce of reason might break
through

organirational discipline.

7l

^

^

bourse

^

in „ hich

^

^^

The princlple even gfits
an

^^

soiution, in that the faculty
of ph i lo s ophy is
supposed £o bfi
Practice absolute freedom of
scholarly discourse.
This last shoulder
be any threat, Kant adds,
because philosophers do not
write for popular
consumption, and thus the effects
of philosophic criticism
will

necessarUy by felt only in the long
term.

That is, change will be

painless

edltor
50

'

'

(Chicago,

IL:

University of Chicago Press

,

1982),

39-
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The role of free srhni 3r
scholarly speech thus
presupposes a thriving
individual, one whose
critic *faculties break
critical
through the
organizational web.
web
wh^
~
what guarantees
these faculties
Iaes ls
i, a
„ remainder
i

,

—

.

^
-

~

nsver rests wlth
knowiedge in
itSe

a lmost

"

t0

~

two hundred yea

„

pressnt

**

^

of hindsight<

other aspects of
interdependence?

Or
Or,

^
we may ask

h*
what happens
when the legitimacy

of the philosophic
remainder closes off theQ
legitimacy of other more
mundane remainders, like
delinquents, the
Lne insane
insane, „
or native people?
Kant's recognition of
rational otherness
Lnerness in some
*™ areas necessarily

^

,

•

•

,

closes off otherness in
Other areas.

uastly,
Lastlv

t-h.
the

organizational
individual may be taten
tak^n as
»q too
y
manrpulated and corrupt to
anohor freedom
anymore.
Thus free social disoourse
seems lixe a neoessar
y but
insufficient condition to anchor
freedom in an interdependent
world.

The bland behavior in all
modern organizations will
be the focus
of the next Chapter.
Here I need to emphasize
once again the alterity
Of modern life.
The construction of unities,
of which Kant is a master
oraftsman, continually opens up
small abrasions through which
we glimpse
a pathology within.
mdeed much of Kantian political
philosophy is

aimed at healing these wounds.
and self-perpetuating.
our freedom.

But

I

Yet the wounds tend to be
self-inflicted

Ke are caught in the paradoxical
imperatives of

have also tried to show why these
imperatives cannot
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be viewed as simply
optional.

illuminates our

sit-i ia +--i„
tl0n

"

^

T
The
he reason
rea.n to
,
read Kant is that
he

-

inte rd ep endence

.

CHAPTER

FREEDOM

Th8re

"e

AND

in

PATHOLOGICAL

ASSOCIATIOM

in Kant 3 thought
„ hich
*

BhUa „ idely
Known, are still worth
reviewing here; first,
first th„t
that ,Kant held the
sensual
to be deeply snspeot,
and, secon d that
his oritioal philosophy
see.s
U3 9r ° Undin9
deSP
^
subjectivity.
IB the two
,

,

^

Prions
9aTC

ohapters

"

theSS

*

i

exp lore d some of the
problems an d Operatives
which

"ions: the continuous a„ d
reciprocal weh

of

economic an d social inter d
e P en d ence, the d
isencha„tment of nature an d
natural law, the
Liie rise
Hsp of
nf the n
Copernican sciences
ULe:5
and
ancl the
,

general need
of conscientious people
faced with these facticities
to thin, of
themselves as at once modern,
go od, and free,
z also conceded that
the
modern large bureaucratic
organization is a plausible,
though
problematic, solution for this
range of concerns.
this chapter ,
will take this one step
further and follow up another
of Kant's hints;
that the ground of modern
optimism might lie in the
subjective
'

»

experiences of discontent and
unworthiness, that is, in
unhappiness which calls forth in
individuals

a

a

dynamic

deeper reflection.

will explore organizational
pathologies with an eye both to their
cyclical and self-perpetuating nature
and to the possibilities of
I
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Thus

.

140

bleakin9

—

"

beyond the*.

But
"ut first
tirst

sensuousness and the
subject.

,
I

must return to

£ejisjiojisjie_£s_

During the 1780s, the
decade in whrch
which Kan,
Kant wrote his
best known
attacks on sensuousness
ess. Europeens „
ere becoming intecested
a

^

3t0rY
k "°" beSt

"

ere 3ta9Sd
'

S ° ren
'

*~

—
—
— --—

the one we todey

i

t

U U

th at Mo2art

thi. sublet, but
also h0 „ £ortunate
that the subject
£ound
says Klerkegaard
cannot reauy
,

-

MtdS beC3USe
'

mediate

"

expression.

*»

—

—

^ ^^^^ ^

—on,

the sensuous i. an

lt must be felt in
the present
present,

as a movement.

If Don Juan is
quintesspnHai
i„ sensuous,
ntessen tla ily

he resliy canno t be
oaptured
in thou g hts, the way
ooethe.s Paust o an be, but
retires som ethi„ g Uke
-sio. „usio is indeed
. languag e, aC cordi„
g to Kier kegaa rd, but it
does not rely on thoughts.
^
It is infin^i
infmxtely indefinite,
and thus
•

.

encompasses more than literature.

Xt needs fewer distinctions,

divisions, fewer enclosures,
and fewer exclusions.

fewer

It conveys the mood

of the sensual better
than literature because it
appeals to hearing, a

more immediate activity than
reading.

1. Soren Kierkegaard, "The
Immediate Stages of the Erotic," in
David
Swenson and Lillian Swenson,
trans., Either/Or Vol. I, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1971)

'
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If there is
anything to this

it f^n
f ° ll0WS that
th * Problems of

sensuousness cannot all

~ - — «-

SOPhY Mi9ht

'

"7~
—axty,

believes th

e

-s

———

and religion

the estheUe, the
ethical

1=
has a large
nas
number of V aH=n«

°°'

" hi = h

^

«-PO

™

' 910US

"

hlCh

" Md

Ceverop deeper re £1
eotions
ons

in

Each standpoint

'

"" h

; nt8

d

«*

human

Eachh standpoint
Eac
t
can make a re tty
good internal case
p
for its
ltS own
° Wn P™cy, but none
can
be finally convincing
to the other two.
two
Thus p
eachh standpoint
views the
other two with deep
suspicion.
-

,

Thi. is brought out
strongly in Kierkegaard's
discussion of

"
Ab

WilUn9

SlaUghtSr

^

a-itted

" ham h -

—

-

^

f

-

"~

—

the view of ethics,

~ ~ «* —thing

as evidence in court.2

dS9enerate

m

For ethics

,

in terms of human

ethical tie, he has
been

^

too preposterous to
be

Abraham

±,

Abraham is the knight of
faith, he knows

and even acknowledges
the authority of
ethics- we
WP must
m
y or etnics,
presume he loves
Isaac, he treasures his
wife's regard,
reoarri
*
and dreams
of founding a blessed
race.
He knows what he is ethi'^n,, ^
ethically doing, yet he
transgresses ethics.
•

S ren K
ke
Edna °H Ho nr t

Lv™;

a a rd

Lns

Howard

'

V.

-

Hong and

^

university of California Press lQfim
t = ,,t
8 6thiCal
account of Abraham 37-41; For
Kie^eiaard^
Kierkegaard's
account
of
Abraham
C Taylor
see Mark
or,
in* A,
Altar,
i-v
Y
Aiu
ri t
y (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press,

^

•

1987),

340-
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Esthetics would alS
o judge Abraham
harg *'
Kierkegaard, can
understand sacr
sacrific
lflClng oneself fco
.

3

Esthetics might imagine

a

lover who

for a c
h
crime he
didn't commit.

-

MS

Pr0teCt

bSlOVed

13
'

'

best friend.

^

C ° ndemn3

Perhaps
erhaps she
sh. xs

—
——
a

Ethics
t^cs, of course,
condemns such

AbrahaM

~"

-

COntrlVed 10V6

-^

illusion for ethics.
ethir?

„„,,,

mother married to
his

l oving

siience as much
_
as

the accidentaUy

,

—^

are always only

"Ethics demands an infinite
mfmrte movement, it demands
OSUrS -" 4
SSth
this silence
But esthetics cannot
comprehend flbrah

— —_ «

flbraham

his own spiritual ordeal
ordeal.

"

abs ° lu tely nothing.

*k
Abraham
i_

u

either

Religious horror
ur

'

^
^^

^^^^^

o

^^

sa V s Kierkegaard,

lies

precisely here.

Neither we nor Abraham v
knows which he is.
Abraham is
comprehensible only
rP
Y for the religious
sphere, though even
here this
understanding is never
generalizable since
ce each rel
religious individual
must come alone to Abraham.

H^

'

There is nothing analogous
to Abraham's experience
in any other
sphere.
Unlike the lover who coul
d have spo.en bu t wouldn't,
or li ke
the ethicist who spea.s
incessantly, A braham
speak
No
„ ould
be able to underst and hi».
„ e d0 es not sacririce Issac
to ssve the

^

—ity,

as

Aga^on

did whe n he offered up

Agan.emnon can have a m utual
understanding.

3

-

4.

Fea r and Trpmhl
Ibid., 113.

\

ng
,

n2

.

i ph ig e „ia.

.

_

Xphigenla an d

No such und erstan d i n g is
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Possible between Abraham
and Isaac
with all
witn
al! h"
K
his being
•

won't happen.

1.

rash or

l ucky ,

u
i *.

but h

th ° Ugh

out , stlll beUeves
absu

"

S

":: rr
hrm,

"

^
- ~~ — -

to o«ry
carr-v

*«, t

b.

the sense of
statistical

-

-—

herorc, courageous,
or faithful.

no longer be Abraham.

^^

He „ ould

Abraham remains silent— *
hi,
>,«
the distress and
8peak
Therei * lies
anxiety
The
i
translates
8peaWLn
me
into the universal
J-t
* is th *t
love for Isaac in the
CM dSSCribe hi *
most belu"fji
h
But this is not what
My la ^age.
is on h" mLdS ° methi
he is going to
de eper, that
sacrifice him because it
understand the latter,
*"
N ° ° ne can
and thus3 ever y° n e
can only misunderstand
the former. 5

No"^ *
/ ^

'

T"
"

-p^i-:«;t

^

t

s:t^n:
plea

-

^
^

'

he cannot say that

^

——

"^erstandable. that it is
an ordeal such that,
'„
e
Anyone placed in such
the te mptatlon.
a P°"trcn
Position' is an emigrant
the universal 6
from the sphere of
:

"

i

outs him off forever from
the

infinite resignation."

_it

y

.

rhis is the ..movement
cf

„. cannot make anyone
understand

^

^ ^

totally singular, it
transgresses the webs of language.
But the next
move is even more incomprehensible;
it is the movement of
faith.

5.
6.

Ibid.
Ibid.,

115.

s
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Isaac, that is by
,
v rtue of
.

^

^oxd

S

;b

His family wila say;
lf you

,

ne „

it will happen
anyway,

^

why not abstain?

wrll give me

Hp m
h f answer;
~ght
because it has to be
an ordeal.
But
then his concern for
the fanrti™
family simply appears
hypocritical? s nce
willing to sacrifice it
to the ordeal
Or if he
h* is sincere
about his
i

^

.

-e,

his ordeal becomes
on ly a vaudevUle.

.

„e cannot sa anything
y

good and evil

Hegel had understood
ethical

Ufe

individuality, not against
hut within

as a mature discovering
o£ one's

_it

y lif 6 8 One dissolves
the opposition between
particularity and universality
by incorporating
bcth.
ror Kierkegaard, Hegel
always resclves the tensicn
between
particular and universal by giv
i„ g pri0 rity to the
universal, Kegelclaims not withstanding.
Thus Kierkegaard agrees,
for instance, that
esthetics always misunderstands
the claims of the universal
when it
.

understands community claims as
merely limits on its expression.
Esthetics ends in being unable
to give itself any expression
at all, it
dissolves in pure possibility,
of course, unlike in Hegel's
system,
actual aesthetes don't find this
to be

a

dead end.

They continue to

live in the oscillations of
contradictions for a very long time.
7.

Ibid.
rl
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1984),

r

LiherI,°
77 oo
177-99.
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Mark C. Taylor,

Cities"

(Ne " Y ° rk:

(1980).

And

in Michael Sandel,
Ke " York diversity Press,
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:r
^

e9aa

"

ais °

—

-~

-

~«.

e thios can contaln
indlvidualUy success£uii

Abraham is that the
single indiv duai
experience is completely

^

^

.

yuer

^

what he denies

man

^

the universal

His

singular

and
d YSt
VP t Xt Seems
'
^appropriate to
judge him by the same
standards we usuallv
usually reserve
r
for self-appointed
exceptions, criminals,
and free riders.

Kierkegaard thus engenders
in m.
genders in
his reader an uncanny
experience,
the experience of pl
acing Abraham
etnical.

One finds oneself
somehow beyond the universal
and discovers
overs that there
th*
is something more
ethi " 5 hUmanlY
~mpletel y incomprehensible;
that there
3
laSS f C ° mPletely Sln9Ul
°
°
to which ethios does
not
apply.
This is a transgression.
Ethios claims to be

"

"

"

"The ethicist sees the
aesthetic,
c, etnical,
ethical sn
H religious
and
dimensions of
experience as .three greet
allied Abraham s transgression
•

i

,

demcnstrates that ethics is merely
c„e discursive sphere among
others.

To return to the sensuous,
and to

Usn^zxnL.

In the Middie Ages

the Church tried to unite
esthetics with ethics and
spirituality in
happy „ holl s m
But i„ the late M ddle Ages
this seem ng un ty

a

.

.

.

out to be merely a truce among
entagonistic forces. 10

.

In the stories of

Don Juan and cf Faust, the truce
is irreparably violated.

It is

important to Kierkegaard that this
falling apart results from the inner

SSS^ET

William in
10. Either/Or Vol.

I,

^

87-89.

iS
'

°f

™

P-phraaing

Judge
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workings

«

Christianity itsel£

-istiandom,

.

^^^^^^^ ^

al „ ays point3
toward a transgressi

ChrlSti3nlty itSe

" ***

negated.

r n

P

^
aS

oppMed

_

^

It there£oce can

sensuousness as an other
t0 be

stained system
"
se„suoosne s s J s
t D o°"r;
and in that sense
it is true that
Cnrfstranitv
Y bro 9
USne3S
world.... it is Christr
"»
;
h s
Sensuous "«= out, has
excluded it from the world
to add
ll
dd another
a determinant of
qualification,
.I'
as
soirif
3
fir
PO.it* by
Christianity.
h
Chli "ianity is spirit
and spirit
the Positive
" hich Christianity
brought into the world
has
XI

^«

T

T"
^"""^

„^h

.

L

Tr
\

^

"

T*?

.

'

Of course the Greeks
were also sensuous and
erotio, but for the,
the sensuous was part of
the beautiful personality,
it was not an enemy
to be subjugated.
. tlt , was liberated unto
life and joy in the

beautiful personality."

Thus the Greeks never
posited the sensuous -as

principle, as power, as self
contained system."

side of spirituality.

No r was it the other

As such one cannot conjure
up a Greek

representative individual for the
sensuous.

Fo r the Greeks the god of

love was not himself in love,
the goddess of midwifery was
not herself a
mother.
..That which constitutes the
power of the god is not in the
god,

but in all the other individuals,
who refer it to him; he is himself
as
it were powerless and impotent,
because he communicates his power
to the

11.

Ibid.,

59-60.

——
d
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, 12

- - mention,

incarnated Christ on
,
the Qthsr

^

^

th6 special individuai
entire fullness of lif~ Mn-4->,j
u
-xtiua h
imssl£ , and this fullness
ex sts
other individuals only
iy in «,„
r,
so fat as tney
behold it ln the incarnated
individual." Thus rhri.f
Chrrstrenrty can develop
better than
Greeks ,
concept of the representative
indivi dua l
•!„
in the «,
representative
relation the entire e„er
gy ls concentrated in a single
individual, and
the particular individuals
participate therein."
.

.

«

^

Thus on two fronts Don
Ju an is the product
of Christianity
he

eddies

a

First

principle of p urs sensuous
rebellion ag ai„st the ethico-

spirituel, end, second, he
is

a

single representative
individual.

But

Christianity has also provided
another .ey element here.
Christianity,
in so far as it is the
spiritual, h as already sundered
itself £ro m
ethics.

This is seen historically
in what

,

h a ve heen

calUng the

disenchantment of nature in which,
seen fro m an Enlightenment
perspective, the spiritual is
chesed out of the world.
Spirit,
oourse, would tell the story
differently; the spiritusl

of

reported

the

world

L

^

eXClusivel y
spirit, renounces the
world,
world it
lt not only feels that this
is not its home, but that it
is
not even xts sphere of aotion;
it withdraws into the higher
regions, and so leaves the worldly
behind as the arena of power
haS alWayS bSen at Strif e, and
to whioh it now gives
piace
Place.
as th
As
the spmt thus frees itself from
the earth, the
S
PP rS in 311 its P«r'
offers no objection to the
.;
change, it,
too, sees the advantages in being
separated, and

~

12.

Ibid.,

62

^f
.

r

^

™
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rejoices that the
Church is not *hi
cuts the bond which
united them. 13

,

^

,

to ^ther, but

The sensuous was
now awakened
ened in
ln *n
all lts richnesSf
joy?
enthusiasm, "thus ord
h the „
hole K0rld become
a
oth sounding _ board
for the worldly
spirit
of the sensuous,
P
Of
while the spiritual
had
aba
"° rld
rl-i

~^

0Pe».

-"

—^

-aracteri.tion £its Mo2att

V

Do n Giovanni is al „
ays exuberant<
spontaneous _

BOIe than

3

matCh

«"

-

^

_

,

i_

—

custom an d mores are
endlessly use£ui
-nners, .nighthood, and

^

^

^

Mo reover,

,

s

voxacioU'S

an

wealth are all so many
opportunities.

A11

other oharaoters in the
opera get their principle
of motio „ f
"lends interest to ali
the others," they l ive
off his oapital.

_^

pa'Liofof^n^ne^thelrif ~
L:

L

ithi

\

them

Hls P

-

" Si °"

^

the

everywhere; it sounds
and
1
Commandant, Elvira's ang er, and
In e s hlte 0ttavi
ott Til's"
Zerlina's confusion
° s conceit,
hP
«
h
*-"»i-tor. The
existenoe of all Mother 1
H »^h his,
corn P ared
only a derived
existence. 14

tZn^lT"^
'

\

'

Of course he must always
go in dis g „ise.

He dresses up as his own

servant or he uses darxness
to dis g uise himself as the
expected ottavio
in Anna's bedchamber.
Even in broad dayli ht, when
g
he appears in his
own name, he is in the disguise
of a gentleman; the seducer
cannot

appear as the seducer.

13.
14.

Ibid.,
ibid.,

88.

118

This,

of course,

is what Kierkegaard discovers
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in all spirituality
and in *n
311 worthuhils
the outer
t
are different
«ent. nBut unlrke
Abraham

^i^

lity:

th9 inner and

*-

Don Juan makes
everythina
9

endless echo.

"

in^

Sn SCh ° £ him
°

This nf

the element

"

hich makes hi
™

«<*

figure worthy of Mozart's
genius.

With Do n Ju an desire

is

•

unleashed Qn

To

.

universal medium.

—

-"'

~
^

mdustriousness, though it has
its limits
xiirats.

-

who „ as

tely musical figure

^

&

^

^

^^^

meet a young „ oma „ is
t0 desir9 her

Bat h e desires woman.

is seduced she is, by
virtue o£ her experien

individual,

^

^_

^

Li ke an endless echo,

^

Once someone

^

she heco.es bot h less
than and more than the
ideal.

therefore has to keep moving.

.

t
Don Juan
treats women almost

He desires absolutely

intense,, is enormously
seductive.

he is himself
the

He

desire must

constantly possess its o bj ect
in a busyness that leaves
one breathless.

Don Juan accepts these conditions
joyously.
strong suit.
Spain!

Reflection is not his

Even his accounts, the list
of his conquests-and in

one thousand and three-is
kept only by his voyeuristric

servant, Leparello.

Don Juan is too busy to take
time to count.

him life and possession are an
exuberant on-going activity.

exactly this which makes him compelling.

For

It is

A reflective schemer would
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bother us more.
Margaret.

But with Don JU an
„ e heaitate

m u«
^neatness

~»

«—

We miaht- m
m ° Ce

returns to

^

He 13 havxng so
much fun.
_

„ ^^
^

the heavier and

F=«=t for aeducing

profound music of
spirituai

alm

an d , Ki6rke9aatd
„ Quld add<

^

^

^

^

^^^^^

^

Juan may in fact be
the lastlast truly mu sical
fi gU re to possess
the modern
age, and Mozart the*
last „composer to
capture the notion of
a fun
modernity. After that,
th*+<-u
the sensuous has
become a serious business.

^

,

"ore interesting perhaps,
than bon auan ia his
victim, bona
Blvira.
E lvira gave up

everytMng

-vira

„as a young nun , a real
coup for ,

to her pride.

^ ^

^ ^^
jn

rhere she could hold herself
above the inoessant chatter
of eligible young „o men.
But after bon ouan she
could return to the
convent only
she were willing to
humiliate herself.
T he other nuns
would think that it had been
such a rash and unwise
adventure; the
Mother Superior's strict but
knowing forgiveness would be
unbearable.
So Elvira would not return
to the convent, nor could she
rejoin her
family and the twitter of the
social sphere, because she threw
all that
away when she went to the
convent.
In throwing away the convent
she has

«

15.

Ibid.,

112;

127
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thrown everything
away to love
lov. Don
n
Juan
women know about
that?

What could

.

9

There is thus no
external ethical
uersext
herself or
o
qive hpr^oi £f
eXt
i0r
•

_

«-»

7

is

thins to

^

at her

"

5 WhSre

—ion.

might discl °-

"eanwhiie

i nuard

.

Ridable

exra - d

enough

t<j

--

dQ

—

hatrsd

-

-

uouw

OPPOrtunity
But „ hen
she was again alone
she would have to
think a„ contradiction;
that the
man she loves is a
deceiver.
The orohio
problem ls that she
must go on.
she
can not return to
the convent because , ha k
she has already
mocked religious
^fe. Besides, she would
need "a priest who
wh
can preach the gospel
of
.

•

the glad gospsl of
pleas

_„

i6

ihus

^

^

the religious also
is closed to her.

^

must

turn to in self-defense.

^

But this is the paradox:
oan she love hi m

altho ug h he has deceived
her?

Thus<

taking refuge

^

^

love throws her into an
endless reflation, so methi„
9 „ eg ei might ter m a
bad infinite.
she mig ht even de si
g „ate this paradox with a pet
phrase
lite, », „as .ore slender
than a reed, he m ore iorious
g
than the oedars
of Lebanon... This phrase
batons the na me for her inward
labyrinth.

16.

Ibid.,

197.

"

.
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with conflicting
resolutions.

"I

**

- ~U,
-d

him,

deceive,

..

u

but then she
,

He „ perhaps dQn

,

t

he neve, actu.lly
promised anything.

P^e,

~

.

^get

Mderstand

of this without anguish,

"i will not

she d oes not dare stop
thinking of

reMbet

hl,

°

" lthOUt

Mm

-

,

^

_

out His hand and she
had sei zed it.

u

^

a

And here she

she would never have
degraded herself £or .

om y stretch

-ink

hersei£ being unfaitMui

But

he
s he

can not

think of him, then,

But

^

t . her only

to not remember him
at all

Her
anguish, and Don Juan,
n, have
nave all
all mil
collapsed into synonyms for
one
another
.

love,

Elvira,

3ays Kierkegaard, has
become like someone on a wreck
at
sea who stays on board
to save something which
he cannot save b6cause he
oannot decide what it is;
"her destruction impends,
but this does not
worry her
.

in this way Elvira becomes
interesting, even granting that she
has

become sicker.

She is now the plaything of
psychologists, the subject

of their endless reflections.

Psychologists, or more correctly perhaps,

153

Phenomenologists, are
the "kniohts
"nights nf
of empathy" who
force open the
interior in order to
empathize with it.
it
Thp
They are also called
professional prowlers
Th-i «
Ie

" eCti0n
-

" S " h0

empathize with

a

«»

v Q fi

-Pathi 2e „i th Elvira Can
can also
alao imagine, even
ve seduc

'

„ ith h

.

"-

And b

.

—

.

.

-

« -30

smpathi2e

labyrinth of reflection.

This ttakes
Thrs
a >„„ tk
the erotio not only
beyond our
physical and social
abilities
litres, but
^
h„* sends
imagination and desire
even
beyond human possibilities.
In Kierkegaard's
o£ . Seducer „
esthetics meets its very
iimit, and perhaps
finaliy even nauseates
"self, depending on one.s
reading of the entry
dated September „.
.

^

Kvery stage of Kierkegaard.
s existential diaiectic
serves to
develop subjectivity
ty.
^,„. rn some
All stand
Ail
relation to spirituality,
to
ethics, and to esthetics.
l rely on deeper
reflections which are
•

M

happiness, but even here the
married person or the
Judge in Volume XX of
must overcome adversities,
must make personal sacrifices
in

order to find worldly
expression for the principles
of love or Justice.
Thus Kant's discovery that
unhappiness is dynamic is developed
further
in Kierkegaard's dialectic.
Elvira's bind is just one of
many possible
binds brought out by the unleashing
of the sensuous.
Esthetic binds, in
turn, are only one of three
varieties available.

Only the ethical

claims that inner and outer can
match, but esthetics would say
that the
price is boredom, while faithful
people would say that the single

154

—

individual is higher
than the ethical
unxversal.
I will return
to this
F or now , w±11
only
ion that
spirituaiists t
•

_
^•--U^o^.

^

.

^d

too humdrum.

^

for aesthetes his
esthetics

w

what is clear 13
is th^
th3t sub ieotivity
is not only an
but an extremely
unstabie

^

a^uous,

111

ract »

^

it owes its

exrstence as much to
pain and sufferina as
it does
h
9 33 Xt
to enlightenment
and
reason

KlerkeSaard 311 tteSe

di3tin0ti ° n

b
'

«*

"

-

d°

"

an inward/outward

put the sides together
again

3 Plit between inner
a„ d outer ls ultimately

sustained only in the
religiQus
fl

^velop

" lthin

dem ° niC
'

rebates «,
is earnest,

^

" ^t-.

other.

Eivirais

^^^
douMe
^

Mhe reas th6 spi ri tual

world the demonic over _
en. races

lfc

^^

the demonic is frivolous.

Kierkegaard believes the modern
age is characterized by
spiritlessness.17 Spirit has
abandoned the world, and it

has done so in
such a way that the sensuous
and the ethical become
temptations.
Those
who succumb to sensuous
temptation are liable to demoniac
obsession,
those who succumb to the ethical
are guilty of arbitrarily
declaring as
universe! what is actually only
some particular and partial
merger of
the inner with the out^r
a partial
.i
j
outer.
A
and
contingent situation is
*-+-,•

declared whole ana
and universal.
uniwr^i

17.

Mark

C.

, „
t+it
is
just this sort of pretension which

Taylor (1980), 23-69.
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scandalizes aesthetes nH h
and drrves demoniacs
cra Zy 18
a
tiful story but
stQry
dismisses
counter-stories.
Especially ethics

-

fl

.

^

,

The ethicist

^

-ic any
f

spiritXessness, since it
claims to be spiritual
of alienation or
,
an ° mie SinCS
Clai
—.rated system of real - lif e
expressions, and of
unfreedom, since it bel 4.
believes its desires
to be
roughly congruent with
its powers.
powers
But- i-v,
But
these claims, the
demoniac
believes, all oontain
hidden denials.
if etnics
ethics is supposed
,
to rest on
full disclosure, the
demoniac de m ands that
these denials be
disclosed.
However, since the co^on
iiie presupposes that
th ese
'

"

- -- «
,

,

^

denial regain conceaied, the
de.oniac

is to ethics mere l
y a

o„

transvessel

This transgression,
however, is on ly the
d
y s
twin.
The ethicai do es not
overcome
it ieeds it, and
then, since ever thing
y
m ust he m ade whole, it
r easserts its
whoieness h y
helping de m oniacs reenter
its co zy circie.
Th e ethicai, to the
extent
that its wholistic ciaims
hide f mentation, raay
itseit he a de.onia
writ large.
.

estran_,

To illustrate some of these
assertions

win look at two attempts
to articulate an ethics in
the twentieth century United
States; the
I

18. Rene Girard, "The Demons of Garesa"
in The^^g^t,, Yvonne
treccero, trans., (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1986), 165-183
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first comes from the
popular

Hahii^^^
™^-^-^ie-tl£axt,

ig the second from
19
the
»or* of the humanistic
management school,
especial
especially of Elton Mayo.
20

tt i

f

Of t„„ H

m r*

opens with the

nations

of classical ethicshow ought „ e to Uve, ho
„ can we preserve and create
a morally cohetent
U£6J Alm ° St ^lately the
authors discover that there
is a gap
between how people live and
the avaUaMe resources
for expressing it.
fo u5 o n
h
„a y s"t

of t": :rve

L

^y--:

- zizitv™

t

;

that th

-

All prevailing American
discourses are individualistic;
the good
life, according to the reigning
discourse, must be either a
quantitative
N

ca^r

'

T

^i^^di^

llah

Of California Press,
ot

'

1985)

^JS (~ST"™

^"

S

(Berkeley: University
y

1
F
J R °« h "*erger, ftaM3£m£
worker (Cambridge, MA: 'r
Harvard University Press 1964)
F
t
Roethlisberger "The Foreman: Master and
1

g

'

'

n^nd

VictL c^ouo! iilk'1945); Chris Argyris, "On the OrganStTon
Of the Future," (Beverly Hills,
CA: Sage Publishing, 1973) Sage
Professional Paper in Administrative Policy
Studies, v. I, no 03-00623,

H^xd

(Spring,

**^^

1
5oL
Macmillan
M^ilLTco
Co., 1933); Elton Mayo, Jhe Social
Problems of „n
v
(Cambrid 5 e
Harvard Press, 1947), hereafter 1947a;
S
t
!
w"
Elton Mayo, Political Problems of an Tn du.sfH.i
n (Cambridge
MA: Harvard Press, 1947), hereafter
1947b.
'

21.

Bellah, et al, viii.

'

^

t.^^

r^m^^^
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maximization of interest

„

3

^""^

deVSlOPi
°f
The human potential
entxal !„„„
language actually
possesses

potential.

"mutual exploration
of infinlt.l,,
elY

"

«'*

" Chu

'

-

C °">P le *

-nail, explain why two
people remain

a

and exciting selves
"22

in a marria e, or
g
why they

perform volunteer work in t-w
their communities, or
why they join
movements.
What happens when
the ral.H
relationship does not

-

the developmental
needs of all parties.
parties'

few

^

obviously meet

„
The potentialist
often actually
.

remains with his spouse,
even under severe
pressure.
Potentialist will resist any
la„ g ua g e of o b li

But the

g atio„, or a„ y notion that
the relationship mi ht
have si g nifi C ance
g
heyond the finite needs
of the
individual parties.

^

ordinary men and women tryi„
g to articulate ethical
relationships while
resrsting the language of
ethics.

While they wanted to maintain
endurina
resisted the notion that
such relaM

^

r*i«*-<
latl ° nshl

^

Ps '

th ey

partners in'a relation!! "m
g
e
at some of these when he
discussed how
ng
y uvea your
o^nfe"
life with
someone.
bound vnn t-^ k~ r n
y
tba
of the ,„
?" He see m ed to re"L h f
^h"^
interests, and indeed The elve
of the
t
oa t
Partners,
are no longer
u 1 I
fullv seoarahle
Utll
ia " inoividoalist language
xept
ullL

P

22.
23.

Bellah,
Bellah,

g

nThac.^

108.
109.

"

"
""

£ "ZT*?
"
Li

L

^*
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-cause there

u

of

—-

"S

SUPPOrt

—

no „ ider

'

^^^^

^

„hy long tecm
relationships require
the rxsk
risk of loss,
hurt, or sacrifice.
i

What proved most
elusive
and ">»t remains
poignantly di£fi oult in
most
t
CUltUre
understanding the world
e
°«
that could^T
"-"come the sharp distinction
between self and other. 24

£ IZeTZT^

'

3Uth0rS belie

-

th3t

- -Id

tne langnage o f civic
republicanism, and they

"

^^^
in principle be

ailed by

^

Tocqueville and allude to
^
ArisfnM..
Ar 1St otle 's discussion
of friendship.
Two
things constitute the
Archimedean point tor
,
for the r
criticisms of American
»~.
there is an older but
still accessible ethical
language
and, second, there
are implicit hot aotnal
ethical practices to
which
om y that lang uage can give ade
q uate egression. Sgainst
this rich and
ethical disclosure all our
current forms of individualism
seem sterile
and poverty striken.
But only half the case
is proved.
The authors
can
a good case that
. utilitarian individualism,
in „ hich » ths

««,

*

self is -the only or main
form of reality- threatens
to be
unsustainable.
But then we
read:

to a larger whole,

XZTlltlT™
24.
25.

Bellah,
Bellah,

110.
143.

a

community and

a

«*

X"

tradition-are cabbie of

—ring

both
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In other words,

only ethical
H
al llfe
Can solv * the problem.
This is
suspect, of course,
because itSn »*"» ° f
critics of
this position--in
the fi^t ChaPt
u
1
J
Turner-,, in the
ChaPt
1 diSCUSSSd
-pter I am discussing
'
Ki k
an array 0£ other
seriousiy suggested
^ticns. Why 3hould Ke loofc

~«1

"

—
«
——
"

-

"

«

*

*

We.

^

Tocquevine

^

Pa-.- that modern
individualism is self-defeating,
but „ either
accept ethical life as
the solution
There
.

^

.

^

republicanism „ hi ch simply
could never be redeeme
^
atomistic individualism i
s

self defeating,
self-ri^f^t-

couw

^

because

xt does not follow
that civic

republicanism can be sustained.

TO show that another
account i. possible

concepts o f spiritlessness
and demonia to give
I

"ill focus on an esthetic
section of

x

an

,

m

use

alternative ceading

h^^^^

because

.

z

thin, this will show how it
is that ethicists c a n
see, sc boring to
aesthetes, and thereby in turn
show how ethics incites the
demoniac
responses which it deplores, ana,
finally, that the religious
sphere can
offer a profound rejoinder to
the ethical critique of American
mores.
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-

ethics; only they
dQn t

—
™"
—"— -

Clan
"

AmSriCan h

«

MYthiC

8

,

««-

—

fcecause thsrapeutic
In the sectio „

authors rind that the
classic

Captain Ahab , Shane
,

really belonging to
the larger society.

The cowboy can shoot
straight and fa st, T ravis
McG ee is too tough
to be corrupted, they
all possess technical
s.ills pl us a peculiar
sense
Of Justice.
Typically the proble, is
that society is too
corrupt or
cowardly to help itselt.
This leads to an ethically
unacceptable
movement, where
e goodness
ooodnpqs and heroism
k~
are found only in special
characters who haunt the
ne margins.
marains
T
h^ movement cannot finally
This
ever
come to rest.

chrgooAVto

"
^ITVlttZ T
^.^^5^2^^*^'

be
Xine between ethical

26.
27.

Bellah,
Bellah,

144-47.
145.
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destructive potentials,
entlallt ~f
^ of
revealed. 28

a

completely asocial
individual ism is

The problem with
cowboys and deteetives
is tnat
that they
the embody
k
the
0£ aUtMOmOUS
But moral indi.idnality
mnst stand
alone
that it ris*s nnnnin,
=0
to madness, cynieism,
or despair.

—

^

One accepts the necessit-u ^-f
values of the group
t0
A d
t0 al ° neness is an
important key to the
American
of the profound
iS
arnbrgS
r th
myth ° log of American
individualism that its morai h~ ^tho^f
y
±5 alW3yS just a
from despair.
»tep away
For an Ahab
1
f ° E 3 C ° Wb °
detective, there is no
y °r *
6tY
m ° ral ademption.
The hero's lonely
quest
for m0ral silence
*
ends in absolute
nihili sm 29
•

.

tLr^ffi'T
™^

"

^rTJoT"
I

^
'

t

"™ ^

^"

^

.

These total breaks clearly
violate an ethicisfs
aesthetics
Everyone ought to seek
happiness in a full and
open social disclosure.
It is impossible to
imagine life without a town.

Will Kane the hero of
High Noon, abandoned by the
cowardlv
townspeople, saves them from
an unrestrained killer
bu ll
h S S h ri f
bad g e i t e USt

=

L L

w it h h
;de
for there is no longer

^^ ^^

^
^liL'Sh'S^.^
one

L L f?

This last is a good example
of what disgusts an aesthete
when he
listens to an ethicist. First
of all, the situation does
have an

ethical side.

Mr and Mrs. Kane have found
each other and themselves in

their ordeal; they are more married
at the end of the film than at
the
28.
29.
30.

Bellah, 144-45.
Bellah, 146.
Bellah, 146.
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beginning, and marriage
aiH to K
y« is Ssaid
be an ethical
tip
T f we
^"^ tie
If
must be
pragmatic, I am sure
they will settle do
down in another
western community
° nS
d " ot
°
their neighbors and

^

-

"

^'

f

leadS

°

Unl6SS

S

~—

—
™
«

-

"
»»»

in P

dO it

aU

the „ e „ school

0ver again

.

Suppose the townspeopie
pursue him a„ d £orce him
t0 do lt

COIPl6tely

*~

" ith

mi

,

a 9 ain a„ d

street, „aten ing him once
again slap

^^

again step into the

^^^

gun down the evil killer„ 3 ^u'
killer, watchxng
him once again reach for
his wife, to
once again teach us that
justice prevails,
prevails to let us once
again identify
with someone we can respect.
resnerin„+.
u
But why
would the townspeople do
this? I
]

only the townspeople who
know they are cowards; the
audience in the
theater is judged as well.
The badge in the dust
breaks the spell.
acted,

I

watched.

townspeople.

I

He

sat watching him on the
screen just like the

Kane not only refuses to rejoin
the townspeople, he

refuses to rejoin the audience.

Had you or

I

been in town that day we

would have let him go into the
street alone, just as the townspeople
did.

Of course during the whole
movie we have been denying this; we

identified ourselves with him against
the cowardly townspeople.

The

badge in the dust means the audience
will demand with their money to see
these scenes over and over again.
Certainly American audiences became

obsessed with the western movie.
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If we looked for
the last western,
western

in a qualitative
ln
sense,

candidate would be Clint
Kastwood's

That

a

_

good
ie

starts with the nameless
marshal be ing orutallv bull
whipped fcQ death
while the whole town crin.es;
but watches.
They have paid the b ad
guys

interests.

The incorrupti.le marshal
had learned that their
mine was on
Federal land.
He was go in g to ruin ever
y thin g
Here the theme of the
lonely law man stepping into
the street to face the
villains while the
townspeople crin ge and watch is
literally beat to death.
Throughout
most of the movie the marshal
lies in an unmarked grave.
Tradition has
it, of course, that a man
in an unmarked grave knows
no rest.
.

Ghostlike, Clint Eastwood arrives
and remains nameless.

standard elements show up, but all
the standard moves change.

All the
The

stranger doesn^t play fair or nice, and
he takes revenge on the
townspeople, even while destroying the
three killers.

At no point does

the drifter make the world safe for
ethical people; and though it would

like to, the audience can not really
identify with him either.
a woman,

he makes fools of people, he deputizes
a dwarf.

the whole fabric of the western.

He rapes

He unravels

At every point he forces townspeople

to admit their cowardice, he despises them,
he dissolves their corrupt

social nexus.

Finally he throws the b ad guys and the townspeople
into

saloon together, without distinction.
tricks,

a

The b ad guys cannot use their old

they can't hold good people hostage because the stranger
doesn't
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^

care whether they live
or not, and,
besides there are no
here.
The bad guys can
terrorize6 th* to
tow ^people all they
want, only it
won't save them.
Because
t duse rho
th e stranger refuse
„~4reruses to get
y
caught up i n the
trap «* protecting
the tounspeoplei „ ho
re£uses
ptet
innocent, and beranw
because this movie xnsists
« insists t-h^
that the townspeople
are
indistinguishable from their
hoodiums
ghostiy
,

-

^

i

^

^

^^

_

at least as it „ as
before,

««* cities

*U~*

also dies; its buUdings

mostly killed either

^^

each other

fcy

^^

its marginal dwarf given
. place of honor<

^

^^

thsir

om

mar3inai

inhabitants given blankets
and clothes.

^

in the morning after the
town's orde a l, when the
drifter leaves,
the dwarf is still sheriff,
and he is insoribing the
dead marshal's name
on . tcmbstone.
The obsessive cycle revealed
and broken, the marshal
can finally rest in peace.
The myth had declared that
the marshal

stepped into the street to
protect the townspeople; now the
secret is
out that the marshal was not
the town's protector, but
rather its

victim.

It has at last become
esthetically impossible to make a

standard American western movie,
its hold on American popular
culture is
ended,

one obsessive cycle broken.

This brief comparison of High Noon
with

Hifl h.Plains

nHfr.r- shou ld

cast doubt upon the ethicist scenario
as described in Habits of

Heart.

Hish^rm

needn't be seen as

a

t-h Q

straightf oward celebration of
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^

autonomous individualism
at

^ ^ _^ ^
^

ethical account can
not really explain why
ue find such myths
so

miLn9

"

'

The modern city,

=°"i„ue to be ineffectual ln
lt3

as even Kant noticed,

reciprocity which encourages

a

is a complicated

^

system of cowardice and
smallness 3!

Kant goes so far as to
caii this

because though

^

behavior is mild, the inward
disposition is completely
corrupt.
The
High Plains drifter would
agree, and has worked out
.any or the dynamic
movements of this system of
cowardice.
w6 understand the American
hero, not as an autonomous
individual, but as

M

a spiritual scapegoat,

then we are in a position to
question the nature of the
society which
requires such heroes and
obsessively requires them to
g o through their

^

endless ordeals,
of the

of course we risk having to
admit that the instincts

might be valld

.

what popular myths espec ally
br ng into
.

.

question is the notion of a sustaining
community which the mad, or the
sick, or the heroes need to only
rejoin in order to be made whole.
Perhaps the community has

a

hand in making them sick.

Their condition

as outsiders may fall well within
the parameters of the demoniac

community, only they speak what the
community cannot acknowledge about

31. immanuel Kant, Religion within th B ,.; m
h s of Raa ^„ M „„„
T
M
Green and Hoyt H. Hudson, trans. (La Salle,
IL: Open Court Publishing,
I960), c.f. 29, "We call him good who
is bad in a way common to all "
especially 30-40. The most intelligent argument
I have seen in favor of
this form of economic reciprocity and its
self-interested moderation is
James Madison's "Federalist 10."
;

U ""'

"° rSe

ml9ht

'

as the c

.

_

-

nities

*
,

™
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0* coliective

„ estern movies
tried

themselves by scapegoating
their law men.

The humanistic management
movement,

^ ^^^^

U*e

the civic republican
tradition, seefcs an ethical
solution to the problems
of modern
spiritlessness.
xt usually refers to
spiritlessness as anomie.
But
unli.e civic republicanism,
numanistic managers are alert
to obsessive
responses and to their
sources in modern organi.ational
Hfe. Lik e the

-thors

of

whether as

ZzZi^^^
a

agree that as

they reject Hobbesean
individuaiism(

prescription for or as a description
of modern life.

They

self -understanding, such
individualism is Inadeguate for
describing people's actual lives
and when this understanding
is applied
anyway, it becomes a
dreadfullv
iy Self
splf-f„ifm
fulflllin 9 prophesy, creating
a

conditions of anomie which it
then -realistically- authorizes
strong
measures to contain. 32 Elton Mayo
refers to individualist
rationalities, and especially economic
individualist rationalities, as
"the rabble hypothesis," by which
he means that economic rationality
relies on the premise that humanity
is

a sea of

introverted individuals,

each interested only in maximizing
his or her own welfare.

32.

Mayo (1947a), 45.
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In their behavior
and in t-w
they accept the
rabble hypoSsisInT > ° C ° n ° mists
that
tS :
financial incentive
dlSmal Hilary of
as thpnni
,
substitute a logical^
h
If
° f ZtlT
Sma11 Poetical value
actual facts. 33
for

2

Against this, like civic
republican ^ Mayo
"observe the facts of l
ife as they are lived _„
J4
34
belong to hierarchies
arcnies -o-f „
of groups,

a

.e^er

„f so m et hi „ 3 , everyone

~.*io

mana9ers „ ould dlsagres

family,
J-Y/

school
school,

^
^ _
today

older civio traditions;
£or them TocquevUie
The scie„ tific

ChM9

"

—

t e 0hnolojioal ,

,

f3Ce

"

things once and for all.
a "M

^
^^

uouw

^.te

^

the

^ ^

Actual people always
#-«
town,

union,

church,

^

^

couid

^^

heip

^

and

- -e

y have „.

t

simply changed

tv^ changes
u
The
keep occurring and they
come so

quickly that no new community
craaitions can
« „
y of traditions
grow up or take root.
i-

M

This emphasis on change
probably is a result of Mayo's
and

Roethlisberger's ages.

Having lived through the era
of the change,

having personally experienced
its disruptions, they probably
have
deeper sense of how far from
traditional communities we have
come.
Bellah, et al.

r

a

often say they understand this
issue, but then seem to

believe modern highly mobile career
people can still be civic
republicans.

Instead of Tocqueville and Aristotle,
humanistic managers

get their theoretical bearings from
Continental social theorists: the
33.
34.

Mayo (1947a), 83
Mayo (1947a), 45
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psychologist Pierre Janet
and the sonologist
Emil Durkeim
In
1940s Mayo also studied
a
tudxed St. Augustrne,
the thinker who
wrestled with
questions of how moral
life miahtmight survrve the
transition f rom classical
to Christian culture.
35

h

.

^

«.

Humanistic managers aiso
share „ ith the authors
Qf
a commitment to
intervie „ ing Md ieacning
fcom
in

UU.

They too discover that
the language Qf indivlduallsm

^

fro, this that what
people are ion ging to express
is ethics,
what
People are expressing is
rather a sense of estrangement
What their
interviews reveal is that
modern work in mo dern
organi.ations contains
host of potentially
pathological situations and
fosters in its
.

participants a myriad of
pathological and obsessive
responses, and it
does this at every level of
a corporate hierarchy.

The humanistic management
school was born in the early
!930 s in
the famous Western Electric
management study. 36 The study
too. about
five years, interviewed over
22,000 employees, and included
countless
hours of observing workers in
controlled and uncontrolled situations.
It is truly remarkable the
way the researchers constantly
let their

findings and observations change
their own thinking.
to learn as they went along.

They were willing

Their sensitivity to their subjects and

35 Mayo (1947b), Mayo's debt to Janet and Durkeim
are well known; for
his discussion of Augustine's City of r,r.H
0 .f. 143-46.
36. Roethlisberger (1964).

a

"

!

69

their ability to know
when their „
own methods and
paradigms had become
-debate on limiting , and

^

ignorance are all
enormously refreshing.

^

^^
•

r

own

controlled e xp eri ment found
that worker productivity
and satisfaction
could be raised in a
variety
P h ys ioal ways.- i„trodnoi„
g mid-morning

«

-en

these ohan g es were later
rescinded, productivity
did not drop

aM

year into the study, the
researchers concluded they
had to abandon
their previous causal
notions of »ny
„hv efficHen,efficiency or satisfaction
rose and
fell.
They turned to Pierre
Janet.
a

in the second phase
the researchers started
their interview

program.

Here employees aired their
many grievances,

xhe idea had at
first been to set up ways
to correct these grievances,
but very few
turned cut to be correctable
or even verifiable.
Sometimes employees

complained about specific things:
a vent fan had been broken
for
time,

a long
or a machine was unsafe, and
everyone agreed that employee
lockers

were overcrowded.

But most complaints were against
people or referred

vaguely to things like "rates are
too low," "earnings are not
commensurate with length of service,"
"ability doesn't count in my
department
.
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t hough

these complaints „
ere usuaiiy

another rational lanan^n
a nguage ,3-5-7
7 on closer
inspeotion
e^^ees really
their
" 0rk6d Md

^

^^

^~-

'

^

^

^
fo

^

^d

in ths best „ ays
to

maximize their economic
utilities
6S 38
Fn ^stance,
For
many employees
stated as a matter of
fact thaithat xf they worked
too hard the company
would simply lower the
piece rate,
Piece
rat-P
Io
leaving
them working harder
to take
home the same wages
Yet
„
Yet,
3the Western
Eleetric company had
never in Ua
history done this.
-

^

•

Several easy explanations
were rejected.
rejected

Wn
>
Workers
were not simply

Pushing their own self
-interests against those
ui
of capitalist management.
For that to be the case
se worker*'
workers h«K,
behavior would need to
change.
Nor
»ere they simply ignorant
fool>
The
f6a

"

b

—

.

mg ^

-

^

^

the legitimate language
in the

Plant, not because it
expressed what they were worried
about.
This,
believe, was the great
breakthrough of the study, to
notice that

I

employee worries and complaints
were neither errors nor
partisan
behavior.
They were neither illogioal
nor were they in oonformity
with
any abstract logic.
Though oouohed in abstract
rational language,
employee complaints contained an
experiential 'lived' logic.

37.
38.

Roethlisberger (1964), 258-59.
Roethlisberger (1964), 532-37.
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are ver
^

life. 39

—

Piecework, th6 gsnulne
issue

"

^

indiV

°™on phenomena

My Mt

win

in all soc ial

^

— ~^

to take home, but
who

9r ° UP PieCe "° rk

c

^

be sociaiiy integrated

*—

n

^^

t0 get lost „ hUe
in individual
piecework it ,a rnevrtable
that some items win
be rated
l
that
less prestigious
-i

t-

~~

T

S ° me0ne

PrefS

" in9

-i

,

<,

*

——~*
—

*-*

work t0 provide
general
social acceptance, while
someone arguing £or
indlvldual
work to provide a way
of standing out.

Thus compl aints tended
to have bQth a

^^^

^^^^ ^ d

content.

^

^
^^^

Such statements Had an
inner and an onter
reference, and the
inner reference could be
reached on ly by further
study of
made the complaintt. "40 Th^ >-^o^
u
The researchers
40
were ied first to abandon
their
causai model and then to
adept an interpretive
approach,
raced with a
aeries of complaints for
which there was no objective
solution, or any
commensurate scale for weighting
relative merits, and having
been
convinced from earlier findings
that these complaints were
directly
related to the organization's
ation s Health,
he^n-h it
^ kbecame important to develop
a
way to think about them
The
rplaHnr, between
v^+.
ine relation
complaints and
..

,

organizational health deserves closer
attention.
39.
40.

Roethlisberger (1964), 262-63
Roethlisberger (1964), 265.

.
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test room who ln her
old department
She was pretty difficult- t„
0Ult

"

*.u

challenged authorit
y needlessly

iabsied

tSSt
,

too.

Qften

she ha d to be d ismisse
d from the test

featu.es of the earl
y experiment was

a

a

troubie]Mter

^
_

She tal.e d too much,

^

fiut

series of blood

of

t ests

After heing tre ate d her d
isposition complete!, changed
a„d she even
apologized to the researchers
for
or ner
her earlier criticisms,
which

she now

said were unfair.

As the interview program
proceeded what bothered the
researchers
was that many employees
at Hawthorne had the
same symptoms as the
anaemic woman, but they did
not

^^

^^^^^

theories of Ja net, and to the
above mentioned idea that
workers used
logic of sentiments.
They also decided that good
managers had been

a

dealing with this sort of material
for years, and they began to
try to
develop explicit statements of
the intuitive knowledge of
these
managers.

They concluded that good
supervision is not

a

matter of

applying knowledge gained through
scientific theories, not, for
instance, from fatigue studies or
theories of economic incentives, but
of using common sense in a variety
of concrete situations.

And any

description of the concrete situation in
any department would have to
include

a

reference to the workers' sentiments.

173

Indi " idUal PSy ° h0l

the

fKt „ ry

°-

"

h

gate „ hile people go

^

—

^^ ^^

*» that m anage ment stops
,t

^ ^^^^

^ t^

interview st age , the reS
e lrchera dlscoveted
that
riddled with socisl
relationship and groupings
Md

^

^k

greatly

.^e^^

one

,

s

status

^

in industry the uhole
„ Qrklng environment

-i*

SOcisl

3 ignificance

...

41

Thus

_

needn

ity

^
,

t

emP loyee home; there „ as
plenty golng on right

one ^
_

^

"PQJ-

re9arded

foUow

„

^

^

^
employee

^
dissatisfied

^

^

shapes people-, dispositions,
self-understandings, and
as much as anything
else.

This discover, leads to
acme interesting insights.
A supervisor
«ho says . P olic y is unfair
may at fir3t seem to be
protesting against
discrimination or favoritism bgt
,
over and gver such compia
nt3
found to "express . d is uise
d demend for privilege, a
g
demand to be
.

differentiated from those below, but
not from those above. "42 Or
again
researchers found that physical
plant conditions, more than an
y other
aspect of work differentiated
supervisory and office workers from
shop
workers.
Thus shopworkers, the lowest
status on the ladder, complained
more about working conditions than
any other group.
"it is too hot,"
"It is unsanitary" "The tools
are no g ocd."43

often as not the man at

the next machine had not noticed
the problem.

Dirt turned out to be a

41.
42.
43.

Roethlisberger (1964), 374.
Roethlisberger (1964), 364.
Roethlisberger (1964), 376.

,
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barometer conrpntconcept.

- ail***

Conversationally it works
li ke the weather;
dirt may

their departments

,

but

Uked

employees felt thla „ ay ._„
ould praise

fche

the company __ and

oompany because

pi

^

t

not dirty.

^

The systems of social
relationships had little in
co^on with the
company^ managerial flow
charts, „ or did the technical
nature rf
talophones make it necessary
to make status distinctions.
Ye t the
social organization of the
company was as important as
its flow chart or
technology for making telephones.
Any ch a„ g e in either the
wot, process
or in supervision affects
the company's social
organization.
Even tiny
trappings of social status,
like new ink blotter,, are
interpreted in
terms of these social relations,
and will be resisted or
endorsed
accordingly. Wh at seemed to be
happening was that workers would
try
under unfavorable conditions to
maintain a social identity and
selfesteem.
Supervisors whose social identity was
also involved in other

^

community organizations, say church,
family, or Little League, were
less
likely to panic when things changed
than were supervisors whose whole
social life consisted only in work.

But for everyone, the social stakes

of every change were high.

Social organization seemed to serve two main
functions; internal

discipline, to integrate people into the group,
and protection from

external interference.

Most of what is "ordinarily labeled 'restrict! on
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of output'

represents attempts
tempts aat
t ,„
socral, control and
discipline and as
-en are important integrating
processes. "44 An internal
social
organization on the shop
floor can make life
pretty miserable for
someone Bho violates
its norms,
one doesn't drastical ly
out produce
otner workers, nor produce
drastically less. One must
not b e officious
or act superior.
An officious inspector
was constantly b ein
g reported
as -slow- and blamed
by emp loy ees for their
non-productive time.- they
*ad to wait for inspections
b ecause they timed
their work so they would
all need inspections at
once
once.
Th«
-i^o
The inspector
was subjected to other

he was usuall. made to
inspect in the less presti
g icus back of the room,
he was excluded from trips
to the candy store and
from conversations.
When his inspections were
slew the men made sure
supervisors heard them
complaining a b out it. Eventually
he had to be removed.

But if the chief function of
these internal or g ani 2 ations
is group
protection, and the main threat
is radical change, the chief
enemies

become those two backbones of modern
organization: the supervisor and
the technologist.
Both of these figures impose an
abstract lo g ic onto
human landscape not designed to fit
it.
the prcblem.

Here we come to the heart of

In existential terms, the supervisor
and technologist

sacrifice the living individual to, or
allow that individual to have

validity and meaning only within the terms
technologist sees the worker as

44.

Roethlisberger (1964), 523

a

of,

an overall system.

The

pair of arms who should be grateful

a
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" hen thin9s

"e

^

that

u,

„ he „ things are

technically rational.

The supervisor introduces
financial incentives

assumption that the worker
is an „,.„
economic monad.

^

^

^

But if people do not
SO to »o lk merely to move
efficiently or merely to
maximize their
earning but also t0 partlcipate
,

^ ^
o£

and if one.s job b ears
its load of social
significance, these attract
iogics may be resisted.
The technologists, logic
tampers with the
relation between a worker and
his job.
This can affect "his
interpersonal relationships, his
traditions of craftsmanship,
and his
social codes which regulate
his relationships to other
people. "45

Supervisory logic may fail because
company authority differs from
normal
social authority.
No where except in the
factory are human

relationships governed b efficiency,
y
and no where else is authority
so
one-sided.
Ordinary authority, say parental
authority, is non-logical
and gives an individual back
ahout as much as it takes away
because it
integrates him or her into the
complicated activity of living. Because

supervisory logic dees not represent
our accepted beliefs about human
relationships, it is experienced as alien.

Lastly, both technological

and supervisory logics are imposed
b y people at one level of hierarchy

upon people at a different level.

A worker, whose sentiments are

rarely consulted and who sees him or
herself at the fottom of the

45.

Roethlisherger (1964), 546.
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hierarchy "cannot hold
to the same
me degree th
the sentiments of
those who
institute the changes."

—

itic management discovers

this longing lt3el4
helps drlve

mhealth? SnVlr

i~

—^—

for ltS9lf pathological

U

^

a

obsessive

**
f

^
^
^^
^^^^

ionging

_

~~ U~
Humanistio

^

^

and association

manawnt

s

the P eo pla it intervie
„ s a distinction
betueen
meaning; but this does
not necessam,,
necessanly mask a healthy
ethical drive,
though sometimes it does.
dopq
nff. lt masks
Often
a resentful
over-thought
desire for privileges or
status
status.
insecure employees form
unacknowledged
social groupings, but
usually
iy these arm,n
groups have to struggle
with the
abstract logic s of tec h „olo
gy and management
Qf
-eh of huma „ s„ cial behavior-oooporatioo
and association--!, either
irrati ° nal
Th e
rules against talking or
against
employees „or king together
F
Roethllsberger f inds that among
shop
fo reme„, „ he „ informal
groups are lgnored Qr
marginalized _
start

m

v,

.

"

-

^ ^^

«

"

.

.

feeling pushed around.

frustrated"

S.^.,.

46.

^

°f 3
^*
Tv^T,'
n9s
1 are important to

Roethlisberger (1945), 293.

him

—

is constantly be i„
g

.
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Impressive technics
achievement is accompanied
by:

with

xr
reM

s

o o

^:ert-o

n aveTo„ g
. 8d hope an * v

^:rt

dry by the batei
°£
h
„:e
p
to moti
h :i: t ;^ £ ::«

—«

Workers who d0 not work
according to the absttact
logic of
management get branded as
troublemakers., Workars „
ho do „ ork
according to those io ics
g
iose their sense of
cooperation and trust an d
replace them with more
pa t hoio g icai attitudes.distrusts T he problem
starts when managers,
themselves under pressure
from their own io ic
g
treat discontented workers
as either troublemakers
or as too dumb to
understand their own interests !,.,,,,„
"^tute on resistant workers ti hter
'
g
disciplines and incentive
systems -for their own good..
Th e demoniac
cycle is coveted when
workers, in the absence of
viable alternatives
such as health, ethical
associations, come to e ua t e
q
satisfaction merely
with hi g h incomes. 49 This
Thi^ means
mo a n c that
t-v.^^
one might accept work
disciplines,
but only conditionally and
externally, „ ith extreme
re3ervations
Qne
constantly looks over one's shoulder
to see how much money others
make
and constantly tries to make
up for lost dignity by wringing
.

.

.

concessions from management.

Managers, to keep their relative
dignity

from eroding, try to wring
concessions from labor or introduce
more
discipline

47. Mayo (1947a),
48. Mayo (1947a),
49. Argyris, 25.

83.

119.
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Discip lina r y syst ems
tend to encourage
conformity
both o t informai group
discipline
supervisQry

Managers, who have the most

t-o

This is

t rue

^^^^ ne.

^

socially, are particularly

1

susceptive to d iscipiinar sy
stems.
y

They want no hint of

^

their d epartments hecause
other mana g ers „ U1 be
qu ic* t0 take ad v antag
e
o £ their weakness.
Managers tend t „
oniy
issues Ufce base retes,
manhours, bu dg ets, cost
curves, and production

^

scales. 50

The re is a dee p se atsd
ne g iect and distrust of
any human
or emotionai content.
in a „ori d where the
only legitimate
a hi g hi y rationai one,
mistakes, o„ersi g hts, an d
probiems are not mere ly
d ifficult encounters with
finite human situations, the
y are
sent
ct on , and
ij^U^liti^. To be cau ght in these is to be

^

M

i

i

hanished from b ein g taken seriousi
y
as valid.

.

Thus one never accepts criticism

One vigorously works to refute
it.

-

13 tend t0

rivalr S/ force groups
? roble
reward an
overaS oof
overall
pointt ofJ view rarely, and place
groups in win-lose
srtuatrons in which they are competing
with each other for the
same scarce resources. 51

trthS'of'ther

"

,

° therS

'

^

Workers adapt through more informal
activities; absenteeism,
turnover, and apathy, managers adapt
by thinking only of their own

fiefdoms and ignoring the health of their
companies. The point is that
the modern corporation is structurally
organized to insure that distrust
50.
51.

Roethlisberger (1945),
Argyris, 11.

21
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becomes the only
otive for action and
Y motive
material ygain
11
the
Lae onlv
only source of
respect.
But to nail
cali these motives extPrn^i
lu say that everyone
in
organUation must spend some
part of
»-

h

" "
blnd

^

SSlf

"^

'

-Ch0 ° 3 « *>
Pl

'

emPl ° Yee

" llitMt Uni ° n
"° rk

-

<~

union demands

,U

rationality.

One oan aot, out

—
—

^

*

^

t, to the demoniac

"ith this ethlcally
,

--

-tive, which

S ay

through

la some relief

But

accept managerial abstract
io g io and economic

.tin

oni y against oneself.

0 r one can
try to retreat back into
oneself, but then not oniy
oannot aot, but
finally cannot »o rk either.
„e caii this condition
apathy.
Both
responses, union militancy and
apathy, are double-bind
responses.
Either can easily degenerate
into obsessive over-thought
resentments.

Like the authors o£ Babits
of

a.

h^,

humanistic managers know

the modern world runs, not
because modern rationality works,
but because
we are squandering our centuries
old accumulation of civic capital.
52
But by now workers have developed
"a social code at a lower level
and in

opposition to the economic logic. "53
cannot be read off at face value.

People's aspiration towards ethics

The lower ethical code is a result
of

having one's efforts at community
systematically defeated in the very
act of association itself.

An individual might yearn for ethical
life,

and covertly be jealously guarding or
seeking privileges.

52. Mayo
53. Mayo

(1947a), 117.
(1933), 121.

.
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The only hope for
ethical Ixfe xn modern
ethical
organizations, humanistic
man agers would insist«»t. i« +-~
to relax the pressures
tending to confor m ity,
competition, and distrust in tk.
the modern workplace.
Their strategies for
doing this involve a lot
of interpersonal group
discussions, more
cooperative forms of assenting
products, policies of
on-going

un-

»

n

consultations with workers,
workers „r
and polrcres of sharing
responsibilities,
risks, and decisions with
employees. One of the more
troubling aspects
Of their theory is that
these changes must always
he instituted from
above and this has lead to
charges of elitism.
However, though one need
net agree with Kayo and
Argyris that change can only
come from the top
down, one must still admit
that change
come that way and so their
scheme need not be dismissed
simply on these grounds.
Below ! win
discuss what I believe tc be the
christian nature of both the
analysis
and the solutions given above,
but first I win look at
sheldon Wolin 3
objections to humanistic management.
irl

i

^

,

Sheldon Wolin54 criticizes Elton
Mayo on two major counts.

First,

wolin fears that Mayors cooperative
forms of organization are simply

euphemism for the manipulation of workers.

Second, Wolin worries that

over-concern with the healthy organization
of work, even if equitable,
will lead to

a

disregard for creating a properly political
public

sphere

54.

Sheldon Wolin, "The Age of Organization," in Politics and vi.-ion
Little Brown and Company, 1960), 352-434.

(Boston:

.

W ° lin

'

S

first worry seem"?

" iticism

is

™^

—
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-

I

win

return to lt

The

.

justified and most of the
forgoing analysis
-as given in order to
show that M ayo ia
offering . deep

—

organise,

Bolin hece

Ma yo wishes to undermine.

^

_^

chris Argyris

^

^
_^

sort of charge by
describing the
of ,
g tne level „f
commitment he thinks would
be
needed to implement
humanistic management.

Argyris nctes that wcrkers
have become wary of new
management
3Chemes with their talk of
worker input and communication
and, he says,
rightfully so. Most cf these
schemes really have turned
out to be
hypocritical attempts to raise
productivity.
But Argyris dissociates
his from these cynical schemes.
If management seriously
wants a more
human managerial style, the
managers must begin by changing
themselves.
If change is genuine,

sceptical workers will be
convinced only slowly

and by long and continuous
experience.

workers usually resist genuine
change.
"placid.'.

There ia a further complication;
"Harmony., is not going to
mean

A humanistic management style
would have to respect

individuals enough to allow them to
flare up, spout off, and argue.
of Argyris best insights is
to notice that old style Pattern
A

One

•

managers, for all their tough talk
and discipline, are people who fear

confrontation

183

healthy,

covered up. 55

and this softness
tends to get

It has become
commonplacee to
ro near
*
hear i-w
that American
workers have

become apathetic.

Unions are
re usuallv
usually blamed.
hi,
„

apethetic, ask s irgyris
„ hy haven
,

apathetie „o rk e r s ?

s
TO

first

Pattern R

I

^

instuute

personam, secountehle

ubor

a „ d to

forcs?

ask them individually
t0

th sm seives ars d eepl
y bou n d up „ ith „ hat it means
" ith dl9nity

opportune

-

^^

„oul d add , lobby fot
economic

th at Bill £acel63sly
disolpline

to hol d „ orter s

5°

t

Hhy have they tended

on f0rmal pr oee dur es,
or,

-Plein

.

But if workers are

«*«

T°

^

^

and then lay the, of£ at
the

is neither to treat the,
a s egusl hu ma „ belngs
nor t „

d o one's job o£ keeping
the organization healthy.

Clearly someone who wishes to
move from Pattern A to Patt<
:ern B
management will have to confront
his or her own deep fear and
shyne;ss
£

about human confrontation.

This amounts to a commitment
on the part of

managers to changing one's own
possibilities for selfhood.

This

separates such managers from those
who are simply practicing

utilitarianism by other means.

Pattern A managers, it turns out, have

been hiding in the rabble hypothesis;
their toughness is the toughness
of herd discipline.

Pattern B is an invitation to quit aping
the crowd

and to take responsibility for one's
managerial actions.

55.

Argyris,

34.
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ManiPUlatiM ml9ht sti
"
option.

0bS

",et

-*~ - >— ~

Supposing . manager
gave into

COUW

°

£

—

« ther

-

—

temptation

_

than an

a

•
interpretation
But to give the
behavior only its external
utilitar
utilitarian reading i s
to
oeny the Cheviot any
ethioal content at an,
that is, take away a„
y
recognition that an action
may have intrinsic
worth.
We are then left
once again able to value
onl y extrinsic worth,
mo ne y
Once again no
trust or cooperation would
be available.
One wonders how an
y politics
could flourish in such an
environment.
Wolin. opposition to E lton
Hayo
seems to me to violate
Wolin's own best instincts.
.

,

.

Woiin.s second criticism is
more serious ana organizational
theorists ought to accept it
as friendly criticism.
Organization
cannot bear the weight that
Ma y o and Argyris place on
it.
W ork cannot

^

be expected to relieve

everts

general sense of anomie.

simpl y to

make everything okay at work
is to leave much else wrong,
fact, ,
viable democratic politics in
a viable public sphere
would relieve a
great deal of the pressure to
make our work organizations do
it all.

m

Argyris might disagree, speaking
of the sorts of leftist
political
proposals sometimes championed in the
1960s he says:

"

0
" lth hUman di 9 ni ty- growth, and
","?
realization
bevoLThlY
beyond the level
of economic subsistence, then
altering the
political system is a good example of tinkering
with the system 56

56.

Argyris,

44.

.
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~
^
—
-

m ° del; endlessly

x

—

state tend t0 degenerate
lnto uhat he

-

*

equi . alent of „ ar
a£ter another 57

,

^ ^

^
^ ^^

*~

£a=t t

one tcumped up
ks

most likely
Dolitioai expression
^
y PO-Litical
ot the*
of
-hhin hypothesis.
the rabble
case o f both Argyris
and Mayo they simpiy
conceivs
democratic polltlcal realm
just
organizationai ohangs
instituted by . managerial
elite<
v,

.

^

poUtics

entertained are top-down;
state planning ,
mobilization.

Wolin has

a

^

^

^

so

much rioher notion of
pollticS;

^

But in the

^

^^^^^

^
^

might

of politics a3 the realm
of the unsettled.

Polities concerns those
things about which we
necessarily disagree and will
„ eed t0 agree t „
argue about.
Political actors in Wolin.
a p0 li ty „ ou ld
presumably have
made the same sort of deep
cedents that Argyris asks of his Patt ern
B managers,

and their experience of
treating people with who, the
y

disagree as citizens would certainly
facilitate the sort of

disagreement-in-trust that Argyris hopes
to create at work.
Likewise
the commitment to human dignity
Argyris advocates for the workplace
would greatly facilitate the more
public practice of democratic
politics.

I

frankly do not see why these two
theories have to be

antithetical

57.

Mayo (1947b), 127
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- ^extant
° 0ti0

"

Md

"

"

insi9ht t0 oarry a „ ay
fcom thia discussion

*—
—

—

° bSeSSiVe

lthin

Str

°f

considering two ethical
theories
theor.es

Earlier my brief discussion
Qf
aesthetics could understand
guch

t
I

i-rCepe^nt
k.i
believe

so ciety

^

organl2ations
.

But by

•

I

have shown that ethical

^^^

^ ^^

celebrate the, since the
y render people aestheticall
y f asc i nat ing.
I win turn to a
more theoretical discussion
of the mechanisms of
obsessive cycles, and the
insights of the religious
sphere.

F
-

^
Now

^^^^^^^^

According to humanistic management
the modern organization tends
to be a theater in which
characters try
to satisfy their various needs

for human association against

conformity.

a

backdrop of low trust and high

This results in characters ignoring
the overall health of

their organizations in order to be
accepted members of some group or
other, that is, it results in
behavior by which one hopes to blend in.

Or it might result in pathological
exceptions; those who feel excluded,
slighted, and conspired against.

variations on the first response.

These last are of course only
The Hawthorne researchers discovered

187

these people often
regretted
not k
bexng properly recognized
g etted rmtas being
superior.
So far It have
k-,
dxscussed these character
s from the point
of
ri6W
f
a
remarkably insightful
°
group of American social
scientists.
Now I would like to brH^-Fl, ^br.efly drscuss this
material from the point
q£ view
Of an avowedly christian
perspective, that of Rs „e
•

Girard.

in

ti^p^

communal violence.

Girard dlscusses these

The

dif.ers

f rom

,

ssues

mythical

^
^
^

Qf

^

though
aeais with aii the same
relationships and the.es, in
that „ hereas mytb
hides a g uiit y victim of
murder or ostracism, the

_al

acknowledged.

„ yth is

_al

are innocent

murder a3 told frQm the
po±nt Qf

the persecutors; the Passion
is the

view of the innooent victim.

Bible

c«Ml victims

constantly ma.es sure that
its

3«

^
^

^

story re toi d from the point
of

The Passion is therefore
the un-myth,

since it reveals the mechanism
of the persecutors account,
and once the
mechanisms are understood the
y lose their hold cn us.
It is worth
discussing, at least schematically
these mechanisms and how the
y worh.

First of all the scapegoat at
the heart of m y th has been subjected
to a double transformation.

First, he or she has been made
guilty of

crimes so horrendous that they
threaten to unravel the very fabric
of
the community.

Myth mentions stars out of crbit, droughts,
pestilence,

animals refusing to mother their offspring,
and great enmities among
people.

The scapegoat is found to be responsible
for all this.

Oedipus

188

has kil le d his

£ ather

a„ d macried his
mothe
'

the water.

»-»
£3llS

are aiways d istin
3 uishin

SOme ° ne

°"

h
" ° h

d isease, they „ere

"

a

Mame d

ds£i

cne Jew h as poisoned

9 mar.s 0£ S ca P e g oats,

"^

£o r the plague

S o m ethin

Oe d i P us is a cri
Pple

.

g

.

^

Such distinguishing

become the reason for an d
focus o£ the accusation,
the victira
hated
without cause. PinaU, the
community draus up ln a
oircle atound
victim an d unanimously an d
anonymousiy
hlm or her> perhaps through
stoning, perh a P s with weapons,
or perhaps they simpiy
£orce the victim
over a cliff, or they ostracize
him or her.

^

^

The second move comes
hpr-aneo the community,
es because
which befc
:ore was

disintegrating and at one another's
throats, is now temporarily
reunified through the unitary act
of communal murder. 58

The second

movement is to ascribe the renewal
of the community to the victim.
The
one who had the power to destroy
now also has the power to heal,
and all

good comes from him or her.
goddess.

This double move is accompanied, as
the myth is reinterpreted

over generations, by

58.

The victim is transformed into a
god or

Girard,

42-44

a

denial of the original violence, but
traces

.
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their swords and weanon*!
eapons to
t-o h
drown out his cries.
59
around the innocent
one is

^ ^n

sa id

+

Here the circle

Pr ° teCt

n0t
Or in other myths
'
the scapegoat qod is 1H it q h
killed unintentionally
or because there
is a
trickster who, while not
actually doing
omg the deed,
deed xa responsible
y
for it,
while he who actually
does
uoes
itki
it
is
y
blameless. 60 These
mese aare
rt* the
sorts of
moves which Girard calls
rail, the
4-k«
persecutor. a account of
violence.
They are
always cover-ups.
The
never gives this sort
of account.
To
really understand how
co^unal violence wor.s, in
order to read this
subtext in ordinary myt hs,
one should study a
story in which all the
elements of the
sranAnA^
u
e sca
Pegoat ™
mechanism
are present,
presentK,,*u
but
where
it is not
carried through. Such a
story is the death of
uohn the Baptist.
i

^

<,

^

Girard.
s

chapter on John the Baptist
is relevant for this
study

because, first of all, that
is where he gives his m0
st rigorous
state ment of how the scapegoat
ms chanis m or
„ orks and
because that is where he ties
the mechanis m into a structure
of mime tic
desire
,

Mimetic desire has

a

^d^,

sort of monkey see/monkey do
quality.

The

story of John the Baptist begins,
like so many such stories-like
Cain
and Abel-with sibling rivalry.
Two brothers want the same life;
"the

27.
60.

Girard, 70.
Girard, 71.
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herita9S
'

CallSd Her0d

—— —

"~ * ~*

~

««e,.

Both brothers „ ere

can only hope to
Ms
brother's wife, Herodias,
at his brnth,
brother's expense.
Two brothers are
divided over an indivisible
heritage
ft
'

.

.

bi, to renounce it.

^

^

But Herod does not
hee d the warning, an
d d esire

festers

Girard points out that
onoe he possesses her,
Herodias ioses her
direct influence over
„ero d , sinoe his d esire
was not so much £ or her
but f or his brother's „i
fe
T hus Herodias resorts
to her daughter and
estabiishes a tria„ g uiar rotation,
an d possi bly even ma.es
her dau
.

g hter

a Prize tor the rivai
brothers.

n^tic;

The situation becomes
more an d more

twin d esires are multiplied.

Bveryone siowi y becomes
possessed

by them.

For Herod ias, wishing onl
y to be possessed as

mimetic prize,
John's warning threatens her
with obliteration,- her intensity
is lifce
Dona Elvira's onl y more d ea d l
Herod, fearing her vengeanoe
y
on j0 hn,
a

.

has locked up John both to
appease and to thwart Herodias.

John becomes the subject of

a

But then

mimetic desire between Herod and
Herodias.

By shielding John, Herod seems
to Herodias to be verifying John
against
her.

Her hatred for John grows immense.

"Attracted by John because

rejected by him, the desire becomes
the desire of destruction; it glides
immediately towards violence."

191

By imitating my
brother's desiro r h
6 "h
mutually prevent each
" e desires;
other
f
As resistance grows
°" C COrr™° n d i «.
on both sidll
the model becomes
beCOmes strengthened;
increasingly obstructive
?
oh^
and the obstacle
becomes increasingly t
only interested in
15 only taksn "ith
obstacles created by
itself
jl° tl
'
iSt
af
that °°stacle;
inflexible, inaccessible
,
"hich fascinates Herod
is that
and" elL ZlTTo
always the coming into
is
being of
s desire
1
Power of
"." 1
hatred more rapidly f rom

flu

«

•

"

"

«

XT*™Z^lTl^T^
"
"
a
"
Coa

annpul^n^rcT

^

™

T^""' "
'

.VZUZTZ^tl .sT

There is always

a

*~
^
"

crowd at lynchings,
pogroms and communal

murders.
orowd,

G irard is trying to
comprehend how individuals
come to be a
how all individual desires
become focused on one victim,
whose

death is called for in unison.

There is a crowd in Herod's
banguet

hall, eminent people whose
good opinion he craves, but
how is it that
they all close on John with
him ? Girard claims that
because the mimetic
structure of desire is the same
in everyone, and because
everyone is

obsessed with some uohn the
Baptist, and because resistance
strengthens
and intensifies desire,
substitutions are possible. 62 As

the intensity
grows, my ability to transfer
my enmity from my John to someone
else's
grows also. Mimetic desire seeks
a lowest common denominator
in each

person and after

from any other.
mimetic rivalry.

a

certain point you cannot tell one
desiring individual

They all copy each other, and in
fact originate in

Everyone desired the same thing from the
beginning,

their desires were always already related.

61.
62.

Girard,
Girard,

130.
134.
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The catalyst was
first the
i-h» K
a
banquet
and then the
Baptist is by no „ th6
3candal;
st
iing biQck

^

_

—

I* Plays on the
lon g in g £or free mo

^

__ ^

_

^

^

Mimetic rivalry h aa
bottl e d up everyone
in inarbittable
Brothers oppose brothers,
the social fabric of
y la unraveled
no lon g er a distinction
between legitimate

—

=o«

-

violence.

and
Bat the crisis is
deferred b y f OC asin on
the scape g oat.
g

crisis resulte d from

a

instea d hcl d s its Other
responsive.

It cultivates its
obstacles,

becomes fail of hatred, an
d is scandali zed by them

.

It happens that „ero d
completely move d by the
,
freedom of

dance, and perceiving that
his g aests are also moved

anything she desires.

Ihe

clash of intert„inin
g of ds sires, b at d esire

,

Soloes

offers her

But she has no desires of
her own, she is a

child.

Her mother has to tell her
what to desire, and even
so Solome
Childishly takes it too literally.
Herodias' "The head of John
the

Baptist," which m ig ht only he

a

metaphor for simple execution
becomes

want you to give me John the
Baptist's
h P ,H
dptlst s nead,
h~
here
and now, on
The thing is clearly beyond
anyone's control at that point.

a

»I

dish."

Thus mimeticism envelopes everything,
everyone suddenly speaks

with one voice, everyone sees his
own scandal in John.

exchange his torments for John's head.

Each one can

"By espousing the violent desire
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of Solome,

desire "63

all the guests
feel as3 lf
if thSy
th *
3re ^tisfying their
own

.

~

leaving John , lt ls
inteMsting

"

—

MS

sacred.

^

a PP a Cently

mention

^

believed Jesus „ as

a

The persecutor cannot
believe the
e scandal
scan <3al is really
dead.
hatred built a victim
into . po „ erful
,

^
^
^
^— I

rM

-

ly

S

*>

-e

His

^

victim either guilty
or

to believe that uohn
.as the cause or social
disruption, nor is it
possible to make him a god
He xa
is rather
ra fh a
9 a.
an innocent man who
spoke
simple truth.

a

The examples at Hawthorn
are,
of course,
course not so extreme
«, or
as the
beheading of Joh n the Baptist.
Per G irard violence rests
at the bottom
of all human association,
times of serious crisis it
can always rise
up to demand its scapegoats.
But usually it need not go
so far.

m

Between times things are less
extreme, mildly demonic as
opposed to
wildly Satanic. Girard
presents an example of a recurring
but not

catastrophic demonic cycle in the
story of the demons of Garesa.
Certainly many modern institutions
feed on mimetic relationships in
which the scapegoat apes the
community's potential for violence
while
the community violently denies
and preserves his accusation.
63.

Girard,

135.

But within

.
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organizations the problem

is

Jesus

By the late

1 9 <„ S

SOiSntifiC

Md

traditiM

£ C °"mUnity

°

.

—

^^

Elton Kayo had become

tSChniMl
-

most often
ten akin
akxn to
fcQ Saint
q
Peter's denial of

-«

- -troyed

- ~* find

any American

any other suitable „
ay tQ

strategies „ithin the
plant t0 integrate
oneseif

^

vatiQu3

Jesus had just been
arrested
sted, his
hxs fon.
followers and disciples
had scattered.
The social group within
which Peter W3S
was a dl
Hi.sc ip le had
u
dissolved.
When
>eter went into the courtyard
there

"

the m selves around

.

£ire

,

i

and Peter tried

join

The fire circle is powerfully
integrating.

tcgether in a ring feeing one
another.
galvanizes a sort of community.

^

_^^
^
^
•

It brings everyone

It is intimate.

The fire

Peter, who „ a s now alone a
nd empty,

tried to Join in the circle
at the fire.

A servant girl, perhaps

a

popular young woman, objected
to Peter's being there.
Jesus?

Wasn't Peter with
Peter said no and left the
circle, but not the courtyard.
She

pursued him, repeating mimetically
what she had asked him before.
The
first time she failed to arouse
the others, but this time she pulled
it
off.

Her example worked.

Also Peter denied knowing Jesus

and this second denial irritated
them.
accent gives him away, he is

a

Galilean.

Come on,

now.'

a

second time

they say.

In other words they are

His
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saying: You don't
real

something and it realh,
Y
of us.

k

i

•

!

"""^ -

^^«

Pending

to be one

Peter responded by
callmg Ho
down ourses on
y oallina
Jesus and denying
9 he
ever knew the man.

should point out the
i
ncrPH n'Ki
incredible
power of the group;
even Jesus'
closest disciples can
not resist joining
mng lt
J
it
th
In the
end peter ^.^
remain in the group
by hating whafc
He of course fails
y nace.
snyone wh ° has
a
by . P01ic
-former should recede
the probl
outsidec
person to espouse the
group's oauses and
specially it,
espeoiallv
its enmities, but
even
getting the letter of the
thing right, the
outsider
I

^

.

~-

—
_ ^

^

»«ut-«

;

^

•

^

*U.

shares the linguistic

_it

y the y tr y to i.itate.

In Peter

.

s

case

the me chanis m of scandal
on ly .o rks to exclude

h im further fro m
the co 2y
hut it clearl y shows the
attraction of the crow d a„
d how .roups
maintain the mS elves by m a*i„
g di stinctio„s an d m aintainin
g them.
The
outsi d er is he who dissolves
the distinctions
It
1C is
1S thi,
k
this mechanism
we
see at Hawthorne.
,

•

In the U.S.

labor force there have always
been scores cf

i-igrants; people whose old ethnic
communities are d issolvin or
g
at work, try to plav down
their ethnic identities.

singled out in various other „a
y a as well.

who,

But people can be

At Hawthorne there were

multiple systems of sentient
involved in all sorts of distinctions,
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gradations, associations,
and hierarchies
arch les
6iH
Old-timers were different
from new-comers,
office workers
different
Afferent from
f
shop workers,
supervisors
of one rank differed
from supervisors
Pervisors of another,
„
inspectors differed
from assemblers, and
so on.
on
rh 0
There
were also prestige
hierarchies
Men's work was
superior to women'sS off
° fflCe W ° rk SU P-ior to shop
work
(These two obviously
conflict.
it xs
is intp
interesting that often
individuals
in the women's
movement will ch.n.
challenge the former
while working to
strengthen the latter
Th^ m
m°
~ 3t SeX1
"
bsha
usually said t0 be
that of blue collar
workersS,)
Aa=^embling some
parts was superior to
assembling others
Tho.n
h6re " 8re d «"-tions
of race, sex, r eli
gion
ity , age, education<
and service
.

'

-- -

"

)

—

,

m

wi

^

complex configuration of
relationsMps ln „ hlch
different gcoups
separated out and yet tied
together,.*, rhis system
o£
conflicting forces and
attitudes.,
=>... working
workino at
a, cross
c
purposes with each
other" placed everyone
in mimetic binds.

^

Somehow or othpr
Q ffo„ t
and his work" had been
es
interest at this point
wastackino'
en integrate activity
an
£
I
one could understand or
control!^
•

IZIZ/

T

^

9r ° UP

COmmunit V <*
ailSd t0 establish
°* dlSC ° rd " hiCh "°
"

Mayo, of course, believed
better communication and open
trustful

confrontation could diffuse this
situation.
people worked from

64.
65.
66.

a

He also believed that if

genuine motivation rather than
the artificial ones

Roethlisberger (1964), 539.
Roethlisberger (1964), 549.
Mayo (1933), 118-19.

^

.
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^^

imposed by inrpnUu^
„
ce„ ti „ e systems
that the pathologlcal
might begin to untie
themselves
ves.
From „
our „
discussions of mimetic
rlVally e kn
WS
"

ascriptions

°"

™ -co,

*""«~

^

even if „ e doubt the

of humsnistic
management ere enough.

_^^

In the
„£
trust, competition,
and conformity which
Mayo
ten us tc expect mimetic
rivalry and de sire,
ostracism, d emo„i a and
,

-

scapegoats

G

-

Connlnsi

—

This discussion cf
organizational

"

'

POSiti ° n t0 aPPreCi

"e

n

a nd

personal pathologies puts
us

—

«

•
^st of supposedly
marginai texts, ranging from
the outbreak of cholera
in Jon athan
Turners illinois tc Kant,
preoccupation with Cain and
Abel and the

propaedeutic cf violence, to
civic republicanism. s
opposition to will
Kane and Travis McGee.
Modern communities have a
deep problem with
miotic violence which we can
neither successful!, cover up
in communal
myths and traditions nor resign
ourselves tc.

according to Sirard this

is because the Biblical
account has dene its wort cn
us.

This means
that no version of community
life which denies or covers up
its
victimization mechanisms will ever
satisfy us. And yet, because we
are
sc interdependent and subject
tc such a continuous reciprocity,
our age
is perhaps more susceptible
to mimetic rivalry than any
heretofore

known, at least in scale if not
in quality.

The message with which the
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sxngle individual

—

is

higher
yner than
t
the universal.
,

Th
inis
i s is,
i«,

,

.

-

and absurd , and
thus

_

of course,

never arise

^

y st it

ouxcjre
T ° return to

-e

Hi^j^

and

the mar.s o£ an
ostracized

^ ^_
Hiat^il^ia^j,^^
^-^iii£r,

„^

responsibility, and his
incorruptibility
uirity.
anything.

_

we
ue rcan see in Will

^

^

But hhe is not guilty
of

the three actors-himself
the ,ill er
,

and the
is clearly dis tanced
from the evil that
threatens the town, though
t0 " nSPe ° Ple b6liS
th
it not for him, evil
„ ou l d not

'W1

-

,

"

be threatening.

Thus the community is
unravelino
unraveling, the accusation
goes,
because of Will Kane.
tk
Kanp
q townspeople
The
offer him many ohanoes
to leave
tney turn on him, the
Uller-, victim is also their
victim.
They have
become a mimetic crowd, each
person monotonously becoming
anonymous to
eject him from the community
cy.
He is t-he
the „community's victim
whether he
wins or loses.

The unstable element in

violation

stories is the villain.

the villain associated with
the crowd or with the victim?

m

„

the

persecutor's version of the story
the villain is tied to the
victim,, to
horrendous evil,
the American western movie,
there is never an

m

attempt to associate the villain
with the scapegoat, and
not explicitly link him tc the
crowd either, though

1

Hi^Jssn

does

have just shown
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^

Cr °" d

--

**«

to the villain.

throBS his badge ln
the d

_

It ls alsQ
AC
also implicitly
.

J

repudtating

Part of it any longer.

^3

^

wor.s for the character

anSf ° rmS

C ° ntinUally

"~ *>—

'»«

*

^

~1

and audiences „ ere

™ ^ —~
d °f

>-e

«

thi3 demoniac cycle

i

,

ity and continuaUy

but

,

_

revenge on the community;
the victim fights oacK
back and wins.
y
Proeees he reveals muoh
more about

amend

.

^

in the

^

between the townspeople
and their dS mons, the
complicity of the
alienee, the
role as obstacle, an d
the poverty and mimetic
quality of the acquisitive
virtues
rrtues.
R,,tBut K„
because it is still vengeance,
and even though vengeance
at least ta.es responsibility
fox its own
•

actions, the cycle merely
repeated itself 0UCsids

.

^

^^

is in the even more
monotonous violence of the police
movie.

there are other interesting
aspects tc the drifter.

Commandant at the end of

Ba^anal,

socially, lies te the claim
that only

a

^

ghost.

He is,

Of course,

like the

The hope, at least

spiritual can

^

resources needed to overcome miotic
rivalry, or to even call it by
its
name
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Obviously one need
not see th
P
these
movies as celebrating
the
tradition of American uHiu,
utiHtananxsm, but as offering
a profound
indictment of it
t have
k-,
also tried to show
the d eepl y Christian
nature
of this indictment.
There rs < n tencan
!
political culture a
Christian

«

•

h „

-i ly

a„on ym i ty of b ureaucrats
a„ d

-atnan

Baldwin runner nan
oppose

sleepers

radical evil, by „ hich

civic ethios b ased on
an alliance
between Cree, ethios an
d the doctrine of Om
„ip 0 tenoe, and by „
a

hich

-orge Wii liam curtis

notion of m i me tic violence
iies at
ethical iife.

^

oan oppQse
t he

tacti(

Heart of

In Amer ioan popuisr
ouiture,

to

»

flme rican

^

^

distrust of

tales and sea cha„te s,
y

coilective violence and
cowardice are seldora successful!,
covered over,
and this constitutes
popular culture. s great
strength and even our

latest

hope for m oral progress.

We can now be tter appreciate
Kanfs

prescience when he linked
linifpH t-h^
the ^experiences of discontent
and unworthiness
to the aspiration for
human freedom.
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CHAPTER

THE

AGE

OE

SELF-ASSERTION

in an earlier chapter

-*

(THE

DEATH

OE

OMNIPOTENCE)

Kant ga„ e us ,

loo* li ke to combine
£reedom

tO SUStain the notion
0£ freedom ,

action and personal worth.

iv

organi2ation

^
^

needed

beiieved

^
^

ooncspts of

These in turn reguired

a

belief in the

possibility of a .oral progress
„ hioh enlightened
culturally i.pose upon the
natural world.

retired

a

^^
^

Tor Kant .oral process
also

.oral creator whose rational
plan could

grantee

a

pcssiMe

progressive approximation of
our .oral ideas to their
realization.
But
Kant rejected the notion
of a Greek cos.os.
He instead replaced divine
voluntatis, with hu.an voluntaris..
Because he could no ionger
consider
the COS.OS a beneficent
provider, whether of .aterial
goods, theoretical
knowledge, or of .oral direction,
hu.an voluntaris. had to take
the for.
of self-assertion.
Self-assertion, Kant thought, had
to be the affair
of intelligible tenuities
and, in an interdependent world,
could not
be an individual endeavor.
Self-assertion, even of morality, finally

involves one in organized rational
activity.

These organizations,

because they are themselves assertions
upon material, rather than

expressions of cosmic purposes, immediately
seem to undermine the very

freedom which makes the. necessary.

For instance, to what extent is it

1
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Permissible to subordinate
nature to self
.
self-asserted
rational principles;
to what extent must
peo D ]^ who
uk. are
People
insufficiently convinced
of assertive
rationality be made to
comply
w
,•
with
lt
P y
h ora.n'
organizational imperatives?
These
sorts of questions,
alono
ong with «-h
a discussion
.he
of mimetic desire
in the
Previous chapter, seem
to undermine our
faith
th that moH
m °dern practice might
somehow work out these
details.
We
we might,
mioht of course, think
of Max
Weber's characterization
of the modern
.

calling:

^^^Tl^^T^^^

All this presents me with
a complication.

The terra

analysis, and, as used so
far,

to an interpretive
projection upon these thinners.

after reading Blumenberg
that

I

This problematic allowed

me to take these thinners
more seriously than
since they were replying to

a

I

otherwise would have,

fundamental problem of the age.

the notion of self-assertion
may have, as

become existentially unsustainable.
I

It was only

was able to see a problematic
of self-

assertion in Kant, Turner,
Curtis, and Mayo.

its lead,

nulity

None of the thinkers

mentioned so tat expressly
uses the term .self-assertion..
belongs rather to Hans Blumenberg.s

a—

-is

or civilization never
before

achieved.

a

But now

framework of interpretation,

That is, in faithfully following

have undermined my own faith in
it.

In order to continue tc

respect the notion of self-assertion,
and the thinkers whose work it
interprets,

I

must now reconsider Blumenberg's
discussion.

o^

1. Max weber. The Protectant Ethir
and the sniHt „ f
h
Parsons, trans. (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1958), 182.

^

Talcott
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The idea, however,
..
is „„
notf ,.„
to simply
say to him, yes, but
it all
,

Heide gg e,s ..nestlon
Concernin g T eohnolo ,.
ot F
gy
But

X

„

t s
.

am sure Blume„ber
g has read his Kaf.a.

Hathet l
«i3h to en gag e him at
the philosophical level,
and especially „ith
texts
which share „i th hi m the
conviction that fennel
Kant is crucially
i-pcrtant to the modern self
-conception.
Thu s , win CO nsider
Heide er S E
and
and

"

'

r-aulfs

^-^-^«^
^M^^
him&

Hh^^i^,

Hith these texts

.

understanding and appreciation
of Blumenberg.

s

hope

,

^

deapen

^

problematic of self-

assertion

in Chapter

I,

Z

said that organizations in
America grew up in

context of Protestant religious

proofs, especially

a

the disenchantment

of nature and the shift from
an emphasis on God's omnipotence
to an

emphasis on God's moral teleology.

m

Chapter II,

i

discussed this

teleology in greater detail, but the
withering of omnipotence and the
lose of the cosmos were both treated
as Kant's "characterizations"
of
the modern situation.

chapter

I

That is,

will use Blumenberg'

s

I

did not question them much.

discussion as

a

In this

means for understanding

why these things were no longer
available, but yet were still operative
as negative motivations.

Their passing could not be met with

indifference, but called forth something
called self-assertion.
does Blumenberg mean by all this?

What

'
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»

i3 Characteristic
o£ Blumenberg s
„ ay of arguing
.

self-assertion.

Self-aq^r*-,^
assertion was and remains
historically necessary,
thus, since we must
will there be aplf a
self-assertion, we must also
will all
the presuppositions
of self-assertion.
if certain philosophical
J-JDh ,
speculations undermine
self-assertion, these speculations
ought to fce
abandoned.
This , , suppose , t . an
eitpample of s
ssertio „ at uork
One of the things „ e
are told not to ask is
i, Heidegger's
question of
Being; another might
be the focus of this
dissertation, the
.

.

,

^

.

organizational implioations of
self-assertion.

in the preceding chapter

I

found that one reason
organizational

relies for its motivational
basis on structures of mimetic
desire.
These structures are in turn
facilitated by a pervasive concern
for

materialist gain and the anxieties
produced by a world of relative
scarcity.
How did we come to rely so
exclusively on materialism and why
do we characterize the world in
terms of scarcity, Are these things
just bad attitudes or are they
inscribed somehow the decision to be

modern?

If they are,

then is self-assertion

Blumenberg wants self-assertion to be

a

a

sort of

'

decisionism?

form of voluntarism, but doesn't

it set in advance what problems we
might consider and what solutic
.ons we

:
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might try and what
we have to
<~v simply
simolv live with?
Sppp
een thls wa Y Kantian
voluntansm would share
some of t-h* aSPeCtS
that
'
ke us unoomfortable
with Hobbes- decisionist
social contract.
contract
Bl
k
Blumenberg
notes that in
Hobbesean theorv
ory "t-h^
u
the contract of
subjection can never be
one that i s
Yet to be sealed, but
is only
one
Y
1,1,
that is
inferred to have gone
before. "2 Blumenbercr
r f„ against
erts
9 a „p
cacl Sctai "' =
juri8tio positiviam
that
1

fc

.

-

•••juristic positivism must
ally itself wit-h
uthat puts the contingency
hlstori
cal factor
of posiM 11 institutions
I
reach of observation
beyond
the
T i
i
Y deGlslonism derives its
relation to legitimacv r! tl
V ° lunt --m-because
voluntarism i/asTt wefe
the LTtlt
-solute power, while
°f
'decisions- have always
already been made that
form of historical
Y 3PPSar in the
authorities!

^
^

^^

^n^^^^TT^^

Thus organizational
resignation and routine
replace progress and
freedom as organizational
motivati ons

The ultimate decisionist
is, of course, the
sovereign state.

"Decisionism cannot function without

metaphorical one."

a

.sovereign, be it only a

Actually the sovereign in whom
final decision

inheres almost has to be

a

metaphor since he must simultaneously
both

decide and legitimate his own
authority to decide.

The question is

whether self-assertion is not
already a deeper form of decisionism,
an

t*™

trans.,

" um

b "9. The Legitim a cy of The
Modern ng o, Robert Wallace,
(Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press, 1983)
98.

^
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ultimate soveripnn
u
-e 9 n, „,,khlch
might play ltsei£
transcendentalism or
pragmatism.

^^

^

—
"1

between Hans Blumenberg,
Ma rtin Hei degg er,
and Michei Foucault
three things Have
an appreciation of
Kant.
and it3

wk

centra! to an understanding
of, using Blumenberg.
term, modern settassertion. M1 three
take seriously

^^^^^ ^

understood it, though none
or

t h em

b een programaticall
y successful.

~t

y

MIy

of problems

I

^

.eiie.es that Kant,
solntions have
ie t their approaches
to the stod y of

greatl y , and their
disagreements throw li ght on
the sorts
was just discussing.

A

in previous chapters

I

-

Hans Blumanbarg

have discussed the importance
of the

disenchantment of nature, the iose
of
the death of God in Series.

a

.prose of the world,, and even

For Hans Blumenberg such
events in our

intellectual history are different
wa y s of designating the
relation
between the religious doctrine of
theological absolutism and the modern
response to it, human self-assertion.
Blumenberg. s thesis is that the

medieval doctrine of omnipotence
aroused

a

deep anxiet y which it then
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could not contain.

Pr ° ]eCtl0n

°f * P

Out Of
of th

*™«

„

anxiety „ as bor „ human
sel£ . assertion

'tanc, upon the „ orld

.

economic preservation"?
bi °logical and
onanism by means naturally
available to it.
It means an »
6
1
r ° 9ram
which man posits his
"cording to
'
?
existence
""^"cal
indicates to himself
situation
and
how he is
" ith the *«"ty
surrounding him and what
°
use
" lU make of the
that are open to him 3
Possibilities

^CanT"

S^ ^^
L ^

™is

^

project must be differentiated
from self-preservation,

a

naturalistic-and positivistbiological conception.

Self-assertion is
rooted in an existential
situation, with its own
historical a
P-ori.
thus C on t ains possibilities
that "self-preservation"
would
net have; it, for instance,
leaves room for freedom
and for selflimitation in history because
its understandings and
agendas are
potentially open to thought.
Blumenberg illustrates the
difference by
discussing modern technical
activitv
activity.
rr „„
If
one understands technology
in
terms of self-preservation,
one necessarily must view
nature as a
beneficiary which is deficient
in the means of distribution.
Human
technical accomplishment then
has the function of assisting
and

«

supplanting nature

to execute essentially natural
ends.

One will then

risx viewing the "growth of
the potency of technique" in
the modern

period as simply

a

continuation or acceleration of something
which is

present throughout all human history.

3.

Blumenberg,

138.

But,

argues Blumenberg, modern

.
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self-assertion grew out
of
but actually -extort

a

f rom. ..

will not
»rll,
„ nr tto intensify
an old orientation,

reality a new

in the late Hidd l
e Age s two d octrines
had changed the faoe
of
«alrty. Thes e were the
d ootrines of
omnipotence an d predestination

Buropean

Christianas

meticulously

catalog

struggle with

t h ese d octrines
is

and rehashed in

pcwer over evil.

theories

_

Xh^i^^^^^

gist of th e story is that
beginning „ lth st
of Gnosticism, Christian

brilliantly

.

Ame

,

s

were co™itte d to
maintaining Cod's

Gn0 sticism had maintained

^^^^^^

the result of the evil
oemiur g e who has weave,
us into a state of
forgetfulness.
T his imperfect state
is his cosmos, in which
we are lost
in what ! woul d term a
mimetic existence,
the God of salvation
brings
us back to ourselves by
reminding us who we truly are.

The problem comes with the
Incarnated Jesus.

!f He were really a
man, He would be a creature
of the Demiurge, with no power
to get out of

the cosmos.

If He were actually G od,

He could be said to be using

manhood as a disguise in order
to slip by the Demiurge.
neede d

a

But if He

disguise He must be subordinated to
evil and have no power over

it.

Furthermore, as time passed it became
apparent that Christ's second
coming might take a long time. Cn a
Gnostic interpretation this might
be further evidence of Cod's
powerlessness to remove his arch enemy, the

Demiurge

s

^

Blumenberg also me
ntions

" " ~— —

civilization knew itself
to ho ^
dSCl
°

^

i

—^
•
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^

one ln „ hich Roman

.

Civil i2ed pagans
viewed
Christian doctrine of
the Last
^
La<^ Day
n=
as being hostile
to the world.
They
viewed the persecutions
Christian. underwent
Christians
„
as a mild foretaste
of
what, in their view,
Christians wished
ea to visit •
even upon innocent
women
and children.
The Gnostic doctrine
had no xepiy
reply to such h
.

^^

charges since
salvation lav exactly
exant-iw ln
„ *-u
the negation q£
going to have to exisf in
.n the world for a
long time, It would
need a
doctrine In „ hich that
uorld „ a3
wholly

^

a

«Mt

,

^

^

,

^

For Augustine, God
created the world and he
created It good. Ev
in the world is the
result or human sin, and
humans were accredited with
^ee win, „ hich made their
transgressions

U

^atonic elements fro. Gnosticism
remain; sin leaves man
state, in what

!

^^

in a fallen

would again call mimetic
rivalry.

Por Blumenberg
purposes this means that
theoretical knowledge is severely
limited
because, since fallen insight
is measured against God's
omniscience,
what dees not effect our
immediate needs for salvation
is beyond our
ability.
However, our curiosity can
extend beyond our needs.
Some
•

science is even encouraged.

But the scientific thinker who
pursues

theoretical knowledge beyond the
point of what is needed for ethics
and
salvation is, according to Augustine,
a

busybody; he is officious.
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Over the coo.se
of the Middle

-

intensified

-

*

flges these
th^
~„
The comment to
God s pouer eventuaiiy

^

icame
_

.

Point of saying that
any statement

GQd

,

3

ud
intentioM

£m

^

or about how much
of His knowledge
edge, and n
over wh.ch areas, He
might have
Uft accessible to human
explocation; an
guestions
s
p
"CMble be USe
a restriction
0£ God s
°"" iPOtCnK
BUt
tWs
to h
•
le human endeavor
and eno„ unga . surrender
to

UMM

-is

_

——^
—

"

^

^^

,

~<

^
^

^^

is because it seemed
to open everything to ,
radical

For instance, we co uld
no longer assume, as
had the Cree.s, that
the
cosmos .as the actuation
of all that was
possihle, since for Oo d
to
exhaust an P ossi bilitie s
ln creatlng the
he

^^^^

have ha d to duplicate
Himself; in „ nich case
He

«.*

powerful B ein g

^

^

^

Nor coul d Cod be assume,
to wor* o„i y according
to
the schema of the Platonic
Id eas, and it hecame
inexplicahle why on ly
these ldeas and no others
were used. Nor could He
even he held to
having made a cosmos that fit
human conceptual frameworks
at all.
At
.

its most radical, the doctrine
of omnipotence forces one
to assume that
God at each instant freshl
y creates from nothing each and ever
y thing in
the world.
It is inexplicable „h
y or even if He maintains the physical

continuity between one instant and
the next; or whether he will
continue
to do so.

If we tie this to the notion
of predestination, we can see that

this situation was fraught with
anxiety for human-kind.

As Max Weber

"

.

—

•
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out , the dQctrine

never knows whether
one

saved is not

a

is

^

predestinatiQn

saved or not, in

^^^^
a

^

situation where being

matter of indifference

T
hi, 13 Wh
ThlS
v,
for Weber, asoetio
Cal
Calvmists and Pietist-*
«
etlSts Pursued
earthly
success.
Y success
Th ls worked
best, as I
nave
.

^

.

stressed earlier, where
Arist-nrt
^stotelian
physics was in pl ace
alongside
,
Ch
Christian
doctrine.
.

.

^ ^^

points out that when
the doctrine of
onmipotence
intensified t0 this level
God
,

^

Cnosticism, the d ependable
God i3 the
He has withheld from
men's knowledae
owledge

be dependable.

^

"frh*
the

^
^_^

^^^^

of saivation

_

^
^

range over which he
chooses to

In a similar predicament
in an earlier
earner era,
Pr*
r
Gnostics had been able
to articulate an escape
in salvation
ivation.
But now escape was
blocked by

™

predestination.

doctrine of

ataxia

indifference.
a cosmos

m

that same earlier era E
En.n,
Picurus could articulate
'

"

a

as interworldly composure
and

But now ataraxia was blocked
because nature was no longer

containing a minimum of beneficence
to support indifference.
Nature had become creation;
ataraxia bad rested on tbe
physics of a
cosmos,
our nature is no longer
reassuring, and our physics has
to be
about reai human power over
nature to compensate for our
radical

insecurity

•
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Nor could

a

few good men
repeat the st«-

in nMl
philosophy
P»y-

„
individual's
fulfilment
•

Phii^o u now
Philosophy
had to assure
^
SSUre the adequacy
of mankind's
possession of the world,
worin S1 „ce the
problem of nature could
not longer
be forced to the
ed 9 e of consoiousnesa
One
e could
oould no 1longer rise
above
the world, nature
had become
bar-™,„ a pressing
theme which made
insistent
demands on philosophy.
.

,

^

These demands were
acknowledged, Blu rae nberg
notes, through
P-tical solutions iike
an intersubjective
inter _ generatiQnai
way of focusing the
..inoperable theoretical energy,
in „ h0
,

se servi ce

both individuals and
generations were enrolled,.*

But also, beoau se
once neither the cos.os
nor the Platonic Zdeas
could serve as li mit:s
upon creation an infi„
ity of possible uorlds
and

^

beca me possible, late
medieval thinners began
looking for oonoeptual
constructions which could be
used in any possible worid
as
instructs
of understanding: m athe m
atlcs and m aterialis m
La te medieval thinkers
speculated that, though Cod mi
ght know .ore about geometric
figures than
we do, of what we do Know,
know beran^
Because it is a priori and
necessary, God
could not know any better
M^tor as a speciesless
Matter,
y setter.
substrate, is the
stuff from which man can make
whateyer he wants. Materiality,
of
.

.

i

,

=.

course, becomes the ideal
premise of an attitude to the
world defined by

technicity.5

Because God is hidden, "man constructs
for himself

counter world of elementary rationality
and manipulability "6
.

4.
5.
6.

Blumenberg, 155.
Blumenberg, 164.
Blumenberg, 173.

a
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Earlier,

says Blumenberrr
enberg, <-k«
the nominalist Gregor
of Remiri had
begun to answer the
problem of sense oerr«*
perception in a world whit
ch may not
correspond to human
conceptions as foil ows:
the act of perception
never
-stifles more than . limUed
judgm
th±s
"elude the more ambitious
judgment, "This oolor
exists

^

^^^

^

.

^

Such confining of
certainty to the
cne tacts
facts of consciousness,
y
says
Blumenberg, already contalns

™

^

Already it asserts, though
with

a

•

^

new intent,

Augustus tree win, and
it asserts free will
precisely
h
y in so far aas human
beings are responsible
for what is bad in the
world
Tf we are
=
world.
if
accountable for evil, then we
«,

can be held accountable
only to the extent that we
can be responsible
for our own perceptions.
if we are to remain
responsible for bad in the
world, this minimum must
be assumed.

When Descartes in his First
Meditation radicalized Ocham's
thesis
of God's absolute potential
into the possibility of a
malioious
deceiver,

he sharpened the doubt surrounding
certainty to such an extent
that the pragmatic formulas for
the self-assertion of reason
tsuch
as Gregor- s] could no longer
be sufficient
7

7.

Blumenberg, 195.
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Thus,

says Blumenberg,
Descartes- contribution
9, Descart-^.
is not to
articulate a brand
*n
new
ew P
Dl
3n
Xa
n for
modernit-v
ernity, but
h,,«rather to make the

absolute immanence."

"

^

"

—

dy noted that if
God could
tamper with the
knowledge seeker when
nen that seeker was
being honest, then
He could tamper with
tn mnr-^i
moral responsibility
too.
hh.f case God
y too
that
would
«- «- author of, say ha
,
tefulness, „ hlch is> of

—

.

—

fc

m

^

cQursei

,

and there£ore canMt

fce

supposed

^

Des

uu.

^^^^

^

^
_
^^^
^^ ^
^

discovered that the unlty
o£ the subject exciudes
ins
theoretical knowledge. God
might fake appearances
questions He cannot hold
the mora ,

"

_

^.^

carries back to episte m
olog y

Thers is

.

a

^ ^
>t

becomes so impossible
that moral responsibility
that point, like one small
ato m

moderns asserted

a

resistance,

a g ainst
a

ity

U

lost as „ eU

^

theological absolutist, earl
y

self-defense
5e

'

a

limit
t„ omnipotence.
mit to
1:L

Thus modern knowledge
relies oruciall y upo „ m0 ral
freedom

8

since
there is one incontestable
thing- m orali ty and
responsibility-knowledge
is grounded.
All that is necessary is
to show that theoretical
knowledge is the expression of
a consolidated self,
the sa.e self that
is morally responsible.
Thus Descartes articulates
"the primeval right
8.

Blumenberg, 196.

-
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of self-assertion

"
'

+-h=>+-

anth «P°logi ca l minimum"
„ hich is

„ the

essence

of the modern age's
understanding o£ itself.

Again according to uean
de Hirecourt. knowledge
can he a product
either of Aristotelian
receptiveness or of the activity
of a knowing
sublet.
the former, Go d produces

«

taei

mUSt
'

all

"

*

in what is known.

»«•

pledge,

if the latter,

^tervene, and so become implicated

Ju st as the primary cause,
God, could not substitute

anything for itself without
duplicating itself, neither can
the
secondary cause allow any valid
substitutions for itself either.
is,

the

That

only a unified subject can be
held responsible.

Blumenberg stresses
that because God had become
absolute, man's concern for himself
also had
to become absolute.
Because of this, modern man had to
reject the

Aristotelian conception of receptiveness,
"For this receptive openness
delivers man up to an absolute power
of whose goodwill he cannot be
sure "9
.

Scholasticism had early-on accepted the Greek
notion of cosmos.
The problem, which plagued Scholasticism
right up to modern times, was
that,

unlike Plato's demiurge, the God of creation
cannot be contained

w ithin His cosmos.
w orld

He could not be assumed to have merely made
the

according to pre-established universal rules, and
therefore, "the

act of the divine will no longer related simply
to the existence of the

9.

Blumenberg, 197.
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^

»orid, b ut also eo
the MiTCrsal truths
that hold ln lt
«ay such a situation
eould guarantee

^

PO S8ibility „as coincident „
Uh reauty
by divine

Md

,.

rsason

io

^
^

^ ^

win.

0£ course, nominalism
had ejected
rejected both .assumptions
in
favor of God's infinite
potential.

^

—

^

POS
«* onlv of
bUt * lso ° f
man

the security of a coLos
that
Platonic deLurge-^t b e
inSUrpaSSable inst
what is possible as material
appearance

tL'^s^arinr^'^t/^

^

—

of

The question then arises
of whether the hidden
truth of the

creation is not
ataraxia?

a

matter of indifference.

Could one retreat into

But the Middle Ages had
theological reasons for rejecting

such a negative happiness.

If happiness were merely
the absence of pain

or the absence of insecurity
arising from uncertainty, then
the bliss of
the Beatific vision would become
a sort of superfluous
addition to a

condition already sufficient unto
itself.

The essence of man's need for

happiness must continue to be fulfillible
only in the possession of
God's truth.
But that truth, because of
predestination, is unavailable
to this-worldly knowledge.

It is in this situation that early
moderns

began to assert the hypothetical mode.

If one says,

"Well!

Let's just assume we have sufficient

certainty to continue," the implication is of
self-assertion.

10.

Blumenberg,

198.

it means
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we assert „e have the
„ here „ ithal

fay

^^

^

impossible,, is to assert
that metaphysics

possible.

make

If knouledge of
nature ia a condition
uhich

^_

assertion possible, then the
epistemological conditions
under which
knowledge of nature is
possible must be assumed to h.
be given.
The

appeal

to 'the normal course of r ac„ rc
nature

i

< ^
tu
18
thus no longer teleological
,

rather hypothetical, in the
sens? of
«f
sense

= ~
a
general

no other hypothesis has
any sense at

all~a postulate

"but

supposition without which
of

which does not assert the
regularity and dependability
of nature but
rather assumes them as the only
possibility left to man. "11 with

Descartes this was extended to the
assertion of "the freedom to
abstain
from all categorical judgment
in favor of hypothetical
indecision "12
.

The ultimate assertion is that
"man does not require certainty
in the
sense of insight into the plan of
creation and the reality lying open

before God in order to assert himself
in existence."

This means that human knowledge
is no longer even a cloudy version
of divine knowledge,

it is radically different.

In relation to

happiness this means that human endeavors
to prolong or materially
enhance this-worldly existence can be strictly
distinguished from the

other-worldly conditions of their ultimate fulfillment.

11.
12.

Blumenberg, 191.
Blumenberg, 199.

But in the
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context of the witherincr
9 of
„
beneficent

^a

.

~'

the l °« of its
teleological

protection, henceforth:

a^ °efrcf^"^

^

*™

«™

" ith a
«-t i.
t0 antici P*te the
inconsiderateness
cw-enesa of
/ processes
n!?
ot natural
+-„
inadequacy of their
* Up f ° r the
products bv til
P '° dUCtion
which from one point
Hypothesia,
of "ew
thj formal expression
the
renunciation of the claim
of the
t
adequacy, becomes
-nse of
?*
0
V1SW a means of selfassertion, the p
potential fl I
or
- hich
t

t

T

^
i£^^*^?
£

-

~

dr„:

This means that theory i
s no long er

a

way of

contention,

an end
and must he, mediated
throu 3 h human production.
Blumenberg summarizes this
entire discussion of the
geneology of selfassertion as follows:

»

"self, hut

is,

The absolutism of the hidden
God freed the fh Bnrof

^

^^Tl^ZT^L
isTe^ STtS^
S^lg^
.

,

the
pri e of t
the restrng point of a
blissful onlooker but rather To
the
workplace cf human exertion. Theory
that can no longer b e
lng U
P ° theSiS
a
loSt its
value
ts stat
itSelf
the ^ctlonalization
or t^orv for a
y Ch° Sen endS ' Us ent
into th -= rol. of
t
„
m anS '. iS a Pr0cess ^sequent
to
the loss of
"
!
its status as an end in itself.
14

dfvWofrof'view'and'thus It
The

L^

"

"

.

™^

*™t

''

^

Hypothesis is an escape from the old
criterion of adequacy to the
object, and method emerges as
"artfulness and self-defense" against

human inadequacy to know the divine
truth.

13.
14.

Blumenberg, 199.
Blumenberg, 200.
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Stated thi, way

,

the modern turning

and organi 2 ation does
constitute

1—

«

constant Stains

a

of

that

us to the technical
as such,

quired

^
,

^

_
^ ^

ratiQnal _ instrumentai

decisionism

,

h

^

,

and though it does
close off

^

to endorse „ ithout
questlon whatevet teohnoio9y

technical i tself , he says
need not play
,
technicel P^ocesse,

^

^

^^

B1 „e„ b e rg is the £irst
t0 admit that technolQgy
can create a sterile world.
wm-in
Thus we are not, in relation
to technicity,
in a situation analogous
to Hoboes' citizens in the
Leviathan,
Hobbes, whenever we protest
we are told first that we
already agreed to
the oontraot and seoond
that any deviation will make
the „ hole contract
come unglued.
Blumenberg seys modern teohnicity
leaves room for

m

criticism and change.

It remains here only to say
something about the relation between

Kant and Blumenberg.

m

many ways Blumenberg seems to me
to be an

exemplary Kantian, and my own analysis
of Kant owes
Legitimacy of

t he

Mod&CD &g&.

a

great deal to

The.

One of the chief advantages of reading

Kant more like Blumenberg would is that
it corrects

understand Kant as

a

rationalist.

a

tendency to

Blumenberg would say rather that Kant

is better understood as an anthropologist.

Kant explores the

anthropological minimum perhaps better than anyone,
and also understands

better than most the extreme drawbacks of
anthropology.

To underscore
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^

all this one could cite* an«
Olt. any of hundreds
of examples from the
CxitUu^f
Pure EsaapJi, but i win o-nnt-o
quote only one.
it co.es, appropriately,
from
.

Kant's discussion of
hypothetical reason:

^f

The hypothetical employment
of reason "4.S rGgUlatlVe
aim is, so far as may be
its sole
possible
S
to
r
i
our detailed Knowledge,
°f
nfr:; y
approximate
!;p r0 ximlL
the rule to
th:
universality.
n

.

a^t

\^\

^

The hypothetical employment
of reason ha*

jr

i-y

AJt:

,

only. 15

regarded, not as criven
itcmif
yiven in itself,

Blumenberg-s analysis of self-assertion
uses
triad: Theology-Cosmology-Anthropology.

confine us,

e

u..*.

but as a problem

a

certain structural

Whether this triad need still

cannot say, but Blumenberg stresses
that it is basic to

I

the way in which thinkers on the
threshold of modernity understood

themselves.

Blumenberg-s thesis is that the
intensification of any one

of the three elements of the triad
finally requires the intensification

of the other two.

The thesis is most consistently worked
out in Part IV

in the discussions of Nicholas of
Cusa and Giodorno Bruno.

Theological

absolutism eventually shattered the finitude of
the cosmos because an
absolute God cannot be contained in finite
manifestations or in finite
PO ssibilities.
PO ssible worlds.

The finite cosmos thus gave way to the infinity
of

This meant that an infinite God and an infinite

universe confronted

15.

a

finite humankind with an awesome indifference, and

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp-Smith,
tram
St. Martin's Press, 1965) B675.

(New York:
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with the real pos3ibnity
that human conceptions
ineongruent with metaphysioal

^
^

^

^

humankind had to assert
a^p^ lt3 own standing and
self-adequacy.
did, anthropology
joined the

„nen it

rank of the absolutes.

NO one has explored the
features of this self-assertion
of

anthropology better than

Manuel

Kant.

I„ Kant,

the principle of

sufficient reason, which
Leibnir had asserted to exist
in creation,
became a principle of the
sufficient rationality of the
hu m an subject,
inhering especially in practical
activity.
with all this in mi „d ! „
now turn to two of Martin
Heidegger's discussions of
Kant's
.
Pure R^<^ n

m

MMt

B

-

Martin HenHpggp r

If for Blumenberg the problem
was to show first that self-

assertion is

a

sort of historical a priori, but,
second, that its

imperatives of mastery needn't be domineering,
Martin Heidegger, though
not using the term here, looks at the
same self-assertion with

jaundiced eye.

a

more

While Blumenberg opposed positivism in order
to gain

a

foothold for reflection, Heidegger carries the
discussion of the modern
a

priori back beyond self-assertion to ask about
self-assertion's own

222

presuppositions.

From thi.
t-M . ™j
point o£ view Blumenberg
resembles more the
positivists whom he overtly
opposes.

Heidegger begins by taking
self-assertion at its word,
but
eventually disoovers that
you can not be self-assertive
without
presupposing some relation or
other to being.
It is this understanding
of being against which
an ontology
ontoloov of self-assertion
5a
even makes sense
An ontology, however, provides
a stance t
deeper reflection than selfassertion can allow. To make
this clear Heidegger
refers to eiato-s

u

„

characterization of the dreamlike
quality of positive science.

Plato had said that the positive
sciences were dreamlike in the
sense that they could not ask
after their own a priori, they
proceed
without understanding their own
philosophical grounding. This is

because there is a difference between
doing, say, mathematical problems,
and asking after the foundations
of mathematics.
To do a problem at all
one must already assume the set
of foundations appropriate to

mathematics to be true.

Blumenberg not only admits but celebrates
this dreamlike quality
of self-assertion.

Self-assertive freedom, he maintains, crucially

relies on affirming its dreamlike stance.

But to know you are in

dream state is already to put pressure on
it.

a

Heidegger finds that the

ontological basis of self-assertion treats the natural
as the ontic.
But we can only articulate that because there
is some prior horizon
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which allows us to
understand
tand it
it.

Th. understanding
„
The
of self- ass erti on

is therefore n„ t
lt39lf . sei f - a sse«ion.

^

one mode o £ c omportment
touard Khat
the who ie s tory even
in its 0 „ n

these issues in

Terence

to Kant

,

s

u#

That is

faut

,

,s

_^^

Mt

Heidegger expiores

thesis:

predicate. 16

^

^

^

^

^^
^

From the discussion of
Blumenberg we know that
self-assertion
involves a projection of
human rationality upon a
material which may or
not fit its projection.
The onl y test is to project
a production
and see whether or not one
can successfully

W

pro duce it.

So long as the

product works as predicted, one
need not revise one's theory.
We know
also that this involves a break
with older metaphysical and
ontological
stances in the world.
In the medieval and ancient
period, it was

believed that the logos was the
structure of both thought and cosmos.
Thus, one could get by with only
one kind of logic,

formal logic.

course, the ontological argument
comes from this earlier period.

the postulate of self-assertion
implies

a

But

radical break between the

rationality we project and the rationality
of God's creation.

formulated this break in his notion of an

Of

a

Kant

priori synthetic judgment.

What it means is that our conceptions
are disconnected from

a

cosmos.

To say a triangle has three angles is
still true, but one need not

Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phpnn^nn]^,
Albert
Hofstadter, trans. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1982), p
Z/ /6/ see also Cr i t i que of Pure
R pa ^np B620-30; Heidegger also
explicates "The Postulates of Empirical Thought" B266-74.
16.

i

,
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—

.

ab ° Ut

synthetic,

^ -

judgment.

syntheti °

—

—

nio.

" ilY

reCSPtiVe

B
-

as distinguished

Modern self -assertion
assertion requires Kant's

-

.

-stern pbiiosophy quired
only analytic
Prim

^

that ons has said
anything about the

"

— *™

sort of judgment became
necessary
necessary.

.

«« *

udgments since

become Prej

«

a

fc
from

a

priori

3e lf -:::; ion
k

_ _

,

cs

lre a di£ferent

h~ a
Heidegger
points out that Kant

retains the medieval notion
of
or realitv
reality in ^
his „.
discussion of analytic
judgments; reality still reside
± resides in +-k
the conceptual structure,
but
Perhaps here as in other
places Kant, seeming bsctatd
usage
to the self-conception
of self-assertion than
is the one we normally
use, where reality resides
with the

m

u

^

object.

When Heidegger begins to unpack
all this he disoovers that,
as
Blumenberg would admit, modern
self-assertion makes use of all
sorts of
boundary concepts which it dare
not clarify.
Aecording to Blumenberg
this should not surprise us;
this myopia is the condition
by which selfassertion assures itself an arena
of free projection.
But Heidegger
transgresses the boundary conditions;
he asserts, following Kant, that
using these concepts without a
clarifying analysis is an invitation
to
error

Some of the concepts in question are:
reality, perception,

actuality, and existence.

The most crucial mistake that comes from
not

analyzing these concepts is subjectivism.

One wrongly places the
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subject prior t0 percelving>
and to
of the other conceDts
Pts>

-nt,

discovery

thr

_

^

p^vFor
instance to say a house
UUbe exi<^<,
*
exists, according
to
i. to nail it do „ n
to an
position
^

^^^^

^

^ ^^

fcring it int0 relation
„ ith the ptegiven
knowing sub ec
.

^

says Heidegger, that the
subject goes towards the
object
'intentionally
that
„ w
S
thS SUb
Ct
lo °Kin9 already beforehand
'
for
something Uta that sort of
object existing in that
object's .ode of
existing.
But then how did the
subject *now to do this, The
Kantian
might answer, because of me
the structure
struct-,.™ of „
consciousness, the categories
of understanding.
But these stand in Kant,
again, as unanalyzabie
boundary concepts.
These concepts, Kant asserts,
get their unity f rom
the horizon of the .transcendental
unity of apperception,, another
unanalyzabie conception.
•

,

^

<?

.

«

Under subjectivism one tends to take
over the medieval

understanding of being and existence as
'extant.-

Rocks and trees are

extant, so are tools, but what about
other entities like causality,

perceptions, or realities?
have no positions.

These are all positings which themselves

Heidegger finally discovers that Kant's
conception

of the real is such that reality
cannot be a real predicate.
is not itself perceived,

Perception

reality is not itself real, existence does not

itself exist, causality is not itself a causal
connection.
right when he asserts that existence cannot be

a

Thus Kant is

real predicate.

But if

one pursues this thought further one discovers
that this is because when

the subject comports itself intentionally, it is not
prior to its

-captions,

„.

as Kant had a

Rather

„
_

^

the sub ect bcings
itaeif
.

perceivingly" t0 the ofcject
because tMngs
existence
are given prior to the
knower
er>
Kan* mat
Kant
make s use of "a wealth
of
structural moments" Without
without- really
„
r-^n, notrcrng
that he does so.

^

.

these moments are

^

a

priories.

sublet doesn't use these

using a tod.
extant, these

And all

a priories in the sense
of someone

Rather t0 comport onesel£
intentiQnaUy
a

ia

priories must have provided
a prior orientation.

Heidegger at this point drops
the term subjectivity in
favor of Dasein,
to show that we xnowers are
always already involved in
something l ike
the extant, we already belong
to objects, because we are
already the a
priories of intentionality
The intentional relation
doesn't arise f rom
the addition of an object to
a subject, rather the Dasein
is structured
.

intentionally.

Be can even hallucinate only
because we "intend in

general," and only in this way could
intending assume the modifications
of "imaginariness

"
.

The subject,

if we recall Descartes'

defense against deception.
Descartes,

I

If

I

can't be deceived.

then,

like its sciences,

a

a

just stay in my subjective sphere,

says

But Heidegger finds that the subject

can't understand its own intentionality.
is what "lights up" the subject.

First Meditation, is

This is because intentionality

The subject of modern thought is,

dreamlike positivity.
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While

thU

analysis has not even
managed

^

Heidegger, extremely
involved

^
^

^ ^ ^^
recapitulate

^

that the self-asaertion
of subjectivity relies
on
not itself subjective,
no, is i t really .
sel£ _ assertion
The
scovery
that the subject relies
on a whole prior
structure undermines somewhat
out allegiance to the
assertion of subjectivity,
but it als0 means
those prior structures
become a Mtter „ hich
conoerns
with these statures?
In this way we £ ind
the structures o £ selfassertion leading, in spite
of themselves, beyond
themselves.
The y
lead, Heidegger believe
=
believes, 1-0
to a deeper thought of
being; presumably to
free a positivist subjectivity
from its dreamlike stupor.

^

^

^

^

^^^

^

Ten years after this analysis
in the

confronted Kant's first

CxiU^

returns to all these themes.

again.

In

B^i^^,

„ eidegger

m^^^

On the brink of World War

n

Heidegg6c

his tone

i3

more anxious; apparently
breaking-through to being was harder
than he
had expected; now it might take
another hundred years or so, provided
we
decide to really ask the right
questions, and even for this, mighty
efforts are needed.

Self-assertion can function now perfectly
well without
ontology.

a

clear

When the pragmatist cautions us that
our language today is

unsuited to ontological questions, Heidegger
responds by acknowledging
the point.

In a passage recalling the earlier
reference to Plato's

dreamy positive sciences, Heidegger says:
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not made do not take
place in
e
but somewhere else-that
is
in h
i.e. where a historical
being
decides, what level of
freedom 7f t
what it will posit as
freedom 17

J

eClsions "hich are made
or
° r ° n the ™toroycle,

T^
f

^1!^

°f

Mst0rical

^

^edom

33 Wel1 as h °* it

i

ifc

choose and

Decision, he quickly adds
V aas, is the structure
of questioning.
To
remain content with a low
level of,
.
level
of questioning is to
remain content with
a low level of freedom,
and, X would add, to
cultivate an innocence
The primary question is
the ontological question;
and the primary way we
should ask the ontological
question is historically.
"we question
historically when we ask
*k wnat
^ -in hhappening
what is still
=
even if it seems
past. "18
The question "What is a
thing?"
«„* to k
turns out
,
y
be kthe
primary
question of our own historical
period.
Kant, Blumenberg, Heidegger,
and
Michel Poucault aU address that
question.
The reason to return to
the
threshold of our modernity thus
becomes a little clearer. Our
historical questioning "is not
directed against the beginning,
but only
against ourselves insofar as „e
drag along this beginning no
longer as
such, but as something 'natural,
i.e., in an indifferent
-

falsification. "19

This means this past does not lie
in the dim past

where we cannot reach
rparh it,
i t-

"Kii+but

i
v,~
is
here
in every proposition and in every

everyday proposition, in every approach
to things."

17. Martin Heidegger, What Ts a Thing?, W.
B. Barton, Jr. and Vera
Deutsch, trans. (Lanham, MD University
Press of America, 1985)
42
18. Heidegger (1985), 43.
19. Heidegger (1985), 48-9.
:

'
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Decision

u,

then , to

„k

the forgotten

concerns e„er y one, lt
is the task of
it

quires

^

^^^^

a

^

^
^
^^^
^

entite Mstoricai

-that „e percelve more
exactiy uith ciearsr

holds us captive and
makes us urfree
ur.free in the
t-ho experience
and determination
of things."

»ith this i„ mlnd
the thing.

,

when he dop<!
uoes

Heidegget loofcs lnto Rant

tms
i-h-i<=

,

^

s

"

he discoversb that
K^t-t is„ looking
cnat Kan
for the
-a-

structures of reason which
g roun d

a

n

thin, in its

things.

„eide gg er,

Should mention, is u„co m f
ortable with Kant's struotures
of reason; he
would l ike to oppose thinKin
g to reason, reason b ein ju st another
g
I

self-

incurred tutelage.

Kant worked through

Critique is

a

a

sort of method which he termed
critique.

deciding of reason's claims beforehand;

a

sort of civil

court procedure, where several civil
litigants, all with plausible
claims, present their cases to

a

magistrate.

Pure Reason in this its self -formation,
pure reason in this claim
pure reason as the authoritative
court of appeal for the
determination of the thingness of all things
as such-it is this
pure reason which Kant places into
critique 20
'

.

•

However, in deciding the dispute this way,
the litigants pay

rather high price.

a

The litigants accept the finding of the court

because they recognize reason as the legitimate
arbitrator; this, by
20.

Heidegger (1985), 119

230

analogy,

resembles

a

mimetic rivalrv
Valry ln
„
in Whlch

^e two parties are so
h
determined
not to let the
other'ss ini-.
interests prevail that
they will
accept domination by
a third Party
party lf
if lt
it st0 ps the other.
Reason
v,

.

.

Slate

into th
*

making a critical survev
survey,

a

enterprise of pure reason,!

—

-

*

does chis by

survey which seta the
boundaries for the

strategically this means
that reason takes
an interest in those
disputes which enhance
its position.- it
encourage,
disputes without which
reason would he
superfiuous.
To the extent
15 trUS
rSaSOn
'
^
-g ime which enccurages some
questions while discouraging
others.
What happens, then,
when these
discouraged cushions get
opened, Heidegger hopes
to say that the
Principles of reason-x-principle,
law of Contradicticn,
and Principie
Cf Sufficient Heason^-win
give way into a rethinking
of what Re iner
Schurmann calls an-arche,
non-principle.

"

-

—

-

Like Blumenberg, Heidegger
finds that Christian
metaphysics
divides intc three .ones whose
subject matters are: God, the
world,

and

man,

In Kant these three
questions are explicitly all
subcrdinated to
the last one, which in the
is the 1 _ ptlaolpl ..
3

CxiUau^^^^

This,

I

have maintained, is the
essential m cve cf self-assertion.

character of a rational mathesis
demands that things must exhibit
themselves as axioms of the highest

The

principles, ..according to the schema

21. Heidegger
22. Heidegger
23. Heidegger

(1985),
(1985),
(1985),

121.
108.
110.

.
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of positing and
thinking as such,
such

-

world in terms

o f rat ional

»

^

an H the
and
progressive illumination
of

mathesis is called

Critic

wishes to "determine in
advance out of principles
the
being of what is " Tn n,=
the re gime of modern
self-assertion, thi, is an
essentially
tas ,
The

teaUy

almS
"

"

"*

^^^^
^
9"n
g of this 'mathematical

"

what Hei d e gg er refers
to as the .mathematical,
would certainly include
Blumenber g s .method' an d
hypothesis
T he mathematical i
s a self.

.

.

Heide gg er focuses in thi
, accession, not on Kanfs
refutation of t he
ontolo g ical argument, but
on the chapter called
"System of all
Principles of Pure Understanding...
(Heidegger has already shown
that
for Kant, and the Wolfean
school ge nerally, "understanding.,
can be
collapsed into "reason.")

Philosophically, self-assertion, at
least in its subjectivist
mode, has always been most at
home in epistemological issues,
and Kant,
at least in the U.S., has
usually been read as the epistemologist
par

exellence.25

Heidegger challenges this reading in
many places, the most

interesting occurs in the sub-section,
"Pure Understanding as the Source
and Faculty of Rules; Unity,
Categories."

Heidegger (1985), 111; 118; 184.
c.f. Robert Paul Wolff, Kan t's Theory of
(Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith Press, 1973)

24.
25.

Mpnt- p

l

»„

H „.j- y
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The needs of modern
if. aQ
se
self
assertion had dictated
that the ground of
all possible judgments
lay
noiiy xn
Y wholly
in t-h«
kthe subjective
sphere.
But, as
again both Blumenberg
and Weber in H4
Afferent ways point out,
this sets
up a certain
metaphysical anxiety which
seeks
KS to ^assure
reass
itself through
productive activitv
u
tx«t, in the physical
»o rW or nature
Kant
Philosopher t0 squarely £aoe
probiem
knouiedgs

^

fc

.

~

m

a

,

against an object „ hlch

to.10, other.
not

..

0bj e, t

..

but

in

.

absence

Heidegger claims that Kant

.

..

^

^
^
^
^

^

^

s „ ord

^
^

object is usuauy

Gegenstand ,, 6 „ hich liteMliy
transiates as istandi
against.. Geg en also means
tear*,.. in the
of
opposite
to,
'in the presence of.
what we are able to k
„o„ mu3t encounter us
from somewhere, come ro
to meet us, » aand
„H also
.i
must "be determined as
standing," and is therefore
constant.
This requires that there
be
.

.

^

,

.

,

•

..

seething that does the

job of Aristotle's receptivity,
but which yet

leaves self-assertion intact.

Following the western tradition
of

metaphysics, the solution must
remain

a

mathesis, but,

a nd

this is

Kant's incredible insight,
mathesis as self-assertion requires
a
gegenstand.
otherwise self-assertion, unlike
medieval m at hesis, asserts
into a void.

This means that Kant had to change
one of the oldest definitions
in western philosophy, that of
the judgment.

Christian Wolff and Leibniz,

a

From Aristotle through

judgment was defined as

a

relation

Heidegger (1985), 137. Peter Fenves has
26
pointed out to me that
Heidegger is grossly over-stating things
here.

233

w

^

between two concepts
P^s, and the *foremost
principle
e of
or ail
all logic was
the
aw 0£ no„- contradiction
Kant deftned

^

™
-it y

^

.

in „ hioh gi „ en
modes Qf knouledge
or appe.cepeion.-a,

concept, but of placing

It
,.

u

brought

^

no lQnger .

given cognitionsn

^

f

^ ^^^^^

^^

objective unity provided,
Kant argues,
argues bv
by a transcendental
"I-think "
The "I-think" provides
a mathesis
* projects
tnes ls xn
t-w xt
in that
concepts against
an intuition which
comes to meet it.
If x say blackboard
intuitively given is grasped
and
.

,

^

^

^ ^

^

^

Pointing out that one
repercussion of this is that
the hegemony of the
Principle of non-contradiction
has come to an end.

A judgment might

contain no conceptual
contradictions and yet still
be false; for
instance,
Giraffes are purple
.

.,

^

^^^ ^
^^^^

^

not really be excluded
because Cod certainly might,
if He wished, make
Purple giraffe.
In the age of self _ assertion

speculations are empty and unsatisfying.

Self-assertion, of course, must
resist becoming

a

a

slave to the

'given.-

Determinism haunts self-assertion
precisely because it depends
so heavily upon the gegenstand.
Thus in Kant the mathesis
reasserts
itself in the structure of the
categories.

Judgments can't be Hume's

"every time X, Y also," but the
more definite, "if

event of

a

rock being warmed by the sun,

a

x,

then Y.-28

In the

poet might encounter a sun, a

Heidegger (1985), 157; £££ B141
and ° avid Hume Enquire
Human
rlttT„: , ''.nV'""'
unoaratanauig
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), Para.
20-32, p 25-38.
27.

lL

H

'

riming

.
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. Object i. the

„

abstracted

of warm rocks and
sunny
ays.
V days

generality beina
erng thatthat

n„
ln

Hum«»
Hume

a
s

^

instances
is a general concept,

^^

i

the highest

^

*-w

the past the

^

past," so Hume gets into
to the hhabit
a h<
of expecting future
suniit rooks to
exhibit warmth.
F or Kant, this a t
y rann y of the gegen,- the warmth
is
not any more directly known
than is the
»-

rock or the sky or the
sun.

Kanfs object

is the necessity of the
cause/affect relation;

sunlight, then warm rocks

1

*-hor,i
'if
If =>
> then-

.„

•

1S what we know,

but we must

quickly remember, only through
rocks and sun.

"The mere intuition of 'against,
is not yet an object," not
a
gegenstand, "but what is conceptually
thought in general, as something
constant," say, a triangle, "is not
yet an object either. "29 One
has an
object, strictly speaking, when
"the intuitiyely giyen has been
brought
to a stand in the generality and
unity of a concept," in our case,
cause
and effect.
This unity is what Kant means by
a synthetic a priori

judgment.

The crucial discussion in Kant is
therefore the one which

explains how it is that something like

a

synthetic

a

priori judgment is

possible

Kant says that synthetic

a

priori judgments are possible because

they take place in the faculty of understanding,
and understanding is

a

faculty of rules for synthesizing the intuitively
given into knowledge.
29.

Heidegger (1985), 140
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~
"

rUlSS

"e

'

"

'

«~ ~

——

-** P-edes

experience.

To

Uke cause and e££ect in
advance, otherwise
„e would not kno„
instances of ca
^•"oLdnces
cause or effect when
we encountered them.
Understanding
Ming is the rule-governed
activity that
apprehends causally, or
we would not experience
it at all.
,

But mathesis as
self-assertion actually puts
more pressure than
this cn the understanding.
n*. only is [pU re understanding,
the
faculty or rules in res
P ect or that which happens,
hut is itself the
source or P rinci P les according
to which everything that
can be .resented
to us as an object must
conform to rules.. .30 The
understanding is not
only the faculty, but also
the source of rules and
their principle.

When Kant says that understanding
is the fa^uiv of rules,
Heidegger replies, "Here the
metaphysical definition of the
essence of
understanding asserts itself." Kant
is not just doing epistemology
here, he is doing metaphysics.

One is no longer busy understanding,
but

asking how something like understanding
is possible.
leaves the dream world of positive
science.

Thus Kant here

Understanding is posited as

that which makes something like an
object possible at all because it is
e ssentially the

faculty of rules,

unde
derstanding is the
replies,

30.

when Kant further says that pure

of the principles for rules, Heidegger

"This means that pure understanding is the
ground of the

CPE, B198.
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necessity of rules at
all
ontolo gy

»

3l

mu
Thxs
•

.

1S not just metaphysics,

specifically, an ontolo
gy baS e d in the
UndSrStanding 13 baSed

-

—

*

in

tm

,

^

I - think .,

neither

fabrication

^

Pure

an d here

The met
H
metaphysical
necessity

requiring there tQ be
3ometWng

as an overpowering
pressure

•

^physical ^essity,

Heidegger and Blumenberg
completely agree
gree.

u~

but

,

a

a

^

^

^

to stand, thns forming
lt
ana maintaining
° f P ° Ssible
constancy.
The metap„ysicar„ecessitv
PUC<S "^"standing
is grounded in this
need that the
f h!
res sure must be freeP
standing. 32

Thia prior metaphysical
necessity mates something li
ke a pure

understanding necessary to
provide

a

source for this ..free-standing...

Kant finds that source in
the principles of understanding
which, in

generally, means for
objects.

a

correspondence between our experiences
and

This is only possible, of
course, because that to which

experience corresponds, the objective,
"already comes before us in
advance and stands before us."

what comes forward in the Gegen,
then,

is not the rock or the sun,
not even the warmth, but the
objective as

such;

31.
32.

for us, the causal.

Heidegger (1985), 188.
Heidegger (1985), 189.

vity of
s.33

Clearly it la no
stretch
0nt0l09y

-owing,

^

-

34 Helde9ger
uncovers

a

^

^

^^^

insisting on not £ocusing
sQlely

oertain

ep 1S temology would
find scandalous
luaious,

^^^^^ ^

«l-h*f
that

m

uhat

^^

*-k

the conditions for
the

possibility of experiencing
are at
g.-.are
at fho
the same time the
conditions of the
standing-against of the ob:ects
obiert<*
^
of experience. "35

comes down to

Uke

a

Human freedom finally

-between;- between man and
tning, but tW
thingthis k
between is an

a rope stretching from
thing to man,

but as an anticipatio
„

beyond the thin g end similarly
back behind

Earner „e saw how Blumenberg
tried

^

to soften the most domineering

aspects of modern teohnioity
by returning to the threshoid.
His purpose
was to discover there whet „
as essentia end whet
superfluous in modern
self-essertion, and he opposed
self-assertion to self-aggrandizement
or
self-empowerment, both of which
Blumenberg admits to have had

destructive histories in the modern
age.

since it seems to me that

Blumenberg was attempting to reply
to Heidegger's objections to modern
"enframing", as stated in such essays
as "The Question Concerning

33.
34.
35.

Heidegger (1985), 190.
Heidegger (1985), 243.
Heidegger (1985), 242.

238

Technology" and

—

~
*~-

*
The Age
of the World Picture
,„ „ hat

'

bet " een

'

~

o, 5 e

^

interesti

is h0 „ clQsely
Heide9ger s discussion

=

U'

1£wio

,

rg .3 , ersion o£
self-assertion.

standing reserve.

^

_

In fict( human freedom

Ihe

^ Rant Heidewer
^ ^
rests ^^^^^ ^

„ as articulated

*. not necessarily imply
the

^

^^

^

what is to come freely
forth.

Yet there is

a

gulf separating Heidegger
and Blumenberg

Blumenberg, wnen be comes
to metaphysical
guestions, would say that
though it is hard not to
as, such guestions,
modern self-assertion is
not really eguipped to
deal with the..

issues and

It has lt3 oun sets
of pressing

„

should stick to what .e do
best, respond technioally
to
our perceptions of need.
Besides, the age has already
come

pragmatically to its limits.

Tne state, which nas always
used eternal

threats as a way to defuse
inarbitrable internal fractures,
has come to
the limits of such tactics.
External threats, in the horrors
of nuclear
war,

pose

a

much greater risk than any
internal dispute ever could.

Thus the tyranny of state
bureaucracy could begin to unravel;
we all
know that if it doesn't we might
annihilate ourselves. Therefore we

don't need the question cf being,
we only need the pragmatic structures
of dialogue which arise from
our relations with the technical. 36

36
ai

ar
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With Blumenberg one
comes away
eeung that
Y feeling
rh
„ the
that, though
modern age
has some serious
flaws, it still
,tin possesses
the resources to set
itself
on a fetter course.
Assurance about our age.
potential for progress
quires a massive and complicate,
historical study, but if
Be patiently
-sue this study, in the end we will
be r6asS ured.
Wh ere Kant could
champion an entire teleology
of self-assertion,
Blumenberg Klll offer
only a wispy possible
progress of self-assertion.
Self-assertion, in
its pared-down form,
of course, claims it
doesn.f need teleology,
nor
does it need to totally
subvert nature.
Such things derived from
-occupations of older medieval
guestions which are not properly
our
own.
But self-assertion can
now, because those old
issues are being
forgotten in the pragma of our
lived dialogic structures,
show a more
authentic face, a gentler side,
and with this better attitude,
self-

assertion is at least potentially
e qu al to the world of
problems it has
so far produced.

But after examining Heidegger's
account of the structures of selfassertion, it seems harder to nod
assent to Blumenberg- s optimism.

Clearly if we are to endorse modernity,
we must have faith in the common
future we are building, and it is
exactly this sort of faith which

Blumenberg tries to generate by giving
modern technicity
geneology.

a

clean

But what if the questions he downplays
still bother us?

Doubts begin to intrude.

Maybe we mustn't ask about teleology because

to do so makes modern life look like

a

treadmill.

Maybe we mustn't ask

about ontological horizons of subjectivity
or its objects because to do

„
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_u^

hen „ e replaoe
truth as correspondence
with dialogic
axog lc strn.tstructures, we evade
having to
confront the ways in
which self-assertion
fosters discourses
rosters
disc
of power

institutional^ problem
di3CiPliMrJ °° ntr0lS
as

correspond

'

^

-

«-

to natural £orces

'

^

.ustify our instituti
ons

„^

of power

^

^ ^^^^^^

^^

con3tituencieSi

^

^

re

Heidegger uneovers in Kan
t almost the same
structures of tnougnts
and options in the
modem a 9 e as does Blumenberg.
This a5 z
,

mentioned before, is not
surprising sinoe Blumenberg
often replies
directly to Heide gg er.
In

Kant „eide gg er finds that
a se lf -assertion

whioh oan be plausibly
described as free requires
towards the thing,

a g entier

attitude

otherwise self-assertion fails
on its own terms.

But rather than findin
g this attitude disabled by
metaphysical and
ontolo g ical structures, „eide
gg er finds instead that it relies on
them.
Kant's interpretation of the
thing, then, is enabled by and
in turn

enables a deeper insight into
metaphysics and ontology.

Heidegger's gloss,

I

From

would draw the opposite of Blumenberg's
conclusion;

the loss of the 'medieval'
questions is

a

source of anxiety.

The loss

of teleology, the loss of the
correspondence theory of truth, the death
of God, and the obscuring of the
ontological question all mean that

modernity also loses its free relation
to the thing.
still requires, more than has any other
age,

a

Yet modernity

relation to things.

The

.
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,

reiation

or mimetic
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^

telation

MichPl F^'n-ilt

^^^in^37

Michel Foucault also asks
about the

modern relation to objects,
especially its objects of stu
dy
But where
Blumenberg discusses the threshold
of natural science and
technicity,
and where Heidegger concentrates
on the threshold of philosophy,
.

Foucault offers

a

comparative study of the human
sciences.

Where

Heidegger discovered that modern
self-assertion presupposed an ontology
which it squanders thoughtlessly,
and with which, if we took stock
of
it,

we might proceed with dove-like
steps towards a freer and less

domineering relation to things, Foucault
finds that the human sciences
are riddled with the imperative
to duplicate and reduplicate localized

versions of the ontology of self-assertion.

Foucault also finds
RSiiUXm,

a

ElATS

and he would find much to commend in the
Heideggarian

interpretation given above.

37.

central text in Kant's Critique of

Heidegger had found that Kant's faculty of

Michel Foucault, The Order of Things. An Arrh.Poin^ of thf
(New York: Vintage Books, 1973)

Science;? ,
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.
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understanding was

bnt-h

experience, as experience
cf objects, pui>biDie.
possible

m

by

Objects.

Heifer

Both

«

_

^

and Blumenberg take
this t o be an act of

Anthropology; what is
discovered ta

donnas itself.

^

conducti „ 9

^

Kant arrived at the

,

transcends!

t be

subject which experiences
ana

Kant tbns articulates
what Foucault calls

that which both knows
and provides

of

^

man as

experiences an d through tbat
,
very experience, provides
tbe ground or
experience in ge neral. M an,
accor ding to Foucault, is
tbis alliance of
tbe empirics! an d tbe
transcendental, an d defined
tbis My , obviously
would be a recent phenomenon
peculiar to modern western
culture.
,

Foucault actually plays down
Kant's role in creating man.
Kant,
says Foucault, was merely
worried about grounding natural
science.
The
more ambitious project of knowing
man, which Kant admitted in
"Was ist
Man" he couldn't complete,
is left to the human sciences.

These

sciences operate in much the same
way as Kant 'a understanding; the
empirical is known through an a priori
which acts as the transcendental

ground for the empirical.

The a priori both renders possible
knowledge

Of the empirical, and at the same
time is what one knows.

this structure of knowing could lead
to either
if properly acknowledged,

a

For Heidegger

dreamlike science or,

to a freer relation to objects.

For Foucault

this sort of claim merely repeats the
tedious to and fro between

positivism, where pre-critical naivete seems
to rule supreme, and

eschatology, in which what we know and what
renders it possible are
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to at

U 3t

be transparently
united; „ here

last become f or - itself
Comte. the positivist

,

in _ itsei£

For Foucault<
phenomenology

.

and Marx

_

eschatoiogisti

,

s

ad

^ ^

_

ce

_

^

unite

projects in „ hat aluays
„ as their

presuppo3ition(
transcendental h a d to sneak
i„ ,the
k
speak in
empirical.
To accomplish this
nergin, of projects,
phenomenology merely chsnged
the point of
application in transcendental
a „a l ys is,. where
Kant had be£ore
after the possibility of
a science of neture,
now phenomenology~ a nd
pr a gm a tism- a sk ab out
the possibility for man
to conceive of himself.
These clsims should become
cleerer below when , discuss
Poucaulfs
section on Ricardo.

^

To ward off a deep insecurity,
modern man relies on things.

According to Heidegger, this
leads Kant to the point of
seeking to know
the I- P rinciple through things.
Thus
the question of the thing was

crucial.

Kant found things to be
essentially

of causality.

a

rule of synthesis, say,

Causality thus reveals to us rocks
and warmth, while

rocks and warmth display

a

fundamental causality.

A causality runs

through things and through ourselves
such that we who know and master
its mechanisms are also those most
subject to its overwhelming order.
This,

of course, need not cause

a

natural scientist to lose sleep.

But

things are different when one seeks in
this same way to know something
about man, when man becomes the thing which
grounds knowledge of man.

.
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****** to know ourselves
through things ieads
moderns
"P03i ti V itieS .. They are:
Life

~ughly, to biology

,

,

Lafcor ,

economics _

—

LMguage

^^^^^^

_

ThsM

^

are not themselves,
according co
toucault, human
h
y to Foucault
sciences, but their
Pr0je0ti ° nS £ li£S
°
'
«e
t render the
human
sciences-say, psychology,
ethnology

-

-

^

,

possihle.
being, and

At any rate man turns
a

speaking being.

Mt

^^

a

a

These
6 P
noaitiv^
osltl ^tres are the
subject of what

Foucault calls the analytic
of finitude.

From Kant, Blumenberg, and
Heidegger we learned that
the basic
claim of self-assertion is
that "the limits of knowledge
provide
positive foundation for the
DossihiHf,,
u
possibility
of knowing, "38 or,

assertion was born in the
incredible
8 idea
Gea of
it,

'

self-

<=
a * Dreyfus
n
as
and Rabinow put

"a being whose verv
very finitude
finUnw Q allows
=
i.
him
to take the place of God. "39

Finitude. as the essential idea
of self-assertion, is no
longer opposed
terra for ter m to the
omnipotent God's infinity, as it
was in the time of
Galileo and Descartes, the time
Foucault refers to as the Classical
age.
No longer is there an operative
divine knowledge which we can

participate in, though only dimly.

Now finitude is self -referential

Foucault, 317.
Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel v«„r»
u lf. R^y nnH
btructuraUsm and H ^ rmenentj r,s (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicaao
Press, 1982), 30.
38.
39.
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expressea a
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limitation,
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In moderni ty we

s tudy

the

£

studies ate oased upon
the

a

priori which is, in

rom us bec a U se it is
what is

s patialit

desires an d appetites in
virtue of uhich
an d the language in
which,

y of the

_
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body

^

^
m
,

assume

in time, disC o ur ses
ate given.

eddied

.

provides the source of
all concrete

finitude is radically
iy otherOther, it is ,k
the

Hai d e gg et.s terms,
what is £u rthest

^

almost

a £ initu de „ hich
ls S el £ - grounding

as fundamental
finitude
ude,

-rest.

finit "de answers
itself

£init e experience o £ man

these

,

a be i„ g

who exists in contrast
with b oth mute animals
and an omniscient God
as
sort of neithernmi,;
„
ncxLxier.
This is to say
that parh
^-f t-K
Y tnat
each of
these positive forms in
which man can learn that
„
t-hat- he is
finite is given him only
against a
background of his own finitude."
it is tnis
»
this a «H
priori,
which is always
needed y et never given, which
animates the human sciences.

a

•

on

whrch man
3

inriSt

40.
41.

being
";:" 7
s

Foucault, 315.
Foucault, 315.

win
a

"
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th e transcendental.

,

first of these attempts
took

"°"

U"

reP6atSd

-

^
^

£rom the natuce o£
seif _ assertion

projects

^

^

uill „ ot revieu
o£ repetition;

-

b ° th

^

t

^

^^

^

^

here

_

T hus, the death
which gnaws at living
things is the »«am„
„
same *fundamental
death on the basis
°£
WCh
6mPiriCal
iS
"
to
the desire that gives
rise
to economic interdependence
is the same fundamental
desire which ..ma.es
everything desirable for
or me,
me-" and fk.
the »•
time in which language
moves
discourses is the same
fundamental time which draws
out m y own
discourse.
Fo ucault finds this
repetition permeates everything
in the
early human sciences; the
transcendental repeats the empirical,
the
ccgito repeats the unthought,
and the return to the origin
repeats the
retreat of the origin.
"From one end of experience
to the other,

^

*~

finitude answers itself."

The problem is that the
positivities, the concrete forms of
finitude, all open upon structures
which submerge us. We are part
of
life which began long ago and
will survive our death; we labor
and toil

within an economy of human making
which no one remembers making or
hopes
to see completed; and we speak

inducted.

a

language within which we were only

Thus we are rooted in contents and
forms much older than

ourselves; life, labor, and language are
always already begun, and they

8

hiSt0rlCity

" hMe

f°U

—
—
— "
~

, t hey subject us t0 .

continual eluda ua
Foucault brings out
some of the main f.*,
f6atUres b y looking at
Rioardo's
notion of ^rsr^u,,
CltY
5lnTO
'
I- worthwhile to
compare
,

"

Poucaulf, account of
scarcity with Bluroenberg
^
do two things at once.

,

s ,,

^

i-nib wij.1

allow me to

During what Poucault
oill3 the Classicai
Galileo an d .escapes,
there was scarcity
because people represent
t0

^

wealth because the land
produces »„ re objects than
are inTOdiately
consu med.
These objects can he eguated
with one another in acts
of
exchange, and therefore can
represent other objects in the
act of
exchange and circulation of
wealth.

Foucault claims that Ricardo
recasts this relation in which
there
was scarcity amid a basic
abundance into a mold of fundamental
insufficiency.

Land,

Ricardo says, can not support
everyone.

So,

Foucault says, "humanity is henceforth
labouring under the threat of
death: any population that cannot
find new resources is doomed to
extinction. "42

Inversely, as people multiply, labor,
because it is done

on more marginal land, becomes
less immediately productive.

everyone, labor must become more intensive.

becomes

42.

a

In this way,

To feed

scarcity

fundamental scarcity and economics no longer
finds its

Foucault, 256.

"
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principle in the intern!
aw of varrous
interplay
representations; where ,
represent
to myself an object
obierr It don t have,
u
or where my commodities
can represent
other commodities
ha„
N ° W thS P rinci Ple of
economics has become not just
quantities of toil, but "rh a
that perxlous region where
life is confronted
with death.
+-

.

^

•

-.

.

Economics, in this way, refers
to an anthropology.

It includes in
its reference the biological
properties of the human species,
it is
related to human poverty and
hunger, and it sets human
labor over
against death.
This is the economic side
of what Foucault calls the

"anthropological hollow" within which
modern thought sleeps.

its main

economic tenet is that economic
man is not representing his own
needs to
himself, but rather "spends, wears
out, and wastes his life in
evading
the imminence of death."

Economics is thus

a

study of finitude, and

Ricardo studies finitude through its
concrete forms, for instance,
population.

But population and its fluctuations
call forth a history,

and history turns out to have its own
concrete forms of finitude.

Ricardo 's economic history runs something
like this:

used to be
a

a sign of the

land's

f ruitf ulness

.

Rent of land

For Ricardo high rent is

sign that marginal land is being over-cultivated.

New population

provides new workers for industry, but also forces new
land into
cultivation.

This is because if a day's toil is worth the amount
of

food and shelter it takes to get the worker through

a

twenty-four hour

period, if real wages remain constant, it will take new
cultivation to
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feed new work^r=?

BUt m

" 91nal

l3nd

estivation and work
than the prime lands did ar^ <-u
did, and the coats
of production in the
marginal
area will be higher
.

^^_

^

indispensable, unless
industrial workers ate per
mit ted to starve, the
production coats in the m
arginal areas determine
the ptice of wheat
This means that producers
in the mote fertile
ateas can make higher
Profits, and thus iandiotds
can iease these iands
for higher rents.

This is the basia of
Ricardo's theory of the falling
rate of
indnstrial profit.
Because coat of subsistence
rises, entrepreneur's
must, to make real wages
remain the same, raise the
nominal value of
wages.
Thus as ground rent rises,
and marginal land is cultivated,
industrial profits must decline.
However it does not dwindle to
nothing, since there is a point
at which entrepreneurs
refuse to hire
any new workers.
this po i nt the labor force
stagnates, population

«

remains constant, no new tracts of
land are cultivated, ground rent
reaches

a

ceiling, and no longer pressures
industrial profit.

The tide of History will at last
become slack. Man's finitude
will have been defined-once and for
all, that is, for an
indefinite time. 43

In this way Ricardo's History presupposes,

at least as an a

priori, the end of History, a time when labor
will limit itself to
needs, and when.

43.

Foucault, 259.
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"...any additional
agricultural
=k
population would perish!
1*
lift
and
the other, surface
to surface b
both
° th
reciprocal antagonism 44
i

TV*

™° b ^i«d

m

R icardo, History is
give n concrete

far as "man as a natural
being
y
of a reply to Blumenberg.
g.

is

f inite
unite.

forms.-

Thus

«*
eXaCtl *
and reinforced by

labor, production,

we have the beginning

According to
n tt
Foucault, in Ricardo we
can see
,

t-

how modern anxiety breeds
itself.
The more man makes himself
at home ln
in the
rho heart of the
world, the
further he advances in hi.
*** nore
also does he feel the
pre
f-rtude, and the closer he
comes to his own death 45

™

v,

.

LSreTn™ ?

Ricardo-

s

T^'

History, then, can be taken
as a dramatization of an

anthropological situation,

a

situation which is carried forward
by

History and its changes, but which
does not itself change.

History is

merely the way, says Foucault,
that the anthropological situation
brings
itself closer to its own impossibility.
By this Foucault means that

nineteenth century economists— Ricardo
and Marx-longed for
"anthropological truth to spring forth in
its strong immobility."

Ricardo looks towards

a

gradual slowing down, as though by half-lives,

and a final stasis in which, with no
more cultivation at the margins, no

44.
45.

Foucault, 260.
Foucault, 259.

.

more pay raises, no more
rontrent increases, „o new
population, no excess
Paction, there will be no more
too, tot finitude to
elude itself.

^™ti*T^ Mur
v^?r
b

o£ everythin9

hide

SXhausted a11 the possible
elements that tena to"
»„J h"*
time his anthtopoLgica^aSness^r
°£

^

Rioatdo, of coutse, is not
alone among sooial scientists
in
resenting people for their
„u» strategies in eluding anthtopological
truths

Marx, on the other hand,

revolution.

sought the end of History through

History is negative; now.

Labor is alienated; now.

But

labor produces infinitely more
than it is paid, so that new
labor is
continually hired, so that the number
of people held by History at

subsistence level ceaselessly grows.

production and underemployment.

Eventually this causes over-

Others might see these disasters as

part of the natural order of things,
but workers, and they alone, can
see through to the real meaning of History.

They will understand that

this finitude is a human creation which
alienates them from
finitude.

46.

truer

Workers can restore this truer form, but to
do so they must

first reverse or suppress History.
that has

a

a

transparent form.

Foucault, 260.

Then

a

truer time will begin, one
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^

Md Matx s
^
lot of excitement
anymore; nerther
neither do their positivist
brethren.
But
FO " CaUlt lnSiStS
*>
finitud e upon itself
ls
StU1 " lth
USing
Pte „„ Knolo9y and
perhaps
,

s

,
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£inltude
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BWnoer^

note

.

featurss o£

e xamlnations of Kant
and

^

^

our modernity.

Both Foucault and Blumenberg
agree about the metaphysical
basis
for the early modern, or
Foucault- s Classical, age, the
time of Galileo
and Descartes.
Self-assertion in that age was
based on a metaphysics of
infinity; human action and
knowledge was held over against
divine
knowledge.
This meant, observes Foucault,
finitude is an external

condition imposed upon human beings.
less than does God.

It merely means people see
vastly

Finitude is thus not

a

fundamental finitude, but

just a result of our status as
fallen beings.

In this setting

representations could be linked discursively
to what is.
think, therefore

within

a

I

am" "was accomplished within the
light of evidence

discourse [which] articulates one upon the
other what one

represents to oneself and what is. "47

47.

Descartes- "I

Foucault, 311
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—re

an d hu m a„ nature used

-agination an d mem or y used to

^

_^

^^^

re »o rt nature's ran dom
chronology

Thought a„ d ceing ooul d co
me together in disoourse
But
Blu menb erg, we k no„ that
such an epistce presupposes
an o^ipotent hut
absent go d
Goc, s fcnowleoge would
be whole where ours is
partiai, clear
where ours is fuzzy.
.

,

.

After reading

Xh^^^jnu^ we

can see that almost

immediately self-assertion abandoned
this metaphysics and began
searching for its own self-grounding.
We have observed Kant's efforts
in this regard.

Ee^n

The new metaphysical stance in
Kant's

is that understanding itself,

as the faculty of rules,

is itself

the condition of the possibility
of understanding anything at all.

And

understanding is, in turn, the condition
of possibility of experience at
all.

Along with this self -grounding Kant can
completely overturn the

ontological argument for God's existence and
displace the centrality of
the principle of contradiction.

He is able to accomplish both these

things, Foucault shows us, because God's
knowledge, power, and

especially infinity no longer stand surety for human
finitude.

With this we can understand American pragmatism's hostility
to
Kant.

Richard Rorty's attacks on Kant's rhetoric as too technical, too

obscure, and too abstract all imply that

a

simpler more direct language

U

a " ailable 48
-
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together in
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Classical disoourse
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„ hece

tMngs
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_
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,

representatiQns
way which makes
self -asserto
assertion
relatively unproblematic
49
i

Ho " ev

"'

Plamt3

aphysics tryin9 instead
t0
encoura g e a dialogic
structure Qf devslopment>
There
,

u ^

anchor this dialogue
,

would point out that suoh
a

a c

self-reflecting positivity;

^

ltment

_u

^

iangua9e

^ ^

duplicating Kant while
wnxxe seeming
seem-inrr to oppose
him. 50

^

^

^

At first it might seem
that Blumenberg escapes
this sort of
criticism since he is closer
to K a nt, end implicitly
edmits it, even
thou gh he too chempions . dia
l ogic struoture Qf

^^^

Blumenberg else ag rees with
Foucault over how and why early
moderns
understood nature in terms of a
fundamental scarcity. 51 Under
pressure
from absolute Will, he says, the
Classical
a ge

broke up into two guasi-

political groups; those defending
God's absolute interests

a nd

those wh O

responded by asserting, equally
absolutely, the interests of man.

Soon
he discovers that these interests
are insecure and that self-assertion
is fundamentally an assertion
against nature's fundamental inadequacy
to

provide for human happiness.

Under conditions of insecurity man self-

Richard Rorty, Philosop h y and the irror of
M
N.tnro (Princeton, N.J
Princeton University Press, 1979), 147-64.
49. Foucault, 338-9.
50. For a criticism of Rorty see William E
Connolly, "The Mirror of
America," in his Politics and Ambigu ty
(Madison, WI University of
Wisconsin Press, 1987.), 116-26.
51. Compare Foucault, 368 with Blumenberg, 197-200.
48.
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fundamental capacUy
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to be positivist at ail
all.
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aajustment>
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^

when
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^^^
^

fundamentai
•

B lum en berg

u

not trying

ust as for Foucault
phenomenology

is

transcendentalism becomina
coming, in
in
u. emphasis
u
its
on the life world,
positivistic in spite
UoMt so pragmatism
sdi1-p of itself,
is a way in whioh
.

Positivism can become, in its
emphasis on human plasticity,
ontological
in spite of itself.
Just as causality

_^

^

Kant's sunny rock, and
juSt as scarcity was the
positive content of
Ricardo's History, pragmatic
adjustment is the positive
content of

pragmatism's version of man-and

I

almost wrote 'Dasein'.

Blumenberg thus sees quite clearly
why positivist sciences had
to
fail, and he is worried that
Heidegger's search for being will
degenerate into

a

search for an absolute substance
which will be too

decisionistic and will squeeze out any
hope for modern freedom.
Yet, he
would think Ricardo was on the
right track, and that self-assertion
might still, by remaining in a
dialogue with its own technical
developments and failures, solve its own
problems.

Besides, he would

ask Foucault, what else could we really
do?

Foucault

's

replies in his later years seemed to say that
we must

continue to be Kantian, that is, continue to
be self-assertive while
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continually testing the
boundaries
ies of self
self-assertion to see whether
they
have given way. 52

Still

I

believe Blumenbera.

in

order to save sel£ . assettion

_

requires the metaphysics
of the Classical age<aye, mat
that is
M genealogy
is, his
works because it shows why
self-assertion ha d to oppose
the metaphysics
of Absolute Will.
He makes self-assertion
rely on the opposition
between man's knowledge and
God's knowledge, and shows
how crucial it
was to overcome this
metaphysics.
But what makes secularization
theory
and Heidegger so suspect is
that they seem to be, at least
according to
Blumenberg, championing the
Absolute half of the opposition.
Leaving
aside that this is not a particularly
exciting interpretation of

Heidegger in

a

book which contains very exciting
interpretations of

everyone else, the fact is that
Blumenberg-

opposition to Classical metaphysics.

s

text works by kindling

Embraced or opposed, this

metaphysics is still the basis of
self-assertion; it is the only
metaphysics Blumenberg considers.
Basic P roblems, and What is

a

The

OrrW

^

thh^, coupled with

^

Thing? allows us to examine more closely

modernity's own metaphysical stance and the
eclipse of that of the
Classical age.

Classical metaphysics is no longer available
even as

something to oppose.

52. Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" in Paul Rabinow,
editor,
The Foucault, R eader (New York: Pantheon Books, 1884), 32-50.
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It also makes a

different
ference that we extend
the discussion of
selfi-v,

*.

assertion into the areaa
of
th* khuman sciences.
ot the

^cations

fo r our oonoern „ ith
ocgani2atio

™

This
mis, nf
of course, has

_

^

«-

office does not make us
ao suspicious as d0
those „ hich hite
their top l9ve! positions
practitioners of
human scienoes
-re the personnel department,
the

consume, research division
whioh bothe

^

„ „

^

^ ^

^

^ ^

as

^^
^

as Weber supposed, that
we object to the pervasive
rationality of

bureaucratic processes, though
in the previous chapter
Cf reasons tor being
uncomfortable

,

^

gave a number

with that too, but „e also
feel

uncomfortable with the substance
of their missions.
unable to thin, of any reason
to oppose them.

Vet,

we may be

But now we can at least

harbor the suspicion that these
agencies work to corner finitude,
trying
to force it to confront itself;
but also that every attempt
to corner it
merely drives it further back.
Every attempt to discover, say,
why men
are so much more violent than
women will either become positivlst;

seeking a gene, a secretion,

a

physical underdevelopment, or

a

societal

deviation, or it will become transcendental;
seeking the violent

priori of

a

a

society such as ours in rapism, misogamy,
or domination.

When these two strategies turn out to
be unsatisfying we will turn to
interpretive approaches.

These last will have their value, not the

least of which is that they are difficult
to routinize into an

organizational approach, but they will succeed by changing
the point of
impact of the study from objects to self-analysis.

Foucault predicts

that this project will likewise finally be unsatisfying,
leaving the

.
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field open again to posi t i
vistic approaches

,

if

^

no

because they are easily
organized.

D

•

Concl

lisi

^^

nn

in every chapter so far,
one event keeps coming up over
and over,

in too many ways to be systematized,
the event which Nietzsche called
the death of God.
Here I have specified it a little
more closely as the

struggle with omnipotence.

At one point in our history,

all

spirituality became concentrated in the
notion of an absolute Will.
as absolute,

spirituality had to flee from the world.

But

This seems to

have opened, very briefly, an era of
freedom in the Classical age, but
it gave way almost immediately to the
dream of a return of a stony

stasis, much as the stony ghost arrives at
Don Giovanni's house for

dinner.

But if this uncanny guest from the future
has failed to appear,

failed to set limits on our desires and impositions,
perhaps we must
learn to get along without expecting him.

All three authors consulted

in this chapter agree more or less with this characterization,
and all

three are trying to come to grips with the situation left in the
wake of
this one event

I

began this discussion of our epochal threshold with Hans

Blumenberg'

s
'

s

account of the second overcoming of Gnosticism, which we

might also designate as the death of omnipotence, or, in terms of the

.
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history of thought, Kantian
self-assertion
assertion.

This second overcoming
of
Gnosticism, which has c1mt-i„
clearly been unsuccessful,
and which leaves one
hoping that a third overcoming
will not be necessary,
necessarv iisS the
,h
experience
of the God of of
salvation-s radical separation
from the world.
Selfassertion was an attempt to
make this loss irrelevant
by grounding human
thought and action upon itself.
But along with the Absolute's
withdrawal there followed several
important consequences; doctrines
of
scarcity, a search for a proper
relation to things driven by an
existential anxiety, and the inability
to articulate an ethics.
Modern
organizations are often driven by axx
all three
i_nree, out
hut It will consider only
the last one, the lose of
ethics.
i

Without

a

beneficent cosmos, nothing like an
order of the world

was available from which to derive,
say, principles of wisdom or

principles of the city. 53

For us,

says Foucault, morality consists in

restoring language to what is mute, or
destroying social myths, or

reanimating what is inert.

Thus it is naive to ask, as does Blumenberg,

for a list of our options so that we may
choose among them.

with Richard Rorty, simply establish
for this,

a

Nor can we,

morality by decision.

The reason

says Foucault, is that Aristotelian receptivity
is gone, or,

as he actually puts it,

thought is no longer theoretical.

Optional

choices and decisions could never be accepted as an ethics
today,

because they are much more aggressive than ethical formulations could
allow

53.

Foucault, Order of Thing s,

321
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As soon as [thought]
functionor repels, breaks dissoclat^
but liberate and enslaved

°" ends
" „*<
It-

""""

°r

—

or reconciles, attracts
r6Unite3; il c
>»lP
<=

This does not mean merely
that the sciences of man
are
inextricably bound up with ethics
and politics; but "more
fundamentally,

modern thought is advancing
towards that region where man's
Other must
become the Same as himself."
Modern morality tends to incorporate
more
and more into its order of things,
yet always discovers the remainder,
that which eludes and mocks it.

Moral progress can easily become
a 'bad

infinite' or as stressed in an earlier
chapter, freedom loses itself in
mimetic desire.

Suppose we require
morality.

a

government agency to implement

a

modern

Suppose we wish to, say, liberate minority
constituents by

busing their children to school in parts of
the city other than where
they live.

Other constituents experience this busing as
an impositi.
Lon

on their right to control the character of
their own communities.

And

since in this case the policy was set by courts, the
time-honored

sanctity' of the court is also called into question.

The court is

openly made into an agency for pushing partisan political demands.

When

morality is this controversial, modern people seek the aid of powerful
government agencies.

Foucault, of course, speaks at the level of

thoughts and texts, but the problems he uncovers have

54.

Foucault, Order of Things

,

328.

a

bearing on

..
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public administration.

The
ine loss of
nf the
hh. cosmos and
of omnipotence is one

powerful drive behind people

Probations

at all.

.

s

turning to

state

„ orality la unsettled

possible a thrivin, democratic
poUtics;

^ ^

^^

^u

>rming

^
^^^^

cieariy

mates

miotic and resentful bureauoratic
positions.

Unfortunately nany of
these latter are done in the
na me of so.e one or the
other of the hu m an
sciences

Finally, the notion of mimetic
desire seems to give us some stance
from which to unravel modern
organization with its discontents, but
after the discussions of this chapter
we can see that its force is
not
so much that of a spiritual
Archimedean point as that of a language
of
s omeone

of

in foreign captivity.

The figures of speech, the very
language

freedom and liberation and alienation which
the captive must use, are

all borrowed from the language of the
captors.
of

freedom in this strange tongue?

How can one sing a song

And yet, it is the only available

language

Blumenberg could show,

I

think, through the relation of neo-

Platonism to Gnosticism that the concepts of mimesis, as found
in
Kierkegaard and Girard, presuppose
have even owed

a

a

Gnostic cosmology.

debt to Marcion's writings.

Kierkegaard may

Mimesis is the concept of

an inauthentic structure of desire imposed upon us by our situation of

being radically cut off from the Good-principle.

Our perceptions and
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especially our self-knowledge
age, are k
Pn . *from their true
kept
content by the
illusionist demiurge.

Foucault-s explication of
man and his doubles; of
man as reduced
and promised, as the being
whose 'in-itself longs to
be
f or-itself
certainly shows modern thought
to be a fragmentation
into a series of
-

,

"regional ontologies" which in
turn seem to proliferate

a plethora of
regional gnosticisms, any of
which might give rise to an
aspiration for
an authentic freedom of which
it can never even formulate
an adequate

conception.

Self-assertion thus becomes

a

sort of Babylonian captivity

in which we endlessly sing
songs of freedom in Babylonian.

Clearly an analysis in terms of
mimetic desire repeats the
structures of reduction and promise.
Hawthorne, the

positives had reduced

Elton Mayo discovered that at
workers to being maximizers of

economic utility and thus subordinated them
to incentive systems.

Shunning Marxist eschatology, Mayo offered
his own, based not on class
conflict but on existentialist cooperation.

in so doing he made an

important contribution to social analysis,
one which no strictly

economic theory could ever provide, but the
"Organization of the
Future", as Chris Argyris calls it, rests in

a

promise that more

transparent relations might be achieved someday.
show that Management and the Worker is

a

It would be easy to

very skillful development, but

still only the latest trick, of the analytic of finitude.
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It should even be
possible to show that where
pragmatism Is a

'Positivism trying to acguire
sensitivity to esohato log ioal
criticisms
existentialism and phenomenology
are 'eschatoloo^,escnatoiogies -trying to be less
v*jr

alienated from daily life

.

But „ hile

^^

•

^

thQught o£

not escape the analytic
of finitude, and while it
relies on the very
structures of Gnosticism it
opposes, it still maintains the
possibility
o£ finitude'
s criticizing itself, of undermining our
allegiance to

modern moralities of incorporation
even while we participate in
them.
Whether this is simply unhappy
resignation, or the opening of a new
space for freedom

I

simply don't know.

I

will conclude this study by

showing how this concept of mimeticism
might be included in
analysis of modern organizational life.

a

Weberian

CHAPTER

A

WEBERIAN

TYPOLOGY

V

OF

A MIMETIC

in the preceding, the authors
whose works

I

WORLD

studied employed

a

number of structural triads:
Theology-Cosmology-Anthropology,
Aesthetic, -Ethical-Religious,
Life-Labor-Language.
will also mention a forth triad,
George W.

Toughness.
I

S.

in this chapter

I

Trow's Spirit-Manners-

It will be the purpose of this
short chapter to tie as best

can some of these triads together.

I

will do this by looking at

Donald Mcintosh's interpretations of Max
Weber.

Weber's typologies form

a

starting point for Mcintosh.

Weber's

aesthetic, ethical, and religious are all possible ideal
types which he
finds are required by material interests.

and other thinkers

I

1

For Kierkegaard, Elton Mayo,

have covered, there is an underlying presupposition

that material interests by themselves cannot motivate action.

interest is also required.

An ideal

Certainly, says Mcintosh, Weber agreed.

Once basic material needs are satisfied, materialism is an external

motivation.

The actions one performs have no meaning of their own, but

are merely a means to material satisfactions.

1.

12

Donald Mcintosh, "Weber as
(1983)

a

Critical Theorist," Theory and Society

75.
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,

The battle, then, is
often over „ hich id6al

and direct material
interests
StSl
notes,

prevail

^

Thi,
Thls 13 ver Y important since,
Weber

full scale rationalization
requires strenuous effort and

strenuous effort requires
motivation.

Mcintosh also finds that Weber
deals with the Theology-CosmologyAnthropology triad. These are
components of the religious ideal
type.

AH

religions, Weber believed, once
they grow beyond mere mysticism
must
begin posing and answering three
questions; "What is the realm of
the

supernatural like, what is its relation
to this world, and what are the
consequences for human life?«2 They must
ask these questions, Weber
thought, because as religions become
established, they become more
rational and ethical, and as they become
more rational they give rise to
the theodicy question; why do bad things
happen to good people, but even

more important for this study, why is
there

a

difference between destiny

and merit?

We have also noted that expansion in any one
element in the triad,
say,

of theology,

results in an expansion of the other two.

But the way

that worked in this particular case was that the realm
of the

supernatural became so absolute that it might as well be absent.

Once

beneficence was taken away, instrumental action became necessary, and
social hierarchies became questionable.

But the triad,

in Calvinism

2. Donald Mcintosh, "The Objective Basis of Max Weber's Ideal Types,"
History and Theory 16 #3 (1977), 272. C.f., also Mcintosh (1983), 93.
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and,

for this discussion,
in early New England, had
been the source of
anxiety and of ascetic
motivation.

At this point Mcintosh
reconstructs a part of Weber-

s

model of

rational action.

Weber had asserted that action
directed at values, or
ultimate ends, finally fails at
the level of meaning. 4 This
is because
if a saintly person refuses
to ever use any questionable
means, no

matter what the end, then the saint
is obviously willing to give
up the
worthiest ends, those which give the
saint's life its direction and
meaning.

This is simply irresponsible, Weber
thinks.

But then, notes

Mcintosh, Weber is unwilling to admit
that Jesus or St. Francis were

merely intellectually confused about what
they wanted.
says Weber,

With these men,

"this ethic makes sense and expresses
a kind of dignity."

So perhaps Weber occasionally thinks
that the ethic of utlimate ends

does sometimes work at the level of meaning.

Mcintosh seizes on Weber's term 'expression.'

Perhaps the problem

isn't that Jesus' actions are incomprehensible, but
that Weber's

instrumental concepts for understanding it are inadequate.

Some action

isn't describable in means/ends terms because it is expressive.

As

expressive, it still can be judged as more or less rational, but not in

instrumental terms.
asceticism.

3.
4.

One might apply this to New England Puritan

The Protestant work ethic, Weber often stressed, is closely

Mcintosh (1983), 98.
Mcintosh (1983), 81-82.

5
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related to an anxiet over
y
whether or not one is saved
Weber himself
tried to understand this
in inst rental terms.
Good works in one s
calling "are a technical
means, not of purchasing
salvation out of
getting rid of the fear of
damnation,' But in an ethically
expressive
action, notes Mcintosh, "The
worldly activity of such a
blessed person
gives a concrete behavioral
expression to [the] sanctified
state."
.

,

ethiC ° f WOrldl —ticism to
ITe ^ttef buHoef °n
achieve worldly success knows
in his heart
thtt he
h! has
t
that
not u
been saved.
He nevertheless continues
to endeavor
to act well, because that is
God's commandment
if,
0
v
success does arrive, this is taken
to mean that God has aided
one's efforts and hence that one
is a member of the etect
Tne
meanrng 1S reflected in the results
of the action.
.

In this case there is also an
element of interpretation.

notes

a

result and then finds an explanation.

This,

One

according to

Mcintosh, is in keeping with the nature
of magical action, which, as

opposed to scientific predictive rationality,
is postdictive.
Mcintosh's second revision of Weber, then, is
to add

interpretively rational action.

a

type of

The examples fall into two categories,

ceremonial action and magical action.

Given all this, Mcintosh believes that Calvinism's incredible

ability to motivate action stemmed from its amazing ability
to integrate
three modes of action, the practical-instrumental, the ethical-

instrumental (c.f., saving souls), and the ethical expressive; or more

5.

Mcintosh (1983), 98-99.
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Precisely, he says these .odes

"a,

differentiated,

integrated in the most thoroughgoing
fashion."

rationalized, and

That is, these modes

were not part of a homogeneous
social matrix, as in primitive
societies,
but analytically separable,
with each element consistently
developed,
yet made to work as a part
of a unit.

Of course, historically we know
that the practical-instrumental

mode dominated.

Weber notes that as one mode is
rationally developed,

it tends to do so at the expense
of the other modes in its

configuration; they become less and less
rational or underdeveloped.

In

the United States these other modes have
tended to remain as possible

critics of the rational-instrumental, but
they remain unable to sustain

themselves as dominant modes.

It might be helpful to follow this
story

through some of the organizatinal literature
mentioned in this
dissertation.

First of all

I

noted that the work ethic and the ethical-religious

parted company somewhere around 1775, and certainly after the
American
Revolution.

Mcintosh recounts this loss of the ethical-expressive in

the following way:

The person who has the reputation for practicing this [the work]
ethic finds ready credit and trusting customers, and so is likely
to succeed.
This presupposed a community in which one is known,
personally or by reputation. But as capitalism advances, the
units of economic interaction become larger, and social mobility
within and between such units increases. More and more, one
cannot evaluate in advance the good faith of the person with whom
one is dealing.
The result of this situation in which neither
party can rely on the good faith of the other is the proliferation

269

At first there was a tight
fit between the ethical expressive
and

the practical instrumental,
but economic expansion and the
loss of faceto-face relations undermined the
trust required by expressive

rationality.

Consequently ethical behavior became
less and less

a

guarantor of success.

What

I

must explain is how it is that as the
doctrine of

omnipotence receded, the anxiousness which drove
economic expansion in
the Puritan era did not also recede.

that we are dealing with

a

triad.

The answer, it seems to me, is

The cosmology and anthropology

associated with omnipotence were still those developed
under the sway of
the theodicy problem.
nature,

Especially in the Newtonian understanding of

and in the anthropology associated with an infinite
universe

riddled with scarcity, we can still note that they were first

articulated in response to the God who may as well not be there, since
he provides no clues or direction in His creation.

However, though in

the United States worldly success and personal worth remained tightly
connected, once omnipotence receded as the dominant doctrine, they were

never again so close as they had been in Puritan times.

6.

Mcintosh (1983), 100.
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in Mcintosh'

3

terms,

in Puritan times
institutional

n<
lorms

Prescribed behavior „ hich was
believed to be morally good
in itself.
But there was »a heavy
emphasis on the goal of worldly
succe ss in a
situation where the opportunities
to achieve such success by
good faith
action [were) restricted."
This created the possibility
of two sorts of
responses.

One could continue to accept
the culturally defined goal
of
worldly success, but precede by
unethical or illegal means. Or,
one
might reject the goal of worldly
success while remaining loyal to
the
ethical norms.
In tne
in
the* Tin-it-oH
United States thxs meant that one
could become
the 'nice guy who finishes last.'

What strategies are available to this
nice guy?

Mcintosh lists

three ideal typical responses: ritualism,
retreatism, and rebellion.

Advocates of alternative politics in the
United States often in practice
mix these types in various proportions.

In this study

I

am least

interested in rebellion, but will consider variations
of the other two.
Such oppositional stances are difficult to sustain
because, says

Mcintosh, in religious terms the ethical-expressive
relied crucially on
hope,

and hope was signified by worldly success.

If one gives up

worldly success, hope is also eroded and it is difficult to
continue to
act faithfully.

In secular terms,

in the world around one,

personal success means lack of personal worth.

lack of

To maintain self-worth

in such a situation would take an exceptional person,

"it is difficult

to continue to act worthily if one is convinced that one is worthless."

The ethical-expressive is also in an equivocal position vis-a-vis legal-

s
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institutional rationality.
Y

The
me ethinyl
«
ethical-expressive
must regard the legal

system as either ethlcally
meaningless
1156

"

rStreatiSm

"

r6belli -'

^

^^

ethicany

- " -**

9ive UP on itself in favor
of a ritualistic
adherenoa to the letter of
the law.

We can see these various
strategies being worked out
b y so me of
the people mentioned in
this dissertation.
^ong transcendentalists „e
might think of Henry David
ia Thorean
inoreau.77 tk.
y
Thoreau practices retreatism.
this we can see that by
developing a non-instrumental,
and more
expressive, relation to nature,
nature he
h P t-r-io*
tries to formulate a different
notion
of success, one more compatible
with ethical expressivity.
Thoreau-

m

*=

vision of the self arises in this
context as not just
heartless world, but as

a

heartful self which inables

a

haven in

a

heartful world.

a

noted in the first chapter that this
self has affinities with Kant's
practical philosophy, which I have further
specified as self-assertion.
I

It therefore shares some aspects
of the utilitarian culture it
opposes,

especially the need to be able to give its
notion of worldly success,
and with it personal worth, a worldly
form.

Transcendentalist

institutions like Brook Farm tried to do this,
but with limited success.

Certainly Thoreau himself couldn't have joined
the commune, since he

would have been too sceptical that it might become
yet another theyworld.

At any rate,

I

found that the next generation of American

intellectuals did not find it satisfying.

Politically retreatism was

7. My understanding of Thoreau is indebted to Jane Bennett,
Native: Thoreau' s Hermeneutics of Self," Polity in press.
,

"On Being
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unable to respond effectively
to so met h i„ g

Uke

the

slave, problem, and

existentially it was defined too
closely as an opposition to
Kali street
busyness

Jonathan Baldwin Turner introduced
science as an overt strategy
for opposing omnipotence,
social hierarchy, traditional
college
curricula, and slavery.

Scientific farming puts one in touch
with a

cosmology of God's causal laws, while
traditional farming traps one in
ignorance and destroys the land.
Turner
hopes, at the level of

theodicy, to integrate cosmic law and
human ethics in the intelligible
farmer; an individual in an intellectual
community who is materially and

socially successful precisely because he
is good, both to others and to
nature.

During the times of plague Turner rejected any
Aristotelian

receptive ethics, especially as it related to
omnipotence, because it
was just too unfair to assume that those stricken
deserved their fates.
He does,

however, try to retain it to some extent in science.

He

rejects any ethical doctrine based on the world as we find
it, with its

conservative overtones, and champions instead

a

scientific doctrine that

the world as we wisely mold it grants success to good people.

All this, however, turns out to require

a

network of national

organizations: The Department of Agriculture, the Agricultural Extension
Service,

the Land Grant College system, not to mention farm lobby

groups.

The analysis so far allows us to understand why the first

generation to staff these institutions found them so fulfilling.

It was
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that there was finally created
a set of institutions
which seemed to
reunite the ethical-expressive
with the rational-instrumental.
But

after a few decades the
rational-instrumental had completely taken
over
the Department of Agriculture.
The Extension Service became the

employer of experts who wrote the
pamphlets for farmers who ritually
accepted their conclusions. There
was, of course, an encyclopedia
problem.

Individual farmers cannot know what
"we" know, where "we" is

the community of agricultural
scientists.

The individual farmer loses

the direct ethico-instrumental link with
the cosmos, and experts and

support industries swell within the gap.

The farmer may as well be

dealing with omnipotence again.

Turner's attempt, unlike Thoreau's, tried to
integrate the

ethical-expressive back into the culture of success.

But in a large

extended commercial republic around 1862 this had to mean
integrating
the ethical-expressive into the legal-institutional
system.

But,

as

Mcintosh notes, the legal-institutional system, based as it is on
distrust, continually undermines the ethical-expressive.

By the late

1980s when farmers lobby for government support on the basis that the

farming way of life is somehow ethically worth saving for its own sake,
other constituencies in the U.S. only hear

disguised as

a

principle.

Why,

a

crass economic demand

they ask, should farming be the only

business in the country which doesn't have to be cost effective?
Farmers themselves have for so long viewed the Department of Agriculture
in an instrumental light that they can offer no rebutal except lobby-

8
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group pressure.

As some one who has belonged
to , £arm otganizati on and
knows the personal capacity
for virtue o£ American
farmers, I cho se this

example because it see med
to me that if the
ethical-expressive ever
could be integrated into the
legal-institutional syste m , it would
be in
farming or nowhere.

George William Curtis also worries
about the theodioy problem, and
tries to solve it by institutionalizing
merit.
In this he explicitly
tries to recreate the spirit of the
Puritans by attempting to carry

Emerson and Thoreau into the public
realm.
service reform as

attained success.

a

Curtis introduces civil

deliberate check on unethically and illegally
Again the first generation found working
in or with

the Civil Service Commission to be exciting
and fulfilling, but in time

the legal-institutional structure would
make it unlikely that men like

Curtis would find careers in civil service.

Everyone is familiar with

Weber's notions of bureaucratic inflexibility, where
action is taken
only because the rules prescibe it.

Thus,

scrupulous compliance with formally legal rules constitutes
behavior in the strict sense of the term... The difference
between traditional and modern ritualism lies in the source of
authority (traditional versus rational-legal) and the type of
formalism "extrinsive" versus "logical")
In both cases,
compliance with the law is in itself meaningless.
It is up to the
actor to endow the action with meaning, i.e., to fit a meaning to
the behavior.
As it is developed and rationalized, therefore,
modern formalism becomes more and more an interprtetive and less
and less an instrumental or expressive mode of action.
rj tlja:l
-

(

.

,

8.

Mcintosh (1983), 102.

9
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This brings me to the
„or k of Elton Ma o.
y

„ OI „tosh .entions that
in a for-nal or a„i Z ation
9
l ike the Western
Eiectric piant at Hawthorne,
the formal elements
elerapnt-<! of the „
organizatonal structure undermine
its
instrumental elements.
elementThis ™
may be srmply because formal
rules can
sometimes be inefficient6nt ' hutbut +->,•
thls 13 not the interesting
case, since
one might simply i nstate
formal rules which are
<~*-f

<?

^^

interesting case results from the
informal structures which grow
up in
large formal organizatons
That is, workers, faced with
formal rules
.

which seem extrinsic to them,
respond to them with an interpretive
rationality.

Sometimes this rationality enhances
the effectiveness of

the organization, but most often
it limits it.
The modern large scale bureaucracy
presents to the individuals
it an environment analogous to
the natural
environment of members of a primitive
society.
it is a world of
arbitrary personal, and uncontrollable
forces, both meaningless
and inexplicable, to which one must adapt
or perish.
The solution
is to endow this world with a symbolic
meaning which provides a
framework of cognitive and motivational
orientation for the
individual

workmg within

.

While,

in light of Blumenberg's discussions,

we may question

whether this situation is primitive or quintessential^
modern, the
point still holds good.

The small group interpretations of individuals

within large-scale organizations have

a

large bearing on not just how

the organization performs, but on whether or not people can think of

themselves as free within them.

This also brings up another tension;

that between interpretive rationality and the ethical-expressive.

9.

Mcintosh (1983), 103.

For

.
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example

I

mentioned in an earlier chapter
that

a manager motivated
by
the ethical-expressive may
easily be interpreted as
trying to use

psychological trickpn;
rr^-ik'
u
trickery t-^
to get
higher
productivity from workers, even
though what the manager reaily
wishes is tor higher productivity
to be
the expression of honest ethical
relations in the plant. From
Mayo's
work we would expect people to
change their interpretation only
if the
new interpretation wouldn't
challenge the structure of their
current
informal social structure.

Mayo himself tried to bring together
the ethical-expressive, the

practical-instrumental, and rational-interpretive
in Humanistic
Management.

In this, unlike Turner and Curtis,
he doesn't have to

invent the legal-institutional system
since it is already

Again the trick is to tie economic success
to ethics.
in the factory is,

according to Mcintosh,

a

But what he finds

modern form of ritualism.

Of course, the "archenemy of ritualism is
innovation."
a

a given.

Since Mayo's is

truly innovative approach, it is not surprising
that workers

themselves usually put up the strongest resistence to humanistic

management

Bureaucratic ritualism thus constitutes a sclerosis of the main
artery of instrumental progress in the modern system:
technological innnovation .... Bureaucratic ritualism is an at least
partly constructive answer to the problem of the meaninglessness
of action which the members of a bureaucracy face.
By endowing
action with meaning, bureaucratic ritualism provides the
motivational support necessary to the continued existence and
operation of the organization. 10

10.

Mcintosh (1983), 104.

.

.
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Mayo-

s

attempt targeted bureaucratic
ritualism, and correctly

understood that modern instrumental
rationality could not, on it,:s own,
motivate action. He also noticed
that bureaucratic ritualism as
it
presently exists is unhealthy both
for the organization and for
its
members.

He sought, therefore to channel
interpretive activity in a

more healthy direction.

He sought to replace the sick
motivations of

the present with the healthy motivations
of the future, and he saw quite
clearly that neither the ethical-expressive
nor the practical-

instrumental can be maintained for long
unless

motivational base is found.

a

more adequate

However, no one would maintain that his

reforms have taken hold in American business.

The work of Chris

Argyris, insightful though it is, still shows
quite clearly that, as

Weber might say, the institutional-practical is
much easier to
rationalize than are either ethical-expressive or
interpretive

rationalities

Mcintosh notes that Weber's ritual motivation is majical, but
reminds us that magic need not be confined to ritual.

things one hierarchical step further.

Mcintosh takes

Moving from the modern business

to the modern state, he examines the charismatic and magical basis for

the widespread popular support for modern state authority.il

One

problem with Weber's saying that in the modern age everything has become

11. Donald Mcintosh, "The Charisma of Reason: The Magical Basis of
Rational-Legal State Authority," (1986), unpublished manuscript
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disenchanted is that Weber also
so neld
held that t-h«
the magrcal was a crucial
part
of human motivation.
The drying up of enchantment,
Weber believed, was
what made the age so spiritless
and locked it in its iron
cage.
,

Yet

clearly mo dern capitalism and
tne modern state can generate
guite
of enthusiasm.
These institutions

a

bit

have:

•retained

a

vigor

and adaptibility which can only
be accounted
C ° UntSd
xf we are to take Weber's
theories seriously, by t
contxnued sustaining presence of the
magical power of charisma
for

^

12

The ideal interest which legitimates
the modern state

nationalism.

i:
-S

Mcintosh argues that nationalism is
religious; it is "not

the equivalent of religion; it
i*

religion in the literal sense of
the

a

word: the belief in and worship of the
State as

a

supernatural power."

To make this clearer Mcintosh repeats
his analysis of the expressive and

interpretive componants of magic.

The expressive, being concerned with

ethical action is not so interesting in this
context where ritual is no
longer the center of the discussion.

As a pure type magic seeks not to change the world
but to
understand it.
It is an interpretive, not a practical, mode
of
action, even if we use 'practical' in the broad Kantian
sense
which includes ethical and expressive as well as instrumental
action.
Prototypically the magician is a seer, not a doer... 13

Magic is

a

search for meaning,

a

vital part of human life.

Magic

ties into cultural myths, where myth is understood as "an explanatory

12.
13.

Mcintosh (1986),
Mcintosh (1986)
,

4.
8.
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account in narrative
atrve form
fn™ o-f
of 4-u
the orxgxn of the world and
humanity, their
current situation, and often
their ultimate fate." it is
a form of
•

.

explanation in which events are
explained by referring to the
supernatural powers which must have
motivated them.

A viable religion must, in Weber's
terms, combine magical with
ethical ideas.
Ethics keeps magic from being a mere
cult, magic keeps

religion from becoming a secular
creed.

For a long time the modern

state integrated these two, so that
one could think of the state as

furthering the universal interest, or, when
with time no one could

believe that anymore, the national interest,
or, again with time, the
interests of the elite.

But finally in our era the state,
especially

its massive power for destruction, can
not be said to serve any ethical,

practical, or instrumental ideal.
such an awsome presence.

This leaves us wondering why we need

How is it that people are actually willing
to

die for the modern state?

Mcintosh replies that it is in the means of violence that
the
state excersises its magical hold.

Modern weapons possess

a

charisma

and it is the charisma of modern weapons, not their efficiency,
which

makes them attractive.

The modern state has become, not, as Hobbes

thought, an artificial person, but an actual person; in the same sense

that God is

a

person.

While one might reply to this that persons for

instance die and the state does not, surely in this dissertation
shown how and in what sense God also can die.

I

have

Mayo and Roethlisberger
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found at Hawthorne that wooers
often personified the c-pan
s , much as
modern citizens do their state. The
systems of offices and roles
tend
to take on a sort of personhood
of their own which actually
operate in
individual lives the way that a God
does.
Besides, millions of people

willing to die for their states, and
can think of no greater or
more rewarding sacrifice.
seea,

Charisma, according to Weber, must be
constantly bolstered by

repeated magical acts.

The state's use of terror, sayS
Mcintosh, is

what fills this requirement.

State violence takes the form of war

against foriegn enemies, war against internal
enemies, and punishment
for criminal acts; often using torture or
other spectacular acts.

the modern era the cult of the state takes an
instrumental turn.

In

This

is again because a religion is a combination
of magical and ethical

ideals.

The ethic which the modern state espouses is the
ethical-

instrumental, or ethic of welfare.

As instrumental, this ethic, unlike

expressive ethics, can also be political, and this gives it access
to

political violence.

Matters are easier where the ethic is primarily instrumental.
Here it is above all the act of violence which simultaneously
serves the earthly purposes and proves the supernatural powers of
the leader. 14

Viewed this way, the value of the matchlock musket in the 15th
century, did not lay in its supior ability to efficiently kill people

14. Mcintosh

(1986)

,

29.
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Actually, it wasn't very much
more effective
euive than
man the crossbow for
long time.
But,

a

were

The French Revolution took major
steps in the rationalization
of
violence.
"The guillotine is a grisly symbol
of scientific efficiency
in the administration of death."
But nationalism also made the
mas sive

conscripted citizen army possible, and
Robespierrie connected the
cultivation of virtue to the excercise of
terror.

But,

"The ultimat e

proof of charisma in the Modern era lies
in the possession and use of

nuclear weapons."

I

find all this makes

a

certain amount of intuitive sense, and

Mcintosh is not the only one who thinks the modern
period is becoming
more and more fixated on rational violence.
Of

BatMe l6

John Keegan in his The FacP

at one point compares modern battle to modern

mountaineering, and in both places finds how increased
technology and

rationalization has led to

a

more and more severe emphasis on endurance

at the cost of every other virtue;

15.
16.

he speaks of

"the hard men of the

Mcintosh (1986), 31.
John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: Viking Penguin, 1985),

304-15.
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•Winter Eiger Direct
,
filthy,

^

,

smelly snow holes. "17

Or George W.

S

.

Trow, writing in the

^^ ^^
^

Ne^rJ^ig

finds upon

examining the textual strategies
of Harvard University alumni
Publications over the years that
at one time the Harvard man
was a
mixture of spirit, manners,
and toughness.
It was this particular
combination which allowed Harvard
to be a backwater for American
society, an institution which
could shelter something like the
Blackrock
Forest from the mainstream
utilitarian ethos. After the First
World
War, spirit was collapsed
into manners, and finally in the
1970s manners
were collapsed into toughness.
In this way we get talk of making
tough

realistic decisions, but with
manners.

a

rhetorical evocation of spirit and

Everything has been subordinated to
toughness; and toughness

says that the Blackrock Forest would
be a more lucrative investment if
it were sold.

backwater.

But,

of course,

this means that Harvard is no longer

a

The distinction between Harvard and all
the utilitarian

institutions around it has become rather vague.
trust Harvard to care for

Thus we find

a

a

One would no longer

forest that one wanted protected.

society which increasingly can motivate itself only

with toughness, hardness, or endurance.

These things were always

important components of the American self-image, but now they seem
to
Keegan, 307.
George W. W. Trow, "Annals of Discourse: The Harvard Black Rock
Forest" New Yorker
(June 11, 1984), 44.
17.
18.

,
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-ve

beeoa,e dora inant and
to have thrown

or virtues which used
to temper the,.

Meintosn ana Weber that
there is
abilit, to

rationale

has been easier to

a

.

^^

^

K ee 9 an here uould a9ree

as Kee 9 an points oat,

^

reclprocal relation

ao m inant iaeai ana its
acceptance.

rationale toughness than m anners

^
^

Ciear ly it

or spirit, sinoe,

the reiation between toughness
ana technoiog, is

so tight.

To the extent all this is
true, Mcintosh's thesis of
a charismati

violence and of the state as
its legitimate wielder ma.es
sense.
what, we must ask, do
people find so magioal about violence.

Mcintosh refers to Preud's thesis
in

But

Here

Ci^iliz^^d^^

that people have sublimated
violence in order to live in groups
and

nations.

acquires

Social life demands
a

a

taboo on murder, and thus the state

monopoly over the legitimate use of
violence.

The charismatic appeal of offic ial
violence springs from the fact
that civilization requires the renunciation
of personal violence,
at least most forms of violence
against parents, spouse, siblings
and offspring: precisely those towards
whom we have the strongest
vrolent impulses.
Since one typically identifies with both
punisher and punished, one can simultaneously
have the sadistic
pleasure of exercising one's violent impulses
and the masochistic
pleasure of being punished for having them. These
meanings of
course are mostly unconscious 19
.

This is the only place where

I

would differ with Mcintosh.

It

seems to me that Rene Girard's account of the
scapegoat mechanism offer:

19. Mcintosh

(1986),

30.
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a

-re

dire ot „ ay to unders
t and the same
phenomena

Points to over and over
again

™oio US

drive

" tMa

^

u

the phen

is • »*y

_

^

^
^

what McI „ tosh

.

a

cQiiective

-

«o rking the meanings and
activation, brought forth
by myth into the thoughts
and actiQns of
of tne
nty , and the magical
Qf
'

^ra

^

co»

^

but the power of the
unconscious "20
.

For Girard myth and violence
are also closely connected;
myth is
coverup of a collective murder.
what we find is a collective

a

which uses scapegoats to take
the heat off mimetic and
frustrated
desires.
Thus the need for violence
stems from the social structure
of
desire itself; in this case from
the dominance of instrumental
rationality, and the technical
rationalization of systems of desire.
in
this way Girard would keep Mcintosh's
relation between violence and the
sacred, between magic and ethics,

rationalized violence.

and between personal frustration and

The violent enforcement of ethics
is

ground to develope something like

a

a

prime

scapegoat mechanism.

The source of frustration may be something
more mundane than

unconscious drives.

The civilization of productivity has by now
come up

against numerous physical limits; third world
people are not willing to

labor at starvation levels indefinitely, domestic
oil reserves are
depleted, the earth's ecology may be unable to withstand
unlimited

exploitation, and many people experience the achievement of
affluence as
20.

Mcintosh (1986), 10
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empty and unrewarding. 21

On top of this

I

have noted how various

strategies to reintegrate ethics,
meaning, and

been at best only partially
successful.

instrumental

have all

In Weber's terms,

instrumentalism is by far the easiest of
the three to rationalize, and a
rational reintegration of all three
would be a tall order indeed. Thus
as instrumental rationality loses
its ability to satisfy desire, we
at

the same time put more pressure on it
than ever to do so.

Since

instrumental rationality simply cannot supply
what ethics, or spirit, or

manners used to provide, and since material
success is still the major
source of self-worth and of hope,

I

would expect people to be rather

reluctant to question desire itself, and to rather
seek the source of
their dissatisfaction in exactly those people who are
either the victims
of that desire or who oppose it; the poor, perhaps
the rich, third world

peoples, and domestic criminals, that is, anyone who can be
accused of

undermining the very foundations of society, or of causing
horrendous
ills,

and who carries some mark which sets them off as different.

With this slight and friendly revision of Mcintosh

I

will end my

discussion of the Weberian structure of American organizational reform.

21. William E. Connolly, "Progress, Growth, and Pessimism in America" in
his Politics and Ambiguity (Madison, WI University of Wisconsin Press,
1987), 42-51.
:
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1.

Conr]

^n

Modern organizaton owes its
existence not so muoh to the courage
of Francis Bacon or Galileo,
but to the collapse of omnipotence
in the
everyday lives of sincere people.

It has been the task of this

dissertation to understand how this
happened, what it has meant, and
what we might make of it.
In pursuit of these things I have
explored
variety of existential situations and
organizational reforms,

a

Philosophical systems and interpretive
standpoints, and especially the

characterizations and speculations of Immanuel
Kant.

This is because it

seems to me that Kant was especially insightful
about the nature of

modern freedom and its connection to modern
goodness, and about the
necessity and difficulty of trying to sustain them
both in an
interdependent world.

In the course of his analysis Kant emphasized
a series of themes,

and it is these themes which
this dissertation.

I

have found unify the diverse thinkers in

All agree that the loss of an Aristotelian cosmos,

the separation of theoretical and practical reason, the hope of moral

progress, the rationalization of sensuous desire, and incongruence of

merit and earthly reward are important concerns for an age that seeks to
think of itself as free.

All thinkers in this dissertation also agree

that individualist solutions are impractical, but that ethics is also an

unlikely possibility.

Kant's attempt to solve these issues has not been

287

sucessful, but once we
understand what is at stake, we can
better

understand why the Kantian answers
are so hard to give up.

In line with this,

Kantian approach.

I

have also considered some revisions
of the

By developing some features of
Kant

thought while

s

ignoring others one can get such
different approaches as those of Hegel
and Kierkegaard, but I also found
important Kantian features in
Blumenberg, Heidegger, Foucault, Elton
Mayo, and Clint Eastwood.
However,

I

did not find that any of these approaches
could make

Kantianism succeed, rather, their value lay
in their ability to
characterize the modern situation and articulate
its worst dilemmas.
This finding obviously has not yielded any
optimistic political or

organizational program, but such

a

study of the modern prediciment

cannot help but generate a certain amount of hope.

This is partly because Kantianism has

things

I

a

history.

One of the

have discovered is that once Kant articulated his philosophy,

it did not sit dogmatically above our thought,

but constantly found it

necessary to revise itself until today Kant himself would hardly
recognize it.

What this means in practical terms is simply that human

beings, and even theories, are much more wiley than social theorists

used to suppose.

As soon as we capture people within our conceptual

webs, we find they have somehow escaped us again; sometimes precisely

because they have believed our theories about themselves.
we must revise our theories again and again.

In response

This is not to say that

.
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the discussion of memises above
is meant to apply only to
text:s or
theories; memesis exists also in
existential experience. Yet memisi
s as
a theory can never encompass
all the behavior it purports
to explain.
At some points it will have to strain
itself, and at those points

perhaps we will discover new avenues of
inquiry.

m

other words, what

we don't know may yet help us.

A second avenue of hope lies in the activity
of criticism itself.
By learning our limits and their nature,
we already make them less

formidable.

This is partly because of the subjective
experience of the

theorist; it is hard not to occassionally allow oneself
to wonder

whether it isn't all just words on paper.

But the more serious reason

is that once we have given these things names we
already in principle

look to the horizon beyond them.

dissolve.

In the process they already begin to

This double nature of criticism, that it articulates limits

by becoming less limited, is captured in the following two quotes;
the

first by Karsten Harries, and the second by Michel Foucault

It has become fashionable to answer the problem of spiritual
dislocation by calling for a return to the life-world or to
ordinary language, suggesting that it is only the philosopher
whose disengaged speculations have let him lose his place in the
world.
Such answers are not convincing. Descartes is too much
with us. We have grown too reflective, too free in our thinking
to make this return.
Inseparable from this freedom is the desire
to reincarnate the dislocated spirit, the longing for words that
will let us rediscover where we belong and thus defeat that sense
of contingency and arbitrariness which is the other side of
objectivity.
And yet, in spite of such longing, we find it
difficult to step out of the Cartesian shadow. And when the

289

attempt is made it seems to yield no
more than poetry: we are
offered a vacatxon from reality
rather than its

reveLJon

V

22

^

C ° nClud
nd t0 Come
to Kant.
I do not know whether
win ever reach mature adulthood. Many
we will
things in our
experience convince us that the historical
event of the
Enlightenment did not make us mature adults,
and we have not
reached that stage yet. However, it
seems to me that a meaning
can be attributed to that critical
interrogation of the preset
and of ourselves which Kant formulated
by reflecting on the
Enlightenment.
It seems to me that Kant's reflection
is even a
way of philosophizing that has not been
without its importance or
effectiveness during the last two centuries. The
critical
ontology of ourselves has to be considered
not, certainly, as a
theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent
body of knowledge that
is accumulating; it has to be conceived
as an attitude, an ethos
a philosophical life in which the critique
of what we are is at
one and the same time the historical analysis
of the limits that
are imposed on us and an experiment with the
possibility of goina
beyond them.
'

This philosophical attitude has to be translated
into the
labor of diverse inquiries
1 do not know whether it must be
said today that the critical task still entails faith in
Enlightenment; I continue to think that this task requires
work on
our limits, that is, a patient labor giving form to our
impatience
for liberty. 23

22. Karsten Harries, "Metaphor and Transcendence" in Sheldon Sacks,
editor, On Metaphor (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 7188.
23.

Michel Foucault "What is Enlightenment" in Paul Rabinow, editor, The
Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 32-50.
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